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ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM TO  
A CUMULATIVE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is about a revolutionary technology called distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) and the question of whether the current regulatory framework 
in Estonia and the EU treats it adequately. To this end, the dissertation uses the 
principle of technology neutrality and its sub-principle of functional equivalence 
to assess the regulatory framework. The dissertation focuses specifically on the 
following use cases of DLT:  
 
1. Treatment of bitcoin in comparison with traditional (fiat) currency and the 
treatment of bitcoin exchange service providers.  
2. Treatment of DLT-based shareholder ledger.  
3. Treatment of DLT-based hybrid smart contract agreements concluded 
during Initial Coin Offering (ICO).  
 
The use-case analyses show that DLT replaces some of the typical functions of 
intermediaries and this feature of it should be taken into consideration in regu-
lation as otherwise the regulation could have a bias against the technology. The 
dissertation approaches existing regulation relevant in the DLT use cases from 
the point of view of technology neutrality and functional equivalence in order to 
identify possible biases and map possible solutions under different regulative 
strategies.  
In its introduction, the following analytical compendium explains what dis-
tributed ledger technology is and where it is used; in Chapter 1, the research 
problem, research questions and the field of investigation is presented along with 
the methods and resources used. In Chapter 2, the principle of technology 
neutrality is introduced along with its sub-principles, Chapter 3 discusses alter-
native regulative strategies for DLT regulation and Chapter 4 applies the prin-
ciples to the existing regulatory framework specific to the chosen DLT use cases. 




1.1 Pace of technological change 
The pace of technological innovation and its adoption by users – especially during 
the era known as the digital revolution – is accelerating with immense speed,1 but 
law-making still remains a lengthy process and the delays in its adaptation can 
have unpredictable consequences on the use cases of new technology. This pheno-
menon is known as the Pacing Problem and is often framed as “technology 
changes exponentially, […] legal systems change incrementally”.2 The Pacing 
Problem leads the regulation to have gaps and be unfit for innovative solutions.  
Along with the Pacing Problem, regulators are also experiencing the 
Collingridge dilemma,3 explained as the desire of the regulator to interfere early 
on with a new technology even though the consequences of its application are 
still unclear. This desire is motivated by the fear that, by the time these con-
sequences are clear, “the technology is often so much part of the whole economic 
and social fabric that its control is extremely difficult”.4 However, introducing 
any new regulation when the technology has not fully developed could prove to 
be detrimental to the expansion of the technology5 and create unnecessary hurdles 
to its use cases.  
All of the above must be assessed in the context that, since the 1990s, the digital 
world has grown exponentially with various software languages, applications and 
platforms. According to the Commission’s previous President, Juncker,6 the 
                                                                          
1  According to Larry Downes, the fast pace of technological change can be explained by 
three “laws” governing digital life: Moore’s Law (which means that every 12 to 18 months 
“the processing power of computers doubles while price holds constant”), Metcalfe’s Law 
(“the usefulness of a network is the square of the number of users connected to it”) and the 
Laws of Disruption, which in general mean that the acceleration of the pace of development 
of technology and the spread of their outputs is difficult to manage for the regulator. Moore’s 
Law was named after Gordon Moore, the founder of Intel, who in 1965 made this prediction 
in his article “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits”. Larry Downes, The 
Laws of Disruption: Harnessing the New Forces That Govern Life and Business in the Digital 
Age (Basic Books 2009), pp. 12–17. Metcalfe’s Law was named after engineer and one of the 
founding fathers of the Internet Dr Robert Metcalfe, who was in charge of connecting MIT 
computers to ARPAnet and was later challenged by other scientists. Bob Briscoe, Andrew 
Odlyzko and Benjamin Tilly, ‘Metcalfe’s Law is Wrong’. (IEEE Spectrum, 01 July 2006) 
<https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/metcalfes-law-is-wrong> accessed 20 October 
2020.  
2  Downes (n. 1), p. 17. 
3  David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology, (St Martin’s Press, New York 
1980), p. 11. 
4  ibid. 
5  ibid. 
6  Jean-Claude Juncker was the President of the European Commission from 2014–2019. 
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Digital Single Market is aimed at creating a “level playing field”7 for all that is 
digital, either developed by an incumbent or an innovator. In order to make sure 
the playing field is level for all technologies and applications, regulators need to 
learn about and investigate the impact of existing regulation on the new techno-
logy to ensure that competition and innovation stand a fair chance against the 
technology the existing regulation was built for.  
 
 
1.2 Distributed ledger technology (DLT) 
1.2.1 Concepts 
The above-described regulatory challenges arise especially with distributed 
ledger technologies (DLT),8 which brings about a transformative or disruptive 
innovation9 that influences many layers of society – economic, political and 
social – representing a shift from the current status quo to a society disrupted by 
innovative new constructs infused with new technical possibilities that cross state 
borders and infrastructural barriers. In other words, DLT is a combination of 
technologies that allow multiple parties (nodes) unknown to one another (peer-
to-peer (P2P) networks10) to jointly maintain a resilient digital database (ledger) 
on the basis of a consensus algorithm. The resilience of the ledger is secured by 
the replication of the ledger’s original copy in the computers of these multiple 
parties, the hashing process11 and linked timestamping.12 The resilience does not 
allow data recorded on the ledger to be amended or removed unless the change is 
allowed under the ledger’s consensus policy. The combination of technologies 
bound to DLT aim to achieve transparency, high resilience and tamper-resistance.13  
                                                                          
7  Commission Communication: A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,  
COM 192 final (6 May 2015). <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/digital-
single-market-strategy-europe-com2015-192-final> accessed 20 October 2020. 
8  In the dissertation, for the sake of brevity these are referred to as DLT and used in the 
singular although they bind together a number of different technologies. No separation between 
different technologies that make up DLT or different versions of DLT are made by the author 
in this dissertation. 
9  Julija Kiršienė, Christopher Kelley, Deividas Kiršys, and Juras Žymančius, ‘Rethinking 
the Implications of Transformative Economic Innovations: Mapping Challenges of Private 
Law’, (2018) Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 12/2, p. 50, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2478/bjlp-
2019-0011> accessed 18 March 2020.  
10  Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: Peer-to-peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008)  
<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 12 April 2018. 
11  Hashing is a one-way cryptographic function that turns any text into an illegible string of 
numbers and letters that is unique and consequently, secures that the hashed text is untampered 
with. See Article I. 
12  Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code 
(Harvard University Press 2018), p. 2. 
13  ibid. 
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Although there are many types of ledger14 with different characteristics, the 
primary advantage of most DLT-based ledgers is related to the security and 
authentication of data that is resistant to modification.15 Instead of a single 
administrator, DLT-based ledgers are decentrally controlled by a distributed 
network of nodes.16 Data is controlled under the network’s governance rules and 
consensus mechanism. Furthermore, DLT data records are visible to all users and 
this means that changes in the recorded data are transparent. These features ensure 
certain functions, such as the possibility to track, trace and gain transparent 
oversight of all records on the DLT ledger. Consequently, DLT is a fusion of 
technologies that promote cooperation and trust among strangers without an inter-
mediary such as a central authority or a bank.  
 
 
1.2.2 Bitcoin and blockchain 
DLT is often known by its most popular example, blockchain, which emerged in 
2008 when an author named Satoshi Nakamoto published a white paper about an 
electronic cash system they called Bitcoin.17 The idea of the new electronic cash 
system (with bitcoin as a unit) is based on an algorithm that creates a network of 
trust between strangers (nodes) and is operated without intermediaries in a 
transparent and secure way.  
Blockchain – the core technology of Bitcoin system – is a specific type of ledger 
among other DLTs that collects transaction data into blocks that, as the name 
says, are recorded in a chain (a chronological list of blocks with hashes of 
previous blocks).18 All of the nodes separately verify that every transaction meets 
the governance rules of the network protocol and then collectively decide whether 
a certain block will be added to the chain. All of these steps are executed by the 
nodes using their computational resources instead of manual checking and, con-
sequently, there is a reward system to motivate the nodes to secure the system’s 
sustainability. Blockchain is only one specific type of DLT; however, in order to 
be inclusive of all distributed ledger technologies, this dissertation will address 
DLT as a group of technologies.  
                                                                          
14  See Article I on the ledger types.  
15  European Parliament, ‘Blockchain for supply chains and international trade. STUDY 
Panel for the Future of Science and Technology’. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research 
Service Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA) PE 641.544 – (May 2020, hereinafter: EU Blockchain 
Study), p. 4. doi: 10.2861/957600. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/ 
2020/641544/EPRS_STU(2020)641544_EN.pdf> accessed 11 October 2020. 
16  See Article I or Pierluigi Cuccuru, ‘Beyond bitcoin: an early overview on smart contracts’, 
(2017) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 25/3, p. 182 <https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/ijlit/eax003> accessed 12 April 2018.  
17  Nakamoto (n. 10). 
18  EU Blockchain Study (n. 15), p. 4.  
13 
The main challenge of such electronic cash system lacking centralized inter-
mediary oversight is the so-called ‘double-spending’ problem19 – if there is no 
centralized controller, how can anyone make sure that funds are not spent twice? 
The Bitcoin system has been created in such a way that the entire network can 
make sure of the actual status of funds due to the existence of a transparent ledger, 
its protocol and the consensus mechanism20 used to verify transactions. 
 
 
1.2.3 Use cases of DLT 
Blockchain technology-based Bitcoin quickly evolved into multiple versions of 
similar algorithm-based systems. These systems became a sort of new type of 
distributed infrastructure21 that revealed a diverse set of new use cases which 
proved to be a substantial expansion from a simple electronic cash system. It was 
understood that DLT (and among it, also blockchain) is a disruptive technology 
allowing “data storage, digital asset transfers and transaction management, thus 
potentially replacing central processors and intermediaries with a decentralized 
computer architecture”.22 
After a slow global start, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have progressively 
expanded their use as a digital means of payment23 and a target for investment.24 A 
whole separate market has evolved around cryptocurrencies with “myriad users, 
trading companies, retailers, exchange platforms and financial service providers.”25 
Although the financial sector remains one of DLT’s focus points, the trans-
formative or disruptive innovation rather lies in the innovative effect DLT can 
have on identity management, security management, data management and gover-
nance in general.26  
This disruptive impact can also be identified in a number of applications devel-




                                                                          
19  Cuccuru (n.16), p. 182. 
20  ibid, p. 183.  
21  EU Blockchain Study (n.15). 
22  Cuccuru (n.16), p. 179.  
23  Skatteverket v David Hedqvist, C-264/14, EU:C:2015:718 (hereinafter: Hedqvist). 
24  Cuccuru (n.16), p. 181. 
25  ibid. 
26  ITU TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU Focus Group 
on Application of Distributed Ledger Technology (FG DLT). ‘Technical Report FG DLT D 2.1. 
Distributed ledger technology use cases’ (1 August 2019), pp. 21–22. <https://www.itu.int/ 
en/ITU-T/focusgroups/dlt/Documents/d21.pdf> accessed 20 October 2020. 
14 
• DLT-based smart contracts27 allowing facilitation of international trade28  
• ledgers to record land ownership29  
• applications to collect taxes and allocate benefits30  
• ledgers to record corporate events and share transactions31  
• systems to prescribe and monitor the prescription of drugs32  
• systems to monitor and track organ donations33  
• applications to distribute and redistribute energy resources34  
• applications to store and exchange data in supply chain management, 
healthcare, public services, intellectual property management, consumer 
ecommerce.35  
 
As can be seen, DLT represents “general-purpose technologies”36 with an abun-
dance of possible applications. The estimate on the basis of positive scenarios is 
that intra-community trade will be using smart contracts in approximately 
100 million transactions by 2030 that are worth up to approximately EUR 
250 million, with total DLT expenditure reaching EUR 11 billion by 2030.37  
 
 
                                                                          
27  Cuccuru (n.16), p. 186.  
28  EU Blockchain Study (n.15), p. 65. 
29 A test project by Lantmäteriet (The Swedish Mapping, Cadastre and Land Registration 
Authority), ChromaWay, Landshypotek Bank, SBAB, Telia company and foresight company 
Kairos Future. Kairos Future. ‘Report’ (March 2017). <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
5e26f18cd5824c7138a9118b/t/5e3c35451c2cbb6170caa19e/1581004119677/Blockchain_La
ndregistry_Report_2017.pdf> accessed 20 October 2020. 
30  Government Office For Science, ‘Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain. A 
report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser’, (2016) p. 6. <https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/
gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf> accessed by 19 October 2020. 
31  Anne Lafarre and Christoph Van der Elst, ‘Blockchain Technology for Corporate Gover-
nance and Shareholder Activism’ European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) – Law 
Working Paper No. 390/2018, Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 2018-7, (March 2018). 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135209> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3135209> accessed 
20 October 2020. 
32  ITU (n. 26), p. 53. 
33  ibid. 
34  ibid, p. 56. 
35  EU Blockchain Study (n. 15). 
36  ibid, p. 48.  
37  PwC. ‘PwC’s Global Blockchain Survey 2018’ (2018) <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ 
industries/technology/blockchain/blockchain-in-business.html> and <https://www.pwccn.com/ 
en/research-and-insights/publications/global-blockchain-survey-2018/global-blockchain-
survey-2018-report.pdf> accessed 20 October 2020.  
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1.3 The research problem  
The recently published Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a Pilot Regime for market infrastructures based on DLT (Pilot 
Regime)38 clearly states that the “EU follows the principle of technological 
neutrality, but rules are still created based on market realities”.39 This means that 
the EU institutions are aware that the existing regulatory frameworks in most 
jurisdictions were built for centralized infrastructures40 which leads “law and 
blockchain currently […] to stand in tension”.41 As stated by EBA and ESMA 
research and confirmed by the recent EU Digital Finance package (EU proposals 
for regulation of crypto-assets) the “provisions in existing EU legislation may 
inhibit the use of DLT”.42 Hence, investigations of such potential inhibitions is 
called for.  
The problem itself is nothing new, as the development of the digital world led 
to the same problem – how to apply the regulations built for the offline world to 
the online world? Therefore, the problem is not specific to DLT, as the uptake of 
any new technology might lead to the same problem with existing regulation. If 
the problem is ignored, it might lead to a discrimination of the new technology. 
Consequently, DLT uptake raises the same problem, which must be addressed in 
line with the policy interest of the EU to develop and promote the uptake of 
transformative technologies, including blockchain and DLT.43 The EU has taken 
steps towards this promotion both by the Digital Finance package and the 
development of the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI), which 
is “a network of distributed nodes across Europe that will deliver cross-border 
public services”.44  
Therefore, upon the multiplicity of technologies that compete among one 
another, there is a need for regulation that can treat these competing technologies 
in a non-discriminatory way. Consequently, the main aim of this dissertation is 
to identify biases in regulation against the use of DLT and its outputs, processes 
and infrastructure. The biases are explored based on the existing regulatory 
                                                                          
38  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology, 
COM/2020/594 final (hereinafter: Pilot Regime). 
39  Pilot Regime (n. 38), p. 4.  
40  EU Blockchain Study (n. 15), p. 48.  
41  Michele Finck, Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe (Cambridge University 
Press, 2019).  
42  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL on Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (Text with 
EEA relevance) SEC(2020) 306 final} – {SWD(2020) 380 final} – {SWD(2020) 381 final}, 
COM(2020) 593 final 2020/0265 (COD), (hereinafter: MiCA Proposal), pp. 1–4. 
43  Recital 1 of the MiCA Proposal (n. 42).  
44  EBSI platform. <https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/EBSI>  
accessed 17 December 2020. 
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frameworks in Estonia and the EU applied in the specific DLT use cases chosen 
by the author. The reasons for choosing these particular DLT use cases is 
elaborated in section 1.4 below. Along with this investigation, the author also 
explores the objectives of existing regulation to find the cause for these biases. 
By existing regulation, the author means the laws45 of the Republic of Estonia 
and the European Union relevant in the context of the chosen use cases. 
To identify biases, the author uses the technology neutrality principle and its 
sub-principle of functional equivalence as tools. The technology neutrality prin-
ciple aims at securing neutrality in regulation towards any technology and the 
technology-considerate treatment of different technologies. The functional 
equivalence sub-principle is used to identify functional equivalence between the 
old and the new in order to grant equivalent treatment. However, as the principles 
are unclear as to their meaning and application, the research also includes an 
exploration of the said principles.  
On the one hand, legal certainty and clarity are the “key catalysts” for the 
development of technology,46 but on the other hand, the Pacing Problem and the 
Collingridge dilemma lead to the careful timing of the regulatory activity that 
should allow iterative adaptations as the technology matures.47 This means that, 
although new regulation for DLT would have an invaluable ‘trust-enhancing 
role’48 and there is a plethora of regulative strategies that are considered to relieve 
the tension between DLT and law, such as: (1) the wait-and-see approach (inno-
vators operating in ‘quasi-lawless zones’); (2) application of existing legal frame-
works; (3) regulatory cooperation (issuing guidance, regulatory sandboxes) and 
new regulation, incl. self-regulation and polycentric coregulation,49 such alter-
native strategies should be carefully considered so as not to have an equally 
hindering effect as that of no DLT regulation. In response to the named challenges, 
this dissertation addresses some of these strategies with the aim of identifying a 
sustainable regulative strategy that secures a regulatory framework resistant to 
bias towards DLT. The research is especially relevant considering that, as stated 
in the proposal for Digital Finance package (a regulation on markets in crypto-
assets) introduced at the end of September 2020 (MiCA Proposal)50 and the 
proposal for the pilot regime for market infrastructures based on DLT (Pilot 
                                                                          
45  On the basis of the Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology, the existing 
regulation in this dissertation is meant as laws or as “authoritative rules backed by coercive 
force”. Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford and Karen Yeung, The Oxford Handbook of Law, 
Regulation and Technology (Oxford University Press 2017), p. 6. 
46  EU Blockchain Study (n. 15), p. 11. 
47  Finck (n. 41), p. 153. 
48  Recital 1 of Regulation 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for 
electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC 2014) OJ L 
257/73. See also Finck (n. 41), pp. 152–153. 
49  ibid, pp. 153–181. 
50  MiCA Proposal (n. 42). 
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Regime),51 the EU has a policy interest for the uptake of transformative techno-
logies, such as DLT, in the financial sector, and for the adaptation of regulations 
to promote this uptake based on the evidence of hurdles.52 Both proposals identify 
as one of their goals the generation of further evidence of these hurdles to assess 
“whether and how to amend existing financial services legislation to ensure it is 
technology neutral”.53 Furthermore, the MiCA Proposal reiterates that the 
proposal supports the EU’s holistic approach to DLT and the aim to position 
Europe at the forefront of its innovation and uptake.54 The dissertation supports 
these goals as the investigation of DLT use cases is also seeking evidence of these 
hurdles. 
Lastly, this type of analysis is especially relevant during the adoption phase of 
a technology in society, meaning that, at the time, regulators are still considering 
multiple courses of action to react to the arrival of transformative innovation.  
With the term regulator, the author means any branch of government – 
legislative, executive or judiciary – unless otherwise stated and, with the term 
“regulatory framework”, the author refers to any modality of regulation that 
creates obligations on the subjects of DLT use cases.  
 
 
1.4 Field of investigation and research questions 
This dissertation does not treat the domain of DLT regulation as a specific or 
separate field of study but uses DLT as an example of a technology for which 
neutrality of regulation is crucial in order for it to compete with other techno-
logies. The shortcomings of any regulatory framework in relation to any techno-
logy need to spark an action in the regulator to either address or choose to ignore 
these. It is not only by ignoring these shortcomings but also by choosing not to 
identify these shortcomings that leads regulators to be non-compliant with the 
principle of technology neutrality. However, in order to identify these short-
comings, regulators need to investigate both the technology and potential biases 
in regulation.  
The DLT use cases the author explores in this dissertation range from operation 
of a bitcoin exchange, administration of shareholder ledger using DLT and use of 
smart contracts in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs).55 The use cases examined in this 
dissertation can broadly be divided into the following types:  
                                                                          
51  Pilot Regime (n. 38). 
52  ibid, Recital 1, and pp. 2–5. 
53  MiCA Proposal (n. 42), p. 146. 
54  ibid, p. 3. 
55  According to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), ICOs “effectively 
allow businesses to raise capital for their projects by issuing digital tokens in exchange for fiat 
currencies or other crypto-assets, e.g. Bitcoin or Ether. ICOs are typically promoted on the 
web and social media to potential investors using so-called ‘white papers’.” European 
Securities and Markets Authority, ‘Advice Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets’ 
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1. examination of the treatment of DLT outputs and the subjects operating with 
DLT outputs;  
2. examination of the use of DLT in corporate ledgers;  
3. examination of the use of DLT in contracts.  
 
The chosen use cases allow the demonstration of different ways of apparent and 
non-apparent discrimination against DLT that may be difficult to detect. Con-
sequently, the examples allow the identification of apparent and non-apparent 
biases of regulation against DLT in a wide selection of use cases. To address the 
research problems described above in the context provided in the introduction 
and based on the DLT use cases presented, the research questions addressed in 
this dissertation are divided into three main questions and three sub-questions 
based on each DLT use case as follows: 
 
1. How to identify bias against DLT in regulation? (Chapter 2) 
2. How to sustainably ensure DLT-neutrality in regulation? (Chapter 3) 
3. Based on the chosen DLT use cases, is the existing regulation in compliance 
with the technology neutrality principle or is it based on a bias against DLT 
use? (Chapter 4) 
 
a) Whether the anti-money laundering regulation in Estonia and its appli-
cation to bitcoin and its traders complies with the principle of 
technology neutrality (on the basis of de Voogd56) similarly to the EU 
VAT regulation and its application to bitcoin and its traders (on the 
basis of Hedqvist57)? 
b) Whether, under the Estonian Commercial Code, a DLT-based share-
holders ledger of an Estonian private limited company administered by 
a non-CSD could be regarded functionally equivalent to the CSD 
maintained ledger, and granted effects equivalence, with CSD adminis-
tered shareholders ledger? 
                                                                          
(9 January 2019), p.11. <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-
1391_crypto_advice.pdf> accessed 21 July 2017. For the purposes of the discussion in this 
dissertation, there will be no separation made between ICOs, “Security Token Offering” 
(STO) or “Equity Token Offering” (ETO). “Security Token Offering” or “STO” is non-legal 
terminology and in the relevant community means an issue of tokens that “function as a 
traditional security asset. They represent a stake in the wealth created by a third party and take 
their value from that party’s success or failure. Distinct from an equity token in that no 
ownership of the underlying venture is created.” Eric Reed, ‘Equity Tokens vs. Security Tokens: 
What’s the Difference?’ (Bitcoin Market Journal 13 February 2019) <https://www.bitcoin-
marketjournal.com/equity-token/> accessed 23 July 2019  
 For an example of a whitepaper, please see here: <https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/ 
wiki/White-Paper> accessed 1 May 2019. 
56  Estonian Supreme Court Administrative Law Chamber (SCALC) judgment, 11th April 
2016, case 3-3-1-75-15 (hereinafter: de Voogd). 
57  Hedqvist. 
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c) Under eIDAS, can DLT-based smart contract signature be regarded 
functionally equivalent to qualified electronic signature and granted 
effects equivalence with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model based 
signature?  
 
Based on the DLT use cases examined and the regulative strategies identified by 
the EU Blockchain Study, this dissertation attempts to find an answer to the 
question how to ensure DLT-neutral regulation. In the context of regulatory 
approaches, the research explores principle-based regulation.58  
 
 
1.5 Current status of research in the area 
Regulatory approaches to technology have been the subject of academic discourse 
for decades, with DLT- or blockchain-specific legal research being a recent 
addition. Therefore, existing research can be divided into two separate topics: 
legal research on the technology neutrality principle and legal research primarily 
on DLT. 
The legal research on the technology neutrality principle includes research on 
functional equivalence and functional approach as concepts of the same principle. 
This legal discourse has been developed since the 1990s with Bert-Jaap Koops59 
and Chris Reed60 as the most noteworthy contributors. Koops’ work entails a 
comprehensive overview of the principle of technology neutrality, addressing 
many of the misconceptions related thereto, with Reed addressing it more from 
the context of offline and online equivalence61 or a cyberspace and futureproofing 
focus.62 In this dissertation, the author builds on the work of both Koops and Reed 
to map the principles developed and presents the critique by Savin63 on the diffi-
                                                                          
58  Sofia Ranchordas and Mattis van ’t Schip, ‘Future-Proofing Legislation for the Digital Age’ 
in S. Ranchordas and Y. Roznai (eds), Time, Law, and Change (Hart, 2020) (Forthcoming) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466161> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466161> accessed 22 
October 2020. 
59  Bert-Jaap Koops, ’Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?’ in Bert-Jaap Koops, 
Miriam Lips, Corien Prins & Maurice Schellekens, (eds.), STARTING POINTS FOR ICT 
REGULATION. DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS, IT & LAW 
SERIES, Vol. 9 (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), pp. 77–108 <https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=918746> accessed 22 March 2020. 
60  Chris Reed, ‘Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and Achievement’ (Autumn 
2010) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 18/3, p. 249. <https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/ijlit/eaq006> accessed 08 December 2019. 
61  ibid. 
62  Chris Reed, Making Laws For Cyberspace (Oxford University Press 2012). 
63  Andrej Savin, ‘Rule Making in the Digital Economy: Overcoming Functional Equivalence 
As a Regulatory Principle in the EU’ (CBS LAW Research Paper 19–10, 24 February 2019), 
Journal of Internet Law 22/8, p. 5  <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340886> accessed 28 No-
vember 2019. 
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culties in the application of the principle in law-making and critique by Harvey64 
in the application thereof by courts. Furthermore, the importance of Kamecke and 
Körber,65 in clarifying the focus of the principle towards allowing more self-
regulation, cannot be overstated. Lastly, the principle has recently received its 
first address in the DLT context by Furrer and Müller,66 who addressed the sub-
principle of functional equivalence in the context of ICOs and DLT-based smart 
contracts. 
However, the legal research related to DLT is in its early stages and mostly 
targets blockchain technology or cryptocurrencies. De Filippi and Wright67 have 
substantially mapped this domain in a form that is detached from specific juris-
dictions and regulative frameworks. Rather, their approach focuses on the pos-
sibilities of use and the potential impact of the technology on regulation in theory. 
They also address models of regulation and build on Lessig’s68 code is law by 
presenting code-based regulation as a development.  
A rather comprehensive overview ranging from building regulative models on 
Lessig and addressing financial regulation and competition laws in the DLT 
context was presented in 2019 by Hacker et al.69 The same year, Finck opened up 
many discussions focusing more on blockchain governance and concepts such as 
regulatable and regulatory technology (again building on Lessig’s groundwork).70 
Finck also headed the EU Blockchain Study,71 which aimed to identify the most 
crucial legal issues the EU needs to focus on and the regulative strategies at its 
disposal.72 
The only research in this domain linking DLT and technology neutrality is the 
EU Blockchain Study that occasionally addresses in the report whether techno-
                                                                          
64  David John Harvey,  Collisions in the Digital Paradigm: Law and Rule Making in the 
Internet Age (Bloomsbury Publishing 2017), pp. 59–60. 
65  Ulrich Kamecke and Torsten Korber, ‘Technological Neutrality in the EC Regulatory Frame-
work for Electronic Communications: A Good Principle Widely Misunderstood. Technological 
Neutrality in the EC Regulatory Framework’ (2008), p. 331. <http://www.unigoettingen.de/ 
de/document/download/65b9d0d841b831596888f8fb208e838b.pdf/KameckeKoerber_ECLR
08_29%285%29_330-339.pdf> accessed 30 April 2020. 
66  Andreas Furrer and Luka Müller, ‘“Functional equivalence” of digital legal transactions A 
fundamental principle for assessing the legal validity of legal institutions and legal transactions 
under Swiss law,’ Jusletter (18 June 2018), p. 15. <https://www.mme.ch/fileadmin/files/docu-
ments/MME_Compact/2018/180619_Funktionale_AEquivalenz.pdf> accessed 12 November 
2020. 
67  De Filippi and Wright (n. 12). 
68  Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999). 
69  Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos, and Stefan Eich, “An Intro-
duction” in Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos, and Stefan Eich, (eds.), 
Regulating Blockchain Techno-Social and Legal Challenges, 1st edition, (Oxford University 
Press, 2019), p. 2. 
70  Finck (n. 41). 
71  EU Blockchain Study (n. 15), p. 48,  
72  ibid. 
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logy neutrality was established in either the text of the regulation or the imple-
mentation thereof. On the other hand, the study does not address the innate biases 
of regulation based on the technology neutrality principle. Nevertheless, the report 
rather sporadically mentions neutrality and often discusses it as a goal rather than 
as a measurement tool.  
As mentioned, Furrer and Müller explored a functional equivalence sub-
principle for DLT use cases, but quite briefly and in a limited context of ICOs and 
smart contracts. None of the earlier work addresses the biases in existing regu-
lation based on the technology neutrality principle, specifically in relation to DLT 
nor conducted any functional analysis of the author’s chosen use cases. Con-
sequently, this research complements earlier research on both DLT and the 
principle of technology neutrality.  
 
 
1.6 Methods and resources 
To address the research problems and questions, the dissertation focuses on the 
following two tools: (i) the principle of technology neutrality and (ii) its sub-
principle of functional equivalence (both presented in Chapter 2) and applies 
these principles to the existing regulation applicable in the specific DLT use cases 
(explored in Chapter 4). 
The other legal research methods used for the purposes of research are a mix 
of legal research methodology and proactive methodology based on the IT law 
approaches presented by Peter Seipel.73 First of all, the qualitative systematic 
analysis method is used to map the scope and content of the principles of 
technology neutrality and the sub-principle of functional equivalence on the basis 
of regulation, case law, legal theory and other secondary sources.  
Secondly, in this dissertation, the author uses legal doctrine or legal dog-
matics as a methodology (doctrinal legal research) and employs the said method 
in researching positive law in order to identify existing regulation that applies to 
the DLT use cases. The doctrinal legal research combines descriptive (external 
perspective),74 hermeneutical and normative (internal perspective) research, 
meaning that the author is not only describing the positive law, but also inter-
preting and evaluating the text of the law.  
The author does not use comparative methodology in the traditional sense but 
merely utilizes comparisons as a methodology in a limited scope. The metho-
dology of comparisons is employed to present DLT-specific regulation enacted 
in different jurisdictions. 
                                                                          
73  Peter Seipel, IT Law in the Framework of Legal Informatics, p. 46 (2004).  
<https://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/47-2.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.  
74  As explained by Sanne Taekema the “external perspective fits descriptive research which 
an internal perspective fits normative research”. Sanne Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy. A 
Characterisation of the Discipline of Law’ in Bart van Klink and Sanne Taekema, Law and 
Method. Interdisciplinary Research into Law (2011), p. 41.  
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Thirdly, as DLT is a new and emerging technology, this dissertation also 
explores a proactive methodology using the IT law-specific problem cluster 
approach and the special theory approach. The problem cluster approach is 
problem-oriented or delves into the legal aspects of a particular technology use 
case.75 As part of the approach, different legal instruments are analysed in order 
to identify the relevant legal norms applicable to a use case. Seipel considers this 
a functional approach functional that is targeted towards “locating lacunae and 
deficiencies in existing legal regulation” from the point of view of a problem or a 
specific use case. The specific DLT use cases formulate the problem cluster. 
Lastly, the special theory approach – the themes that fall under this approach 
require “analyses of the interaction of rules and tools [...] and it does not content 
itself with simple presentations of valid law (lex lata)”.76 The author conducts 
functional analysis of legal norms and applies functional equivalence sub-prin-
ciple as a special theory approach to identify the functions the existing regulation 
requires and the functions DLT performs in comparison. This means that in the 
research, the author not only explores existing regulation, but also explores the 
technology and its wider context to identify whether the technology is func-
tionally equivalent to the objectives of the functions required by existing regu-
lation. The special theory approach allows the for identification of infrastructural 
biases in regulation that are built around a certain system or ‘tool’, as used by 
Seipel, which the regulator knows and can relate to.  
Through the application and expansion of the special theory approach, the 
author analyses the interaction between rules and tools, using the functional setup 
of a particular technology and the legislative aims of the regulator to identify 
functional equivalence. 
As to the resources used to conduct the research, the key resources employed 
in the qualitative systematic analysis method are the Framework Directive,77  
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),78 eIDAS and the writings of 
legal scientists and academics. The DLT use cases guide the dissertation as to the 
areas of dogmatic legal research in the clusters based on the DLT use case. The 
specific regulation under examination expands from public law to private law. 
The first DLT use case explores the VAT (VAT Directive79) and anti-money 
laundering regulation (the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention 
                                                                          
75  Seipel (n. 73), p. 46.  
76  ibid.  
77  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive) OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, pp. 33–50. 
78  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regu-
lation or GDPR) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88. 
79  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added 
tax OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1–118 (VAT Directive). 
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Act80 of Estonia, and of AML Directives),81 the shareholder ledger use case 
explores corporate law and public ledger regulation (predominantly the 
Commercial Code82 of Estonia) and the protocol-based contract use case explores 
both contract law and electronic signatures regulation (eIDAS,83 Law of Obli-
gations Act84 and General Part of the Civil Code85 of Estonia). The author uses the 
regulation of primarily Estonian – and EU laws as well as comparative regulation 
from other jurisdictions. The other jurisdictions are chosen because, in these 
jurisdictions DLT-specific regulation has been proposed or adopted. Such 




As explained in the previous subsection, the main research problem is addressed 
by exploring different DLT use cases and not at a specific field of law.  
Therefore, this dissertation does not explore a specific substantive law, but 
instead explores existing regulation as applied to the DLT use cases chosen 
                                                                          
80  Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act of Estonia [rahapesu ja terro-
rismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus] – RT I 2008, 3, 21; RT I 2008, 3, 21 (hereinafter: 
MLPA I). Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act of Estonia [rahapesu ja 
terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus] – RT I 06.07.2016, 13 (hereinafter: MLPA II). 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act of Estonia [rahapesu ja terrorismi 
rahastamise tõkestamise seadus] – RT I, 17.11.2017, 2 (hereinafter: MLPA III). All trans-
lations of these legal acts are based on the unofficial translations published in the Estonian 
State Gazette (Riigi Teataja). These translations do not have any legal force.  
81  Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15–36 (hereinafter: 
AMLD). Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering 
or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (hereinafter: 
the 4th AML Directive or AMLD), OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73–117. On 30 May 2018 the 4th 
AMLD was amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending 
Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) (hereinafter: the 5th 
AML Directive or AMLD) PE/72/2017/REV/1, OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, pp. 43–74. 
82  Commercial Code [äriseadustik] – RT I 1995, 26, 355; RT I, 10.07.2020, 35.  
83  Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 
2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal 
market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (eIDAS). 
84  Law of Obligations Act, [võlaõigusseadus] – RT I 2001, 81, 487; RT I, 20.02.2019, 8. 
85  General Part of the Civil Code Act [tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus] – RT I 2002, 35, 216; 
RT I, 06.12.2018, 3. 
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through the prism of the two principles. Therefore, the structure of the research 
is built as follows:  
 
DLT use cases 




These elements are put through a compliance check under the principle of 
technology neutrality as follows: 
 
principle of technology neutrality 
(qualitative systematic analysis method – to explore its scope) 
sub-principle of functional equivalence 
(special theory approach) 
DLT use cases 





The compliance check of existing regulation with the technology neutrality 
principle is not conducted in isolation from the objectives of the specific 
regulation as the objectives of the regulation not only reveal why the regulator 
decided to include certain formal requirements but also what functions any new 
solution could potentially fulfil without meeting the formal requirements. This 
approach challenges the regulation’s bias towards a certain existing solution 
(technical or organizational) and allows to analyse whether, in a specific use case, 
the DLT solution is able to achieve objectives functionally equivalently without 
necessarily meeting all the procedural or formal requirements set in the existing 
regulation. The described approach allows the author to assess whether the existing 
regulation is technology-neutral or has an innate bias for a technical – or 
organizational solution that existed during the drafting of the regulation. 
Each article the compendium is based on, other than Article VI, formulates a 
problem cluster. In the problem cluster, the technical- or organizational solution 
of the DLT use case is presented and the applicable existing regulation is explored 
in order to conduct the functional analysis. In order to conduct the functional 
analysis in each DLT use case first the requirements of the existing regulation are 
identified e.g., formalities, certificates, licenses, registrations, limitations, restric-
tions and thereafter, the objectives of these requirements are explored - such as 
transparency, legal certainty, identification, immutability, etc. Only after such 
analysis is it possible to assess whether the DLT employed in the specific use 
case is able to achieve the same objectives through the use of its functions. In 
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response to the research questions, the argument of this dissertation is developed 
in the four journal articles listed below along with the current compendium.  
 
• Article I. “Decentralised technology and technology neutrality in legal rules: 
an analysis of De Voogd and Hedqvist”86 investigates the means of payment 
use case and explores “whether the principle of technology neutrality can be 
applied to the centralised-decentralised scale in a manner similar to its 
application to the offline-online scale”87. The article discusses two court 
cases – one from the Estonian Supreme Court (de Voogd) and the other from 
the CJEU (Hedqvist) – comparing the two approaches of applying existing 
regulation to bitcoin and the activity of trading with bitcoin in comparison 
with the application of existing regulation to fiat currencies or traders in this. 
Based on this comparison, the author examines whether the regulatory 
framework and the interpretation of it was technology neutral. The article 
concludes that based on de Voogd there was a bias against alternative means 
of payment under Estonian law which is contrary to the principle of techno-
logy neutrality.  
• Article II. “Shareholder ledger using distributed ledger technology: the 
Estonian perspective”88, which analyses the compliance of the regulation that 
addresses the maintenance of a shareholder ledger with the principle of 
technology neutrality using Estonian law as an example. In addition, the article 
analyses whether existing regulatory framework grants effects equivalence 
to a functionally equivalent DLT-based ledger with a CSD maintained ledger. 
The article concludes that the regulation has a bias towards CSD maintained 
ledgers and, irrelevant of the functions the DLT-based ledger performs the 
result and effect under the regulation depends on the ledger administrator 
and not the functions and processes the ledger maintenance includes.  
• Article III. “Hybrid smart contract challenge to European electronic signature 
regulation” (co-authored with Liisi Jürgen, Eduardo da Cruz Rodrigues e 
Silva and Alex Norta)89 explores, based on Estonian and EU law, whether 
regulation eIDAS allows the qualification of the DLT-based hybrid smart 
contract used in Initial Coin Offerings (ICO), based on the qualification of 
the electronic signature appended to it, as a contract in an electronic form. In 
                                                                          
86  Anne Veerpalu, ‘Decentralised Technology and Technology Neutrality in Legal Rules: An 
Analysis of De Voogd and Hedqvist’ (2018) Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, 11/2, pp. 61–
94. <https://doi.org/10.2478/bjlp-2018-0011> accessed 15 July 2019. 
87  ibid, p. 1. 
88  Anne Veerpalu, ‘Shareholder ledger using distributed ledger technology: the Estonian 
perspective’ (2019) Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 13/2, pp. 277−310. 
<10.5817/MUJLT2019-2-6> accessed 15 July 2019. 
89  Anne Veerpalu, Liisi Jürgen, Eduardo da Cruz Rodrigues e Silva, Alex Norta, ‘The hybrid 
smart-contract agreement challenge to European electronic signature regulation’ (2020) 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 28/1, pp. 39–84. <https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/ijlit/eaaa005> accessed 31 May 2020. 
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the article, the smart contract is referred to as the hybrid smart contract 
because the contract is not only code but composed of multiple components 
that include also written text. The focus point of the research is the 
compliance of eIDAS regulation with the principle of technology neutrality 
in the context of DLT-based smart contracts. Furthermore, the article uses 
the sub-principle of functional equivalence to assess whether the electronic 
signature on the hybrid smart contracts can be qualified as functionally 
equivalent to the qualified electronic signatures under eIDAS and concludes 
that eIDAS regulation includes a bias towards Public Key Infrastructure 
based model and centralized trust service providers.  
• Article IV. “Functional equivalence – an exploration through shortcomings 
to solutions”90 discusses the sub-principle of functional equivalence as a 
source for the development of a technology-neutral regulation model in order 
to respond to and resolve the bias against the application of the distributed 
technologies discussed in the preceding articles. The article explores the use 
of the sub-principle of functional equivalence in different jurisdictions and 
in case law. The article explores a principle-based approach to regulation on 
the basis of the “privacy by design” regulation model used in the GDPR.  
 
  
                                                                          
90  Anne Veerpalu, ‘Functional Equivalence: An Exploration Through Shortcomings to 
Solutions’ (2019) Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 12/2, pp. 134–162. doi: <https://doi.org/ 
10.2478/bjlp-2019-0015> accessed 07 June 2020 
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II THE PRINCIPLE OF TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY 
In this chapter, the author presents the meaning and relevance of the principle of 
technology neutrality in the DLT context in order to address the research question: 
how to identify bias against DLT in regulation? Furthermore, the author 
elaborates on the difficulties of understanding and complying with the principle 
and identifies the ways in which the principle is misused.  
 
 
2.1 The aim of the principle  
The principle strives for anti-discrimination and equality of treatment of techno-
logies along the lines of gender-neutrality and ethnic origin neutrality principles. 
In the EU law context, the principle is at times defined through the freedoms of 
the individual, e.g., a definition of technology neutrality provided in summary of 
Regulation (EU) No 283/2014 on trans-European networks in the area of tele-
communications infrastructure: 
 
“the freedom of individuals and organisations to choose the most appropriate and 
suitable technology for their needs. Products, services or regulatory frameworks 
taking into account the principle of technology neutrality neither impose nor 
discriminate in favour of the use of a particular type of technology.”91 
  
The principle originated from the aim of securing offline-online equivalence. 
Considering that offline and online equivalence is no longer the primary focus, it 
can be stated that the principle aims to secure a sort of blindness to the differences 
between technology and flexibility in law not to hinder the further development 
of technology. According to Koops, technology-independence is not the same as 
neutrality independence as independence requires the regulation to “abstract 
completely away from technology”92 and does not regard technology as part of 
the solution at all. Although, regulation that is technologically indifferent or inde-
pendent can still be neutral in case regulation does not prefer the technology-void 
solution over the technology-inclusive solution.93 Technology-neutral regulation, 
on the other hand, does not favour any technology over another.94  
The main aim of the principle is therefore that “the rules should neither require 
nor assume a particular technology”.95 Neither should regulation be built so that 
                                                                          
91  Summary of Regulation (EU) No 283/2014 – guidelines for trans-European networks in 
the area of telecommunications infrastructure titled Supporting telecommunications networks 
and digital service infrastructures across Europe <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ 
LSU/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0283> accessed 1 March 2021. 
92  Koops (n. 59), p. 5. 
93  Reed (n. 62), p. 193. 
94  Koops (n. 59), p. 5. 
95  Reed (n. 62), p. 191. 
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only one technology can easily comply with it and that different technologies must 
adapt themselves to conform with the requirements set in regulation. Neutrality 
requires that each type of technology must be treated in an equivalent way so that 
the effect of the regulation across technologies is equivalent and does not favour a 
specific technology.96 Given this aim, rather than focusing on the characteristics or 
functions as requirements, regulation should focus on the aim of these functions.97 
Kamecke and Körber find that the principle prohibits the regulator from 
maintaining or creating regulation that aims to replace the market selection between 
technologies with selection by a regulator.98 This means the principle dictates that 




2.2 The relevance of the principle to DLT 
When the online world emerged, many regulators identified a potential risk of 
discrimination against the online domain as regulation had been created only for 
the offline domain. The named discrimination was mitigated by the introduction 
of the principle of technology neutrality, which aimed to neutralize any pre-
ference of the regulator towards the offline domain.  
Furthermore, as stated by Chris Reed, “the key factor in persuading legislators 
that technology neutrality should be adopted more widely was the advent of the 
Internet for general public use”.100 The threat of the mistreatment of the Internet 
was regarded sufficiently important to include the principle as a guiding goal in 
recitals, green papers, model laws, directives and regulation. Nevertheless, the 
principle, although primarily regarded as the “starting point for ICT regu-
lation”,101 has along with the digital revolution outgrown its initial use case.  
 Therefore, the principle’s overarching attempt to guide the regulator away 
from influencing how any technology in any sector, application and use case 
should work or be used 102 is absolutely relevant for DLT. Consequently, the 
principle is relevant for any technology, but especially relevant for technologies 
that are deconstructing the key structures of society, trade and communication. 
DLT is affecting key infrastructures of digital society similarly as the online 
domain deconstructed the offline infrastructures.  
                                                                          
96  ibid, p. 192. 
97  ibid, p. 192. 
98  Kamecke and Körber (n. 65), p. 331. 
99  ibid, p. 331. 
100  Chris Reed, ‘Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality’, (September 2007) SCRIPTed 263 
4/3, p. 264. <http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/scripted4&i=281> accessed 
20 November 2018. 
101  Koops (n. 59), p. 26. 
102  ibid. 
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2.3 The subjects of the principle 
Technology neutrality is sometimes confused with platform neutrality and net 
neutrality. As technology regulation is not based on well-developed legal theories, 
technology neutrality, platform neutrality and net neutrality are some of the key 
concepts in technology regulation. The principle needs to be distinguished from 
these other neutralities, as the subjects and content of the principle are very 
different. Platform neutrality applies to platforms (e.g., Amazon and Google) and 
means that online platforms with a wide audience should not use their platform 
only to offer, rank or create preference for their own goods and services.103 Net 
neutrality applies to Internet service providers (ISPs).104 ISPs that are pre-
dominantly operated by telecom companies are able to block Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP), specifically services like Skype , Zoom, etc.105 Therefore, net 
neutrality addresses the concern of discrimination against content providers. As 
ISPs have the technical capability to discriminate against content, meaning to 
prefer certain content and block other content, net neutrality prohibits discrimi-
nation based on content that travels through these controlling infrastructure 
intermediaries. Furthermore, net neutrality prohibits the preferential treatment of 
the services of these ISPs or any specific applications for the purpose of minimising 
competition, transparency and consumer choice.  
Both of these neutrality concepts target either public – or private stakeholders 
who control certain infrastructure. In contrast, the principle of technology neutrality 
is targeted at the regulator who controls the regulation of multiple infrastructures, 
services, processes and outputs and the principle aims to restrict the regulator 
from discriminating against any technology. The principle is not only relevant to 
legislature in law-making, but also the executive branch and the judiciary are 




                                                                          
103  Jan Krämera and Daniel Schnurr ‘Is there a need for platform neutrality regulation in the 
EU?’ (2018) Telecommunications Policy, 42/7, pp. 514–529. <https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.telpol.2018.06.004> accessed 9 May 2020. 
104  Winston J. Maxwell and Marc Bourreau, ‘Technology Neutrality in Internet, Telecoms 
and Data Protection Regulation’ (January 2015) Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review 21/ 1, pp. 1–4. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529680> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.2529680> accessed 28 September 2020.  
105  Almost 10 years ago in a speech delivered by Vice President of the European Commission 
Neelie Kroes at the European Commission and European Parliament Summit on ‘The Open 
Internet and Net Neutrality in Europe’ in Brussels, 11 November 2010. (Transcript) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/net-neutrality-%E2%80%93-way-
forward> accessed 9 May 2020. 
106  Koops (n. 59). 
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2.4 The origins of the principle 
In July 1997, the principle was included in the Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce by US President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore,107 the Bonn 
Ministerial Conference.108 In 1998, ICT regulations were formulated by the UK 
and Dutch governments,109 in which either technology independence or neutrality 
were discussed, and similar statements were included in the G8 Okinawa Charter 
on Global Information Society in 2000,110 the Green Paper on Consumer Pro-
tection in 2001111 and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 
2002. 112 Furthermore, the principle has been also represented in EU law in several 
directives and regulations, however, foundations of the principle can also be 
identified in the Treaty of European Union (TFEU),113 in Article 2 by recognition 
of the values of equality and non-discrimination and in Article 3 that stipulates 
the aim of the Union to establish an internal market that promotes “scientific and 
technological advance”. Without a doubt, the establishment of Digital Single 
                                                                          
107  “Rules should be technology-neutral (i.e. the rules should neither require nor assume a 
particular technology) and forward-looking (i.e. the rules should not hinder the use or 
development of technologies in the future)”. William J. Clinton, Al Jr. Gore, ‘Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce’, (White House 1 July 1997) <https://clintonwhitehouse4. 
archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html> accessed 12 November 2018. 
108  “Ministers stress that the general legal frameworks should be applied on-line as they are 
off-line. In view of the speed at which new technologies are developing, they will strive to 
frame regulations which are technology-neutral, whilst bearing in mind the need to avoid 
unnecessary regulation”. European Commission. Directorate-General for the Information 
Society and Media. ‘Declarations. Global information networks: Realising the potential.’ 
(European ministerial Conference. Bonn, 6 to 8 July 1997). <https://op.europa.eu/en/ 
publication-detail/-/publication/0d76a85c-e66a-41af-91c2-28cd29a85094> accessed 29 April 
2020. 
109  Koops (n. 59), p. 1.  
110  “We should ensure that IT-related rules and practices are responsive to revolutionary 
changes in economic transactions, while taking into account the principles of effective public-
private sector partnership, transparency and technological neutrality.” Okinawa Charter on 
Global Information Society. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/ 
charter.html> accessed 29 April 2020. 
111  “A comprehensive, technology-neutral, EU framework directive to harmonize national 
fairness rules for business-consumer commercial practices”. ‘Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee on the “Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection’ 
(COM(2001) 531 final) OJ C 125, 27.5.2002, p. 1–5.  
112  “The rule of law, accompanied by a supportive, transparent, pro-competitive, techno-
logically neutral and predictable policy and regulatory framework reflecting national realities, 
is essential for building a people-centered Information Society.” World Summit on the Infor-
mation Society. Declaration of Principles. Building the Information Society: a global chal-
lenge in the new Millennium. Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4, (12 December 2003). 
<http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html> accessed 29 April 2020. 
113  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 47–390.  
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Market (DSM) is also a goal in line with the principle as DSM should be based 
on the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services across the single 
market of the EU. As stated by European Commission in 2015, DSM is a market 
“where the individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online 
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and 
personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence”.114 
Therefore, under Articles 49–55 (freedom of establishment) and 56–62 (freedom 
to provide services) of the TFEU, self-employed persons and professionals or 
legal persons who are legally operating in one Member State should not be 
restricted or discriminated against for using a particular technology, form or 
means in another Member State. More specifically, the principle is represented in 
the following secondary law of the EU as provided below.  
The e-Commerce Directive115 of 2000 states in Article 9 that Member States 
must  
 
“ensure that their legal system allows contracts to be concluded by electronic 
means. Member States shall in particular ensure that the legal requirements 
applicable to the contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of electronic 
contracts nor result in such contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness and 
validity on account of their having been made by electronic means.”  
 
The referred Article aims for non-discrimination of electronic form of contracts 
and instructs the Member States not to deprive this different form legal effective-
ness and validity. The new proposal for Digital Services Act116 that amends the  
e-Commerce Directive specifically names the principle of technology neutrality 
in Recital 5 by stating that it aims to set up “requirements that are technology 
neutral” so that innovation would “not be hampered but instead be stimulated”. 
The principle was included from 2002 also in Recital 18 of the Framework 
Directive,117 which stipulates that “regulation … neither imposes nor discrimi-
nates in favour of the use of a particular type of technology...”. Article 8 (1) and 
(2) require Member States to ensure “that there is no distortion or restriction of 
competition in the electronic communications sector” and that “in carrying out 
the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive and the Specific Directives, in 
                                                                          
114  Communication from the Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM 
(2015) 192 final, p 3. 
115  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, pp. 1–16. 
116  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending 
Directive 2000/31/EC COM/2020/825 final. 
117  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive). Official Journal of the European Union, L 108, 24.4.2002, pp. 33–
50. 
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particular those designed to ensure effective competition, national regulatory 
authorities take utmost account of the desirability of making regulations techno-
logically neutral.”  
The said Framework Directive promotes the principle also through the 
reiteration of the goals of non-discrimination principle in Article 8 (3) (c) “The 
national regulatory authorities shall contribute to the development of the internal 
market by inter alia ensuring that, in similar circumstances, there is no discrimi-
nation in the treatment of undertakings providing electronic communications 
networks and services” and the goal of transparency in Article 4 (d) “promoting 
the provision of clear information, in particular requiring transparency of tariffs 
and conditions for using publicly available electronic communications services.  
The said principle was included in Recitals 34, 35, 38, 40, 68 and Article 7b 
of the Better Regulation Directive118 in relation to spectrum management and is 
also included in the service neutrality principle. This brought about a new wave 
of liberalisation for the technology of mobile operators.119  
Recital 51 of the NIS Directive120 from 2013 included the principle stating that 
“measures … should not require a particular commercial information and com-
munications technology product to be designed, developed or manufactured in a 
particular manner.” This means that the wording of the principle often does not 
use the term technology neutrality, but merely conveys the idea of it. 
In Article 6 (7) (e) of Regulation (EU) No 283/2014 of 11 March 2014 on 
guidelines for trans-European networks in the area of telecommunications infra-
structure121 it is stipulated that in  
 
“Actions contributing to projects of common interest in the field of broadband 
networks shall meet all the following criteria in order to be eligible for funding:  
… 
(e) use the technology which is deemed most suitable to address the needs of the 
geographic area in question, taking into account geographic, social and economic 
factors based on objective criteria and in keeping with technological neutrality;”  
                                                                          
118  Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authori-
sation of electronic communications networks and services (Better Regulation Directive, Text 
with EEA relevance). OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37–69. 
119  Maxwell and Bourreau (n. 104), pp. 1–4. 
120  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems 
across the Union (NIS Directive). Official Journal of the European Union, L 194, 19.7.2016, 
pp. 1–30. 
121  Regulation (EU) No 283/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 on guidelines for trans-European networks in the area of telecommunications infra-
structure and repealing Decision No 1336/97/EC Text with EEA relevance OJ L 86, 
21.3.2014, p. 14–26. 
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Furthermore, in Section 4(4) of the same Regulation’s Annex titled Projects of 
Common Interest it is stipulated that:  
 
“Actions taken for the provision of local wireless connectivity shall be eligible to 
receive funding if they: 
… 
(4) respect the principles of technological neutrality at the level of the backhaul, 
the efficient use of public funding and the ability to adapt projects to the best 
technological offers;” 
  
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)122 from 2016 stated that “in 
order to prevent creating a serious risk of circumvention” Recital 15 urges the 
protection of natural persons be technologically neutral, stating that it “should not 
depend on the techniques used”. Recital 28 of GDPR talks about the specific 
technique of pseudonymisation, but also clarifies that “the explicit introduction 
of ‘pseudonymisation’ in this Regulation is not intended to preclude any other 
measures of data protection.” Furthermore, in Recital 71 of GDPR, the idea of 
the choice of measures by the obligated subjects is stated, indicating that the 
subject needs to follow “appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures” and 
“implement technical and organisational measures” that are “appropriate”. The 
‘appropriateness’ of these measures is measured against the objectives these 
measures aim to achieve – that of minimisation of data, risk of errors and possible 
discrimination based on data.  
Also, public-sector specific European Interoperability Framework (EIF) devel-
oped by European Commission and published in 2017 as a guideline should be 
also mentioned here, as it includes 12 principles to govern interoperability 
between different stakeholders and public sector and technology neutrality is one 
of these principles. The Framework stipulates clearly: 
 
“When establishing European public services, public administrations should focus 
on functional needs and defer decisions on technology as long as possible in order 
to minimise technological dependencies, to avoid imposing specific technical 
implementations or products on their constituents and to be able to adapt to the 
rapidly evolving technological environment.”123 
 
In the EIF and its implementation strategy, the principle is included in several 
recommendations for public administrations stating goals such as: 
  
                                                                          
122  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation or hereinafter: GDPR) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88. 
123  European Commission. ‘New European Interoperability Framework Promoting seamless 
services and data flows for European public administrations’ (2017), p. 14. <doi:10.2799/78681> 
or <https://ec.europa.eu/isa2/sites/isa/files/eif_brochure_final.pdf> accessed 24 November 2020. 
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(i) “Do not impose any technological solutions on citizens, businesses and other 
administrations that are technology-specific or disproportionate to their real 
needs” 
(ii) “Ensure data portability, namely that data is easily transferable between 
systems and applications supporting the implementation and evaluation of 
European public services without unjustified restrictions, if legally possible.”  
(iii) “Actively participate in standardisation work relevant to your needs to ensure 
your requirements are met.” 
 
The author argues that considering the stated aim and subjects of the principle, 
the principle of technology neutrality can be defined also using the principles of 
equality of treatment, non-discrimination and transparency that are elementary to 
public procurement processes. The aim of these named principles in the public 
procurement procedure is to secure that the state in purchasing goods and services 
is not favouring a particular technology neither as an object for purchase or in the 
procedure of procurement. The said principles are included in many recitals and 
articles of Directive 2014/24/EU124 in relation to public contracts, tenders and 
rules of procedure. These clauses promote the idea that contracts by the regulator 
should be awarded on the basis of objective criteria and should not prefer a 
technology or a tenderer. The aim of technology neutrality principle is best 
explained in Recital 74 of the said Directive that states:  
 
“The technical specifications drawn up by public purchasers need to allow public 
procurement to be open to competition as well as to achieve objectives of 
sustainability. To that end, it should be possible to submit tenders that reflect the 
diversity of technical solutions standards and technical specifications in the 
marketplace, including those drawn up on the basis of performance criteria linked 
to the life cycle and the sustainability of the production process of the works, 
supplies and services.  
Consequently, technical specifications should be drafted in such a way as to 
avoid artificially narrowing down competition through requirements that favour a 
specific economic operator by mirroring key characteristics of the supplies, 
services or works habitually offered by that economic operator. Drawing up the 
technical specifications in terms of functional and performance requirements 
generally allows that objective to be achieved in the best way possible. Functional 
and performance-related requirements are also appropriate means to favour 
innovation in public procurement and should be used as widely as possible.” 
 
As said the principle stems from the offline-online treatment equivalence, con-
sequently, the principle is recognizable also through medium- or form equiv-
                                                                          
124  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC Text with EEA relevance OJ L 
94, 28.3.2014, p. 65–242. 
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alence of offline and online contexts regulated by the Software Directive125 and 
Infosoc Directive126 extending regulation to any form. More specifically Recital 
5 of the InfoSoc Directive states that:  
 
“Technological development has multiplied and diversified the vectors for 
creation, production and exploitation. While no new concepts for the protection of 
intellectual property are needed, the current law on copyright and related rights 
should be adapted and supplemented to respond adequately to economic realities 
such as new forms of exploitation.” 
 
The principle is not specifically stated but present in Article 4 of the Infosoc 
Directive that treats the rights of the authors in relation to distribution equiva-
lently irrelevant of the form stating that “Member States shall provide for authors, 
in respect of the original of their works or of copies thereof, the exclusive right 
to authorise or prohibit any form of distribution to the public by sale or other-
wise.” The same extension is included in the Article 4 of the Software Directive 
granting “the exclusive rights of the rightholder within the meaning of 
Article 2 (c) shall include the right to do or to authorise any form of distribution 
to the public”. Furthermore, according to Recital 7 of the same Directive, “the 
term ‘computer program’ shall include programs in any form, including those 
which are incorporated into hardware. This term also includes preparatory design 
work leading to the development of a computer program provided that the nature 
of the preparatory work is such that a computer program can result from it at a 
later stage.”127  
Also in the new MiCA Proposal introduced in late 2020 it was stated that its 
goal is to ensure “that the EU financial services regulatory framework is inno-
vation-friendly and does not pose obstacles to the application of new techno-
logies”,128 while identifying the specific object of said regulation as “removing 
regulatory obstacles to the issuance, trading and post-trading of crypto-assets that 
qualify as financial instruments, while respecting the principle of technological 
                                                                          
125  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the legal protection of computer programs, OJ 2009 L 111 (hereinafter: Software Directive), 
p. 16. 
126 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
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OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, p. 10–19 
127  To clarify this point further as stated in Recital 11 of the Software Directive “In accordance 
with this principle of copyright, to the extent that logic, algorithms and programming lan-
guages comprise ideas and principles, those ideas and principles are not protected under this 
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128  MiCA Proposal (n.42), p.1. 
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neutrality”.129 More specifically, recital 6 of the MiCA Proposal reiterates that 
“Union legislation on financial services should not favour one particular techno-
logy.” Lastly, the same Recital also clearly aims for preferring or presuming the 
use of DLT by stating that, “crypto-assets that qualify as ‘financial instruments’ as 
defined in Article 4(1) point (15) of Directive 2014/65/EU should therefore remain 
regulated under the general existing Union legislation, including Directive 
2014/65/EU, regardless of the technology used for their issuance or their transfer.”  
Furthermore, in addition to MiCA Proposal also the Pilot Regime as part of 
the Digital Finance Package in the EU is straight-forward about the fact that “the 
EU follows the principle of technological neutrality, but rules are still created 
based on market realities.”130 This means that some of the existing regulation 
“sometimes restricts and even prevents the use of DLT”.131 Furthermore, Recital 
1 of the Pilot Regime states that the regulation is aimed at contributing to a future-
ready economy and regulation that is fit for the digital age. 
In summary, the overview of the origins herein shows that the principle has 
been historically used in regulation aimed for information and communication 
technology (ICT) sector – Framework Directive, Better Regulation Directive, NIS 
Directive – however, the idea of equal treatment of online-offline or physical-
digital is later conveyed also by more fundamental digital commerce regulation 
such as eCommerce, InfoSoc and Software Directive. Furthermore, the idea, aim 
and content of the principle is unmistakably recognizable in public procurement 
regulation through the use of the principles of equality of treatment, non-
discrimination and transparency. These are all the same values that are recognized 
also part of the technology neutrality principle and therefore, the use of these 
principles in public procurement can be used to understand the expectations the 
technology neutrality principle creates for the regulators in relation to regulation. 
The placing of the principle among the values that need to be respected in 
establishing guidelines for the public sector in creating interoperability shows that 
whereever public sector is making decisions that could influence the use of 
technology – neutrality should be respected. Lastly, the clear use of the principle 
as a goal and value in GDPR and the references to it as the aim of the EU in 
introducing MiCA Proposal and Pilot Regime for the finance sector clearly 
indicate that digital society has expanded the use and value of the principle in a 
way that it can no longer be considered as a principle for the ICT sector. As 
technology has infiltrated also other sectors, such dissemination has brought the 
principle to all these other sectors that are transformed by technology and 
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2.5 The meaning of the principle 
As discussed in Article I,132 the principle of technology neutrality consists of 
different categories of equivalence: 
 
Functional equivalence aims to ensure that the regulator should not discriminate 
between different technology or domains (e.g., offline and online domains) in case 
these domains or technologies are able to perform equivalent functions or even 
merely reach similar objectives with the performance of different functions. It is 
the position of Van der Haar133 that the utility aspect should also be part of the 
functional equivalence, who has explained the principle through denominated con-
sumer certainty rational, or the “natural person’s perspective”, that if the services 
or goods are considered by the consumer as interchangeable, these services should 
enjoy equivalence of outcome and not be treated differently. In the DLT context, 
this means that, if cryptocurrencies are used by the consumer as fiat currency, these 
should be regarded as interchangeable and the effects equivalence of the regulation 
should be enjoyed. The author proposes that part of the functional equivalence is 
also the utility of the technology, meaning that if technology is used equivalently 
while not having similar functions, this should persuade the regulator to treat the 
technologies equivalently or, in other words, grant these technologies effects 
equivalence. 
 
Effects equivalence134 aims for the regulation to have a substantively equivalent 
effect across technologies, even if the regulation addressing different domains or 
technologies is specifically and exclusively created for a single domain or techno-
logy (according to Reed this is referred to as “implementation neutrality”135). The 
effects equivalence is therefore related to the consequences of regulation. It is at 
times also referred to as equivalence of outcome, e.g., the effect of a signature in 
offline and online domains has equivalent consequences as to its binding force or 
validity. 
 
In other words, if the technology performs equivalent functions and has equiva-
lent utility, it should also enjoy the effects equivalence under regulation. The 
author elaborates on these concepts in the following section. 
                                                                          
132  Veerpalu (n. 86), p. 78. 
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2.5.1 Functional equivalence 
Some authors argue that functional equivalence is a generally accepted principle 
of law-making136 and can be regarded as one of the main regulation methods in 
information technology in the EU.137 Although, often confused as one and the 
same, technology neutrality and functional equivalence are not with the same 
scope. This is due to functional equivalence being rather a starting point of the 
technology neutrality principle. 138 This means that these principles partly overlap 
but do not carry the same weight or scope. According to some scholars the prin-
ciples can be separated because functional equivalence is the guiding principle as 
to equality in treatment as a principle of law which should apply to any new 
behaviour, and the principle of technology neutrality should be the basis for “the 
choice between the available substantive rules which could be used to implement 
those legal principles”.139 Such distinction is especially relevant in case of 
convergence of markets and disruption of one sector by the stakeholders of 
another sector (e.g., ecommerce startups disrupting financial sector.) 
The aim of the equivalence is to secure legal recognition for the functionally 
equivalent electronic form outputs – electronic transactions and registries, signa-
tures and data – as for paper-format outputs in order to ensure that the difference 
in the medium of the transaction, registry, signature or data did not affect the legal 
effect in a negative way.140 However, the functions the electronic signature must 
meet in order to have equal weight and validity are very different from those applied 
to paper-based signatures.  
The difficult part here is the identification of what can be considered functio-
nally equivalent. For this purpose, using the example of electronic form, “an exami-
nation of the function fulfilled by traditional form requirements (‘writing’, ‘signa-
ture’, ‘original’, ‘dispatch’ and ‘receipt’) and a determination as to how the same 
function could be transposed, reproduced or imitated in a dematerialised environ-
ment”141 is needed. Using the UNCITRAL example in developing the Model Law 
on Electronic Signatures142 (MLES), the determination of these features followed 
these steps (also referred to as functional analysis): 
 
• an analysis of the requirements applied to paper-based signatures;  
• identification of the purposes and objectives of these requirements; and 
• an analysis of the functions of the novel system.  
                                                                          
136  Reed (n. 60), p. 248.  
137  Savin (n. 63), p. 5. 
138  Koops (n. 59). 
139  Reed (n. 60), p. 249. 
140  Harvey (n. 64).  
141  ibid, p. 60. 
142 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, (5 July 2001). <https://uncitral.un.org/ 
en/texts/ecommerce/modellaw/electronic_signatures> accessed 02 May 2020. 
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Only after such functional analysis is it possible to determine whether effects 
equivalence (such as binding force and validity) can be granted to the novel 
system.143  
Furthermore, functional equivalence can be also recognized in the functional 
method used in comparative legal theory that is used to understand regulation in 
other jurisdictions. The method is used to compare the unknown with the known 
by decomposing the unknown into functions and institutions that perform these 
functions. This comparative functional method brings us back to the concept of 
functional equivalence that as already discussed suggests that “similar functional 
needs [of society] can be fulfilled by different institutions . . . .”.144 As explained 
by Ralf Michaels:  
 
“The functional method asks us to understand legal institutions not as doctrinal 
constructs but as societal responses to problems – not as isolated instances but in 
their relation to the whole legal system, and beyond, to the whole of society.”145 
 
The functional method in comparative law bears a lot of similarities to functional 
equivalence – the comparisons undertaken inspect the functions and purposes of 
the functions of the foreign system aiming to identify the functionally equivalent 
purpose of function instead of comparing merely legal institutions and architecture. 
The functional method of comparativists starts off by asking the question “what 
social problem a certain legal institution seeks to resolve”146 without basing the 
investigation on concepts known to the person conducting the comparison on the 
basis of the legal system they know but instead investigate the solution on “purely 
functional terms.”147 Thereon, the comparativist would investigate the foreign 
system to identify the corresponding legal institution that also resolves the same 
social problem identified. By setting aside the perceptions of the known legal 
concepts, purposes or functions and legal institutions the comparative theorist can 
understand what makes law work in the foreign legal system and not only how it 
differs from the existing known legal system. Such method allows the 
                                                                          
143  UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 with 
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comparative theorists to acknowledge and accept “reasonable substitutes” to the 




2.5.2 Effects equivalence 
While functional equivalence is identified on the basis of the functions, outputs 
and utility of the new technology in comparison to the pre-existing ones, effects 
equivalence has to do with the existing regulation and the treatment of these under 
the regulation. Simply worded, effects equivalence is the treatment the innovator 
may demand from the regulator in case functional equivalence is already 
established under functional analysis. This is supported by the statement that, “if 
the effects of a technology are regulated rather than the technology itself, the 
regulation will usually establish functional equivalence between [these] techno-
logies”.148 This means that effects equivalence deals only with the consequences 
of using the new technology and its outputs or processes. The effects equivalence 
question often deals with treatment – are these goods treated equivalently to the 
way functionally equivalent goods are treated?  
Using DLT as an example, as discussed in Article III, in the case that DLT-
based smart contracts are qualified as functionally equivalent to electronic con-
tracts, the treatment as to the validity of the contract needs to be equivalent. The 
effects might differ due to differences in functions, but in order to be in line with 
the principle of technology neutrality, all the differences in treatment must be 
non-discriminatory, transparent and neutral in their effect.  
Finally, if regulation makes the use of the innovative solution more onerous 
or potentially less effective than the pre-existing technology, no effects equiva-
lence has been granted by regulation and there is discrimination against the 
innovative solution. The same aspects are discussed in Article I – if crypto-
currencies and fiat currencies are identified as functionally equivalent (like bitcoin 
and legal tender in Hedqvist), effects equivalence must be granted in the tax 
treatment of these outputs. Furthermore, if the compliance requirements under 
anti-money laundering regulation for these outputs prove to be more onerous for 
cryptocurrencies than for fiat currencies, no effects equivalence is granted and, in 
order to be in line with the technology neutrality principle, the regulator must 
justify such difference in treatment on the basis of neutral, transparent and non-
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2.6 Sustainability 
According to Reed, sustainability of regulation is one of the most cited values of 
the technology neutrality principle.149 The principle aims for the regulation to be 
flexible enough so as not to hinder technological innovation and to guarantee a 
certain level of legal certainty not requiring constant change and uncertainty.  
Sustainability requires the regulator to draft regulation in such a way that it is 
flexible enough to not impede on any future development or application of tech-
nology. Sustainability should ensure that regulation allows innovation without 
needing over-burdensome regulatory amendments or constant revision to 
facilitate fast-paced technological change. 
In line with the sustainability aim, the Digital Finance Strategy150 commu-
nicated by the EU Commission also stated as that one of its aims is to “ensure 
that the Union’s financial services legislation is fit for the digital age and contri-
butes to a future-ready economy that works for the people, including by enabling 
the use of innovative technologies”, which is also repeated in Recital 1 of the 
MiCA Proposal. However, this does not mean that the regulation can merely 
remain the same whatever the change in technology. EU regulators are often 
motivated to subject the innovative solution to the existing regulation due to fear 
of the impact on the market, consumers, the environment or their own potential 
control over it.151 The obvious question market incumbents have in such a case is: 
the disruptors are disrupting the market the incumbents have built (and dominate), 
so how is it possible for the innovator to operate on the same market without 
being subjected to the same regulation? Consequently, the incumbents lobby to 
apply existing regulation to the disruptors business model no matter the dif-
ferences in the technology, business or infrastructural model used. This is not 
what sustainability means. Sustainability, while still ensuring technology neu-
trality, means that the regulator must investigate new technology and ensure 
neutrality of regulation either through implementation or adaptation of its inter-
pretation even if the regulation remains the same. 
Additionally, it is not easy for regulators to let existing regulation expire and be 
repealed simply due to innovation. This is understandable, as the regulators have 
put a lot of effort into building the regulation and, thereafter, building the relevant 
case law. Not to mention the fact that the creation of a new regulatory framework 
is not an easy task for any regulator, especially considering that regulation is often 
needed for a domain, technology or infrastructure that the regulator does not 
understand or the effects of which have not been realized to a substantial level.  
Instead, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, the sustainability value 
of the neutrality principle requires that the higher the specific legal act is in the 
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hierarchy of legal acts, the more sustainable and abstract its legal norms must be. 
Such legal norms are accompanied by the less sustainable and gap-filling guide-
lines, standards, etc. in the lower level.152 On the basis of the sustainability value, 
Koops claims that the regulatory framework should promote certain substantive 
principles (such as fundamental values153 and rights) that are important from the 
point of view of the regulator “rather than put all effort into creating specific 
regulations for specific problems.”154 At the same time, it must be considered that 
the more abstract the regulation is, the less certain the regulation subjects are of 
the outcome of its application in a specific use case. At the same time, the more 
abstract the regulation is, the more sustainable it becomes. Sustainability is also 
sometimes referred to as “future-proofing of regulation” and “statutory 
longevity”.155 The neutral wording of regulation aims to achieve this so-called 
future-proof, sustainable or, in other words, foresight regulation. However, fore-
sight regulation often tends to be vague and therefore creates legal uncertainty, 
as the subject of the regulation is unable to predict the effect of the regulation on 
a new set of facts and consequently, the regulation becomes non-transparent. An 
example of this is the long-standing confusion related to the term ‘stored on 
electronic device’ in the context of electronic money under the e-Money 
Directive.156 Does ‘stored on electronic device’ include a smart card or an 
electronic wallet on the user’s computer, a loyalty card or a mobile application, 
etc? Is the term ‘device’ in this context future-proof?157 Therefore, according to 
some scholars, foresight regulation is not possible at all,158 as technology 
advances so quickly and so unpredictably that applying existing regulation will 
always bring unforeseeable consequences, such as limiting the use and depriving 
the innovative solution of its benefits. Additionally, according to Bennett 
Moses,159 language is unable to achieve technology neutrality as, in order to draft 
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regulation with legal certainty, language uses existing terminology tied to the 
present technological reality.  
 
 
2.7 The principle of technology neutrality in Estonian law 
The principle of technology neutrality is included also in the national laws of EU 
Member States and has been similarly included in the national laws of Estonia. 
The predominant source for the principle in Estonian law is the Estonian 
Electronic Communications Act (ECA).160 The principle is already described in 
§ 1 of the ECA through the purpose of the act that is stated as  
 
“to create the necessary conditions for the development of electronic com-
munications to promote the development of electronic communications networks 
and electronic communications services without giving preference to specific 
technologies and to ensure the protection of the interests of users of electronic 
communications services by promoting free competition and the purposeful and 
just planning, allocation and use of radio frequencies and numbering.” 
 
The principle can also be recognized in the wording of § 6 section 2 of ECA that 
stresses that the specific purpose of regulating the management of radio fre-
quencies is the need to “ensure the purposeful, objective, transparent and propor-
tionate management, and the effective and efficient use of radio frequencies” also 
in order to create possibilities “for the development of new technologies”. Further-
more, without specifically mentioning of the principle, the aim of the principle is 
stated in § 28 section 2 of ECA stating that “the Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Communications and the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory 
Authority shall manage the numbering resources on the basis of objective, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria, taking account of the 
need to achieve harmonised, efficient and effective use of numbering.”  
§ 40 section 1 of ECA states as “the purpose of the sector-specific regulation 
of markets of communications services (hereinafter market) is to ensure the 
pluralism of communications service providers, their equal and non-discriminatory 
treatment by encouraging competition, and the quality and availability to end-
users of the provided services” and in section 3 of the same paragraph “the sector-
specific regulation of markets must be technologically neutral”. In the opinion of 
the author separating technology-neutrality into a different section of the legal 
norm while the meaning of the principle is already explained in section 1 shows 
that the meaning of the principle was empty to the regulator and the term 
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“technologically neutral” is used to meet the expectation to use this term, while 
understanding the meaning of this term is uncertain.  
Additionally, § 134 section 4 of ECA stipulates the objectives of state orga-
nisation of the electronic communications sector by explaining the principle of 
technology neutrality with specific components without again naming the prin-
ciple. The section reiterates that the state organisation of electronic commu-
nications sector must be pursued on the basis of objective, transparent, non-
discriminatory and proportionate regulatory principles, among other things, the 
following: 
 
• “the promotion of foreseeability of regulation by ensuring uniform regulatory 
approach also after regulatory amendments; 
• the ensuring of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of communications 
undertakings; 
• the promotion of infrastructure-based competition; 
• the promotion of investment in communications networks and other units of 
electronic communications infrastructure, the supporting of innovation and the 
protection of investments.” 
 
The author finds this § 134 section 4 of ECA as the clearest description in 
Estonian law of the components and aims of the technology neutrality principle.  
In addition to ECA, the principle is recognizable (though not mentioned) also 
in §§ 14, 17, 21 and 29 of the Personal Data Protection Act161 that states a general 
obligation of the controller of personal data to implement legal and technological 
measures which enable to fulfill the obligations of the act. The Personal Data 
Protection Act does not mention the technology neutrality goal or principle 
specifically nor mention any of its components stated in ECA.  
Lastly, the author concludes that the principle is through its components 
represented also in other legal acts in Estonia that limit or guide the regulator, 
such as § 22 section 1 of the Product Conformity Act162 under which the “con-
formity assessment bodies perform their functions in a competent, transparent, 
impartial, independent, non-discriminating and proportionate manner and follow 
the requirements established for the conformity assessment of specific products” 
or Public Procurement Act163 that aims “to ensure the transparent, practical and 
economic use of the contracting authority’s or the contracting entity’s funds, equal 
treatment of persons, and effective use of competition in public procurement”.164  
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By far the most case law on the content of the principle has been generated on 
the basis of public procurement disputes.165 Through reference to Public Pro-
curement Act § 88 section 7, Articles 42(2), 18 (1) and Recital 74 of 2014/24/EU 
Directive the principle and its sub-principle of functional equivalence are at 
lengths discussed in Estonian Supreme Court case 3-20-718, nevertheless, still 
unmentioned by their titles.166 
 
 
2.8 CJEU case law 
Most CJEU cases that mention technology neutrality or functional equivalence 
are dealing with electronic communication,167 broadcasting168 or broadcasters.169 
Nevertheless, the principle is present, though not mentioned, also in other types 
of disputes as discussed below. In European Commission, European Parliament 
v Council of the European Union, 170 technology neutrality was discussed in the 
context of the meaning of the “broadcasting organisation” to include broadcasters 
“regardless of whether, in the context of new digital technologies, the reference 
to broadcasts transmitted by wire or over the air”. The principle was applied on 
the basis of the Framework Directive for example in Belgacom SA v Belgium171 
to fees charged for radio frequencies from the mobile telephone operators where 
the court stated the fees must be “objectively justified, transparent, non‑discrimi-
natory and proportionate in relation to their intended purpose and take into 
account the objectives of” the technology neutrality principle. In Comunidad 
Autónoma del País Vasco, Itelazpi SA172 the court supported the European 
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Commission in the conclusion that granting state aid to digital terrestrial television 
operators in order to switch over from analogue television to digital is not in 
accordance with the principle of technology neutrality, insofar as the state aid 
excludes other technology provider such as satellite service providers.  
As stated in section 2.5 above the author finds that the principle can also be 
explained through the use of the principles of transparency, equal treatment and 
non-discrimination used in public procurement. This is especially so concerning 
“technical specifications, in the light of the risks of discrimination related either 
to the choice of specifications or their formulation”.173 Furthermore, “complying 
with those requirements is all the more important when […] the technical specifi-
cations listed in the procurement documents are formulated in a particularly 
detailed manner. Indeed, the more detailed the technical specifications, the higher 
the risk of favouring the products of a given manufacturer will be.”174 Furthermore, 
according to CJEU it is required that “the level of detail of the technical specifi-
cations complies with the principle of proportionality”.175 These cases assist to 
understand what non-favouring of certain technology means and how to interpret 
these principles. . 
The examples of CJEU case law show that functional equivalence is often 
raised in the case of how goods and services of different forms, such as physical 
versus digital, are compared. Given that the principle was developed for the equal 
treatment of these two media, the principle is of the utmost relevance in relation 
to digital goods176 and the Digital Single Market (DSM). In eDate Advertising,177 
the court treated paper-based – and online media equivalently, specifically 
identifying the equivalence of publication and the distribution of a newspaper 
(paper-based medium) and a publication online “by means of the Internet” (online 
medium). The dispute was related to eCommerce directive and the court reinforced 
that the free movement of services applies equally to electronic commerce 
services and non-electronic services. Furthermore, the court also reiterated that 
the right to initiate proceedings against such service providers should also not be 
subject to stricter rules than those for non-electronic commerce services.  
However, the equivalent treatment of these categories is not relevant only 
from the point of view of the simple treatment of the category but also from the 
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point of view of taxation. On the basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality that 
“precludes similar goods or supplies of services, which compete with one another, 
from being treated differently for VAT purposes”178 discussed in Commission v 
Germany,179 functionally equivalent goods also need to be taxed similarly for the 
purposes of competition and equal treatment.  
However, although the technology neutrality principle dictates that digital 
goods, though distinctly different from physical goods, should be treated equally, 
not all directives and consequently, also case law of the CJEU on these different 
media is that consistent with this idea. While, regarding software as reinforced in 
the UsedSoft case180, the Software Directive treated downloaded software equally 
with software on a material medium (e.g., CD-ROM or DVD) 181 under the Soft-
ware Directive, e-books – as the digital version of printed books – were at times 
treated differently. The rulings of Commission v Luxembourg and France,182 
Allposters,183 Darmstadt,184 VOB v Stichting Leenrecht185 and recently Tom 
Kabinet186 show that the court is inconsistent as to whether different media of a 
book should be treated equally or differently. In the Tom Kabinet case,187 the 
court regarded it inappropriate to apply the UsedSoft logic to e-books, as these 
are not software, nor are they functionally equivalent to physical books. The court 
regarded the Software Directive as lex specialis from InfoSoc Directive and 
reasoned that, although the aim of the Software Directive was to treat “tangible 
and intangible copies of computer programs”188 equivalently, it was not the aim 
of the InfoSoc Directive. 
In order to treat e-books differently, the CJEU qualified these goods as 
functionally different and identified a limitation to the principle of technology 
neutrality. For example, the court stated in the UsedSoft case: 
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“the sale of a computer program on a material medium and the sale of a computer 
program by downloading from the internet are similar, since the online trans-
mission method is the functional equivalent of the supply of a material medium. 
Accordingly, interpreting Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24 in the light of the 
principle of equal treatment justifies the two methods of transmission being treated 
in a similar manner.”189 
 
Hence, the CJEU separated the content layer and the transport layer of the techno-
logy and established that there is no difference in the product itself (the content 
layer) even though its transport layer is different. However, in the Tom Kabinet 
case, the court stated:  
 
“the supply of a book on a material medium and the supply of an e-book cannot, 
however, be considered equivalent from an economic and functional point of view. 
As [...] dematerialised digital copies, unlike books on a material medium, do not 
deteriorate with use, and used copies are therefore perfect substitutes for new 
copies. 190 
 
As can be seen, the court analyses the goods functionally and separates the trans-
port layer from the content layer (e.g., the difference of supply), and the different 
utility aspect of the e-book is that it does not deteriorate with use and used copies 
are perfect substitutes for new copies. Those characteristics can also be regarded 
as functions of the e-book’s delivery process and, therefore, this process comes 
with a different bundle of rights for the e-book itself under Article 3 of the 
InfoSoc Directive that are not the same as the rights attached to printed books.  
Interestingly, also in the UsedSoft case, downloadable software has different 
delivery processes, but the Software Directive does not separate these bundles of 
rights in an equivalent way. Consequently, the core difference of online – and 
offline media – the fact that digital medium does not deteriorate with use as it 
does not have a materialised component – is a cause to treat the delivery process 
and hence, the good itself differently and, consequently, the relationship of use 
might change from distribution to mere communication to the public. Therefore, 
such differences in treatment might limit the principle of technology neutrality 
due to difference in functions that justifies difference in treatment.  
The court also pointed to the reason for the justification of such difference: “a 
parallel second-hand market would be likely to affect the interests of the copyright 
holders in obtaining an appropriate reward for their works much more than the 
market for second-hand tangible objects”. 191 This point is more related to the 
economic point of view than the functional, as there are plenty of material goods 
which actually increase in value over time or with use (furniture, art, vintage 
goods, etc.) and also these are later sold on the second-hand market along with 
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the originals to the detriment of the copyright holders attempting to sell originals 
of the same. The issue is that these two cases are based on the application of two 
different directives. Under the InfoSoc Directive, there appears to be a limitation 
to the principle of technology neutrality due to the economic interests of the copy-
right owner and that limitation devalues the scope of rights of the user for the 
benefit of the copyright holder. In a way, this means that because technology has 
advanced to a level that allows the publisher of the book to control access to the 
electronic version of the book indefinitely than as stated by the court, the assets 
and features of the new technology have consequently altered the rights attached 
to the digital good. This in turn has changed the relationship of use of this digital 
good for the benefit of the copyright holder. This is a direct consequence of 
technology use as due to technology there is no deterioration of the e-book upon 
use. Legally, therefore, the court argues that no sale is taking place, as all the 
copyright holder is doing is communicating the e-book to the public and con-
sequently, no exhaustion of distribution right takes place.  
The Tom Kabinet case ruling, and the respective InfoSoc Directive inter-
pretation show, that, upon advancing technology, the scope of rights that was 
limited due to constraints in the physical world can be expanded or changed. This 
means that the choice to expand these scopes is directly related to technological 
possibilities and capabilities. This is an additional limitation of the technology 
neutrality principle: when technology advances and the contextual changes take 
place, the rights and liberties of individuals might also expand or change. This 
aspect does not carry the preference of a regulator for one technology over 
another, but merely grants the electronic version of the category – such as e-books – 
a higher level of exclusive control by the copyright holder. 
DLT in essence also has capabilities to advance the control of the copyright 
holder (mostly directly the author) and there are a number of solutions built on 
DLT, such as Scenarex’s product book chain,192 that allow authors to forego 
publishers and sell, resell and lend their e-books without involving the technology 
heavy solution of a third party publisher. This allows the author themselves to 
earn directly from the distribution and decide whether the smart contract 
governing the sale, resale and lending should allow for the expansion of absolute 
right like in Tom Kabinet’s case or instead allow for ownership and resale option 
for the buyer of the e-book while granting the author the right to earn through the 
execution of the smart contract on all following resales of the respective e-book. 
Another example of a DLT-based publishing solution is Publica’s193 product 
Book ICO, which allows funds for writing the book to be raised and, con-
sequently, copies of the book to be sold prior to it being written.  
 
 
                                                                          
192  Scenarex website. <https://www.scenarex.ca/en/bookchain/> accessed 16 November 2020. 
193  Publica website. <https://publica.com/> accessed 16 November 2020. 
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In addition to the pessimism around the sustainability goal of the principle as 
described in the section 2.6 above, there are other reasons why the principle is 
difficult to apply and follow in practice. Reed has stated that, even though the 
principle is not clearly understood by regulators, the validity and priority of the 
principle is rarely questioned.194  
The critique of the principle presented herein is not only related to its limi-
tations but also to the difficulties in its application and the guidance the regulator 
is able to obtain from the principle. This critique can be divided into several 
categories, such as (i) contextual changes and convergence of technologies; 
(ii) failure to understand the technology; and (iii) undesired consequences such 
as vagueness, as further discussed below. 
 
 
2.9.1 Contextual changes and convergence of technology 
Due to the advancement of technology, the context of the market and society 
changes constantly and, at times, leads existing regulation to become unfit in the 
changed context. This was also discussed in the work of Kamecke and Körber as 
presented above – the aim of the principle is to curb regulators from extending 
existing regulation to the changed context. Chris Reed presents the example of a 
publisher in the online domain in comparison to the offline domain as an example 
of this type of contextual changes.195 The publisher in offline media has 
systematic control over content (“media under editorial control”196), but in the 
online domain, control by a hosting service provider is less systematic due to the 
mere abundance of content posted by users. Hence, the regulation differentiates 
the treatment of these publishers and introduces different regulation for these 
domains.197 The same challenge arose in case of telecommunications services and 
OTT services198 where the market changed dramatically as technologies converged 
from simply traditional telecommunications services into vastly different services. 
This type of convergence challenges the regulator to treat the outcome of utility-
                                                                          
194  Reed (n. 100), p. 264. 
195  Reed (n. 100), p. 264. 
196  Savin (n. 63). 
197  Article 14 of e-Commerce Directive. 
198  Andrej Savin uses a simplified definition for these services by characterizing them as 
“media companies that distribute content and services (VoIP, instant messaging, streaming, 
etc.) through the Internet rather than other proprietary channels.” Andrej Savin. ‘EU Regu-
latory Models for Platforms on the Content and Carrier Layers: Convergence and Changing 
Policy Patterns’ (November 14, 2018). The Nordic Journal of Commercial law, 1/2018, 
Copenhagen Business School, CBS LAW Research Paper No. 19-08, p. 22.  
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284434> accessed 14 November 2020. 
198  Reed, (n. 100), p. 278. 
2.9 Critique 
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wide equivalent services (such as telephone services and VoiP) differently199 and 
makes it difficult to understand how new regulation should be developed in order 
for it to be technology neutral.200  
This is especially relevant in relation to social media and search engines, such 
as Google, Facebook and Twitter, which have become the “primary distributors 
of news content”201 and through this control of news content delivery they also 
control the majority of all digital advertising budgets.202 However, the extension 
of the “media under editorial control” regulation to social media and platforms 
on the basis of the functional equivalence sub-principle is uncalled for precisely 
because of the contextual differences.203 Instead, these OTT service providers are 
subject to a “significantly simpler and less onerous regime”204 known as internet 
society services (ISSs) regulation. Due to this, the incumbents of the market might 
not appreciate neutrality and merely identify the difference in the treatment of 
these service providers.205  
Furthermore, as suggested by Savin, the EU’s platform regulation is also the 
result of technological convergence bringing about different organizations (the 
platforms) on the markets for obtaining information, data, goods and services.206 
This means that the shift in the context, the roles of participants, the services these 
participants provide and the infrastructure they use in order to provide these could 
result in existing regulation being unfit to address the new market and an 
adaptation is called for. This in turn means that while the technology neutrality 
principle guides regulators to refrain from extending the existing regulation, it is 
not as clear as to the content of the new regulation so that the effects equivalence 
(equivalent effect across different technologies) could prevail. The hosting 
service providers in online media have a certain degree of immunity against 
defamation claims and consequently, their treatment is different.207 However, 
even considering that the difference is caused by the process, setup, infra-
structure, speed of change and control over changes of the specific service, it is 
difficult under the principle to establish how exactly the difference should be 
reflected in regulation for effects equivalence to prevail. Therefore, given the 
operating differences between service providers, technology neutrality remains 
                                                                          
199  Savin (n. 198). 
200  Reed, (n. 100), p. 278. 
201 Center for Media Transition. The Impact of Digital Platforms on News and Journalistic 
Content (2018). <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20commissioned%20report 
%20%20The%20impact%20of%20digital%20platforms%20on%20news%20and%20journal
istic%20content%2C%20Centre%20for%20Media%20Transition%20%282%29.pdf> 
accessed 22 November 2020. 
202  ibid. 
203  Savin (n. 63). 
204  Savin (n. 198), p. 22.  
205  Savin, (n. 198), p. 22. 
206  Savin, (n. 198), p. 24. 
207  Reed (n. 100), p. 267. 
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ambiguous on how to grant equivalence of treatment considering these dif-
ferences, and the intention of the regulator to introduce regulation at all should 
be examined in order to identify the ways to achieve equivalent effect. The out-
come of such difficulty is examined in Article III and in section 4.3 of this disser-
tation (eIDAS use case), which shows that the regulation was aimed to be neutral 
regarding handwritten signatures and electronic signatures. Still, the contextual 
change in reality is considerably different and even while the regulation attempts 
to be technology-neutral, it still is closely linked to the existing understanding of 
the use of a particular technology. 
 
 
2.9.2 Failure to understand technology 
Reed argues that the aim of the principle is unattainable because the legislators 
fail to understand the technology.208 In the wording of the regulation, the regulators 
fail to convey the technological part properly, either omitting something or over-
regulating. Reed brings an example under the Database Directive209 of 1996: the 
intention of the Commission expressed in the explanatory memorandum aimed at 
protecting “databases both of content originating from third parties and content 
originating from the maker of the database”.210 Unfortunately in the wording of 
the directive, the making was defined as the “obtaining, verification or presentation 
of the contents” and this tilted the protection of databases to only cover that which 
the maker of the database itself has obtained, verified or presented, instead of that 
of third parties. Consequently, database-making was a misunderstood process.  
Similarly in Estonian law, point 10 of § 3 of the MLPA defines the virtual cur-
rency wallet service as “a service in the framework of which keys are generated 
for customers or customers’ encrypted keys are kept that can be used for the 
purpose of keeping, storing and transferring virtual currencies”.211 The definition 
was transposed from the 5th AMLD proposal that read “‘virtual currencies’ means 
a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or public 
authority nor necessarily attached to a fiat currency, but is accepted by natural or 
legal persons as a means of payment and can be transferred, stored or traded 
electronically” and wallet service as “wallet providers offering custodial services 
of credentials necessary to access virtual currencies”.212 As the 5th AMLD includes 
regulation about the credentials necessary to access the virtual currencies, it is 
important under the directive not how the credentials are maintained (encrypted 
or not encrypted), but rather that these credentials should grant access to the 
                                                                          
208  Reed (n. 100), p. 279. 
209  Directive 96/9 on the legal protection of databases OJ L77, 27 March 1996, p. 20. 
210  Reed (n. 100), p. 279.  
211  In Estonian: “virtuaalvääringu rahakotiteenus on teenus, mille raames luuakse klientidele 
või hoitakse klientide krüpteeritud võtmeid, mida saab kasutada virtuaalvääringute hoidmise, 
talletamise ja ülekandmise eesmärgil”. 
212  Article 1 (1) and (2) of 5th AMLD.  
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wallet. The author concludes that the Estonian law-makers meant to say “encryp-
tion keys” (credentials used in controlling access to content) or even “encryption 
and decryption keys” but by mistake said “encrypted keys” (meaning that the 
keys themselves are encrypted for safekeeping these) in the definition of the 
respective service. Based on the Cybernetica AS overview of DLT mandated by 
the Estonian Information System Authority,213 the word ‘encrypted’ is used in the 
context of ‘encrypted’ documents, messages or data and the word ‘encryption’ in 
the context of scheme, regime or operation or as a process. The algorithm and the 
keys are used for encryption and not encrypted themselves. As described in Article 
III,214 the public key cannot be encrypted at all as it is a wallet address and 
otherwise the parties trading with each other would not be able to use these wallets. 
Plus, the custodial wallet provider does not generate any private keys for users 
and therefore, there is no need to encrypt any keys. 
 
 
2.9.3 Undesired consequences 
One undesirable consequence of the principle of technology neutrality is the 
vagueness of the regulation. Although the subsidiarity principle guides the 
regulator to develop regulation that is abstract in higher-level regulation, if 
regulation aims to be technology-neutral, the outcome only reveals itself through 
case law unless the guidelines or lower-level regulation that somewhat clarifies 
the meaning behind the vagueness are issued. In aiming to be vague for the sake 
of neutrality, legal clarity and certainty suffer as the regulation is unclear. Reed 
brings the example of the phrase ‘stored on electronic device’ in the then valid e-
Money Directive, which is also present in the valid version, and believes that the 
vague construct leaves a lot of unanswered questions that have caused long-




In order to frame the principle specifically in the digital society context leaving 
biotechnology, environment protection, military and similar applications aside, 
and specifically aiming to identify limitations to the scope of the principle of 
technology neutrality, it is possible to use the regulation of the Framework 
                                                                          
213  Cybernetica. ‘Krüptograafiliste algoritmide elutsükkel. Uuring’ [Life cycle of crypto-
graphic algorithms. Study] (Riigi Infosüsteemi Ameti tellimusel, 2017). <https://www.ria.ee/ 
sites/default/files/content-editors/publikatsioonid/kruptograafiliste_algoritmide_elutsukli_ 
uuring_2017.pdf> accessed 21 October 2020. 
214  Veerpalu, Jürgen, Silva and Norta, (n. 89), pp. 39–84. 
215  Reed (n. 100), p. 280. Read further on the example at Chris Reed, ‘The Law of Unintended 
Consequences – embedded business models in IT regulation’ (2007) The Journal of 
Information and Technology Law 1, part 3.1 <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/> 
accessed 22 November 2020. 
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Directive in relation to significant market power as a source on the circumstances 
any curbing of any technology’s use could be justified.  
Also considering that the principle is based on the general principles of non-
discrimination and equal treatment, the limitations of it are at the borders of 
differences that can be identified in the new technical solution. This means that 
in case the functions analysis reveals differences between the comparison objects 
that also effect the possibility to obtain the purpose and objective of the require-
ments set in regulation, the difference of treatment could be justified. However, 
the key question there is – whether the difference is substantive enough to justify 
difference of treatment and whether the difference in treatment is proportional to 
the difference in substance.  
Furthermore, limitations to the principle can be identified under Article 3 (2) 
and (4) of the eCommerce Directive, under which the Member States may restrict 
the freedom to provide information society services from another Member State 
if the measures taken will be necessary for  
 
“public policy, in particular the prevention, investigation, detection and pro-
secution of criminal which the service provider has to comply in respect of: 
offences, including the protection of minors and the fight against any incitement to 
hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of human 
dignity concerning individual persons, the protection of public health, public 
security, including the safeguarding of national security and defence, the pro-
tection of consumers, including investors” 
 
which all could potentially be used as the basis for limiting the obligation to comply 
with the technology neutrality principle. Similar list is included and provides a 
justification to restrict data controllers or processors in Article 23 of the GDPR.  
In the context of the NIS Directive, the limitations to the technology-neutrality 
are stipulated in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)216 laying down 
rules for application of the NIS Directive as regards to the further specification 
of the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for managing 
the risks posed to the security of network and information systems and of the 
parameters for determining whether an incident has a substantial impact. 
However, the author suggests that regulators should use the Services Direc-
tive217 and the criteria for granting authorisations as an example for assessing the 
legality of limitations on the use of technology. Given this analogy, these limi-
tations and differences of treatment must be:218 
                                                                          
216  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151, of 30 January 2018, laying down 
rules for application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council as regards further specification of the elements to be taken into account by digital 
service providers for managing the risks posed to the security of network and information 
systems and of the parameters for determining whether an incident has a substantial impact. 
217  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, pp. 36–68. 
218  Article 10, Service Directive. 
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(a)  non-discriminatory; 
(b)  justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest; 
(c)  proportionate to that public interest objective; 
(d)  clear and unambiguous; 
(e)  objective; 
(f)  made public in advance; 
(g)  transparent and accessible.  
 
As it appears, specific legal instruments regulating in each specific sector or 
service may also include limitations for the technology neutrality principle that can 
justify a regulator’s non-compliance with the principle as long as the choice is 




The current chapter provided an overview of the principle of technology 
neutrality. The principle is relevant to DLT, as regulation has been drafted for 
centralized structures and the impact of the regulation on distributed infra-
structures must therefore be analysed to identify biases in regulation against DLT. 
The reason for the presentation of the principle is to understand the meaning of 
technology neutrality and functional equivalence and to guide the application of 
the principle in the DLT use cases discussed in Chapter 4. 
In this chapter, the author presented a comprehensive overview of the aim, 
meaning, origins and subjects of the principle. In summary, the principle is 
expressed by the goal that “the rules should neither require nor assume a particular 
technology”, and the principle is aimed rather to curb the regulator more than 
anyone else. This means that the regulator should refrain from preferring or 
favouring technologies, outputs of technologies, processes thereof or infrastruc-
tures based thereon. The principle is regarded as the starting point of information 
and communication technology (ICT) regulation but is considered relevant in all 
fields of law, applying equally to all branches of government – legislative, execu-
tive and judiciary. 
The overview of the origins of the principle presented shows that the principle 
has been historically used in regulation aimed for ICT sector, –however, the 
principle has grown and expanded across sectors involving digital component.. 
Furthermore, the idea, aim and content of the principle is recognizable in public 
procurement regulation through the use of the principles of equality of treatment, 
non-discrimination and transparency. These are all the same values that are 
recognized also part of the technology neutrality principle and therefore, these 
principles in public procurement can be used to understand the expectations the 
technology neutrality principle creates for the regulators in relation to regulation. 
The placing of the principle among the values that need to be respected in 
establishing guidelines for the public sector for creating interoperability shows that 
where-ever public sector is making decisions that could influence the use of 
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technology – neutrality should be respected. Lastly, as technology has infiltrated 
also other sectors, the principle can no longer be considered as a principle only 
for the ICT sector, but this expansion has brought the principle to all sectors with 
digital processes or outputs and the principle should be recognized as a general 
principle of law.  
In Estonian law, the principle is not worded in any other legal instruments than 
the ECA and even in ECA the term carries no definition. Nevertheless, the prin-
ciples components can be found clearly stated in other norms of ECA and Public 
Procurement Act that also has the most relevant disputes ruled on in Supreme 
Court. 
Consequently, as stated in this chapter, the main aim of neutrality is to secure 
competition among technologies that have the same characteristics, functions or 
utility or reach the same objective. In order to answer the question of how to 
identify bias in regulation on the basis of the technology neutrality principle, the 
author identified the components of the principle: (i) functional equivalence and 
(ii) effects equivalence. Both of these components should be used in analysing 
existing regulation in order to identify non-compliance with said principle. 
Initially, the functional equivalence sub-principle requires a functional analysis 
to be conducted. For the purposes of the analysis, the technology and its functions 
need to be studied along with the objective of the regulation and its requirements 
in the context of the aim and meaning of the technology neutrality principle. The 
effects equivalence requires that the equivalence of the effects of regulation is 
granted as soon as the equivalence of functions is established.  
The court cases discussed show that courts struggle to understand the techno-
logy neutrality principle and that there is inconsistent practice in applying the 
principle. The principle is also relevant in the context of the treatment of digital 
goods versus material goods and, therefore, the court cases of UsedSoft and Tom 
Kabinet were discussed in the chapter in order to exemplify the fact that techno-
logy (such as the technical transfer layer) can also be the cause for difference of 
treatment. As can be seen in these cases, there are multiple layers in technological 
solutions, and the process of examination of these might reveal different functions 
and utility. Technological advances may change the context and develop reality 
in such a way that granting equivalent treatment to virtual expressions of 
previously physical objects seems like a constraint that was anchored in physical-
world limitations. Hence, the offline-online equivalence of treatment, if followed 
to the letter, actually limits technological advances and use cases. Such difference 
of treatment is not necessarily contrary to the technology neutrality principle, as 
the principle requires regulators to consider the technology and its capabilities 
when regulating in order to ensure that the effect of their regulation is as non-
favouring as possible. However, the principle does not require the limitation of 
the use of the technology for development of the rights of the parties and the 
object’s trading options and liquidity. This is especially relevant to DLT and 
crypto-assets, even on the basis of the MiCA Proposal, which addresses the newly 
developed sui generis categories of different crypto-assets that are further 
developed versions of their off-chain concepts of means of payment, means of 
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exchange, entry-form securities, etc. Nevertheless, the layers might not neces-
sarily justify equal or different treatment but may assist in understanding the 
interest the regulator wishes to protect and, consequently, reveal a reason why the 
regulator might wish to treat media differently despite the equivalence of utility 
and content layer.  
The following chapter addresses how to ensure DLT-neutral regulation con-
sidering the regulative strategies suggested by previous research for DLT regu-
lation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this dissertation does not treat DLT regulation 
as a different field of study; however, recent regulative initiatives – the MiCA 
Proposal and the Pilot Regime – show that EU institutions are preparing to regu-
late DLT, and the regulative strategies presented in the following chapter are the 
alternatives that have been identified as relevant for consideration. The next 
chapter will build upon the research of earlier scholars and assess these regulative 
strategies on the basis of the sustainability and neutrality aims of said principle, 
bringing examples of the DLT-specific regulative initiatives identified by the 




III REGULATIVE STRATEGIES 
The following chapter aims to find an answer to the research question: how to 
sustainably ensure DLT neutrality? This research question is addressed on a 
foundational level, meaning that the question not only concerns which regulative 
strategy to use in a fragmented and isolated context of one specific DLT use case, 
but the wider perspective of the impact of the technology is considered. As 
previously mentioned, DLT is not an isolated technology that can be used in one 
sector but has applications across society and markets and expands into un-
expected use cases constantly. Therefore, the choice of regulative strategy should 
consider the technology’s wider context and the contextual changes introduced 
thereby.  
Furthermore, DLT-based networks are globally accessible and not limited to 
a specific territory or jurisdiction. This means that any national or even multi-level 
regulatory activity at EU level should be conscious of the reach and accessibility 
of DLT as any regulation with limited territorial scope fragments the legal certainty 
of operating a global network and creates obstacles for users and innovators. 
Therefore, legal scholars carry the burden of sharing and investigating the 
regulative strategies adopted in different jurisdictions to identify potential 
regulative strategies that could limit the negative effect of fragmentation of national 
regulation.  
The discussion in this chapter is followed by use case analyses based on 
specific existing regulation to exemplify the limitations existing regulation may 
create to DLT use. Nevertheless, in designing regulative strategies in response to 
the disruption brought about by DLT, the regulators should not only view the 
specific use cases but also the wider context and try to address the entire existing 
regulatory framework using a sustainable regulative strategy and models to ensure 
neutral treatment across the sectors in which DLT is used. Therefore, in the 
current chapter, the question of how to ensure DLT neutrality in regulation is 
addressed by displaying a selection of strategies that regulators should consider 
while aiming to regulate DLT use. The chapter addresses these regulative stra-
tegies based on sustainability and neutrality aims.  
In 2018, the European Blockchain Observatory and Forum and the European 
Commission requested a study on the legal and regulatory aspects of blockchain-
inspired technologies (Study),219 which was completed in March 2020. The Euro-
pean Commission’s aim was to look at the technology and understand its “devel-
opments and also its potential impact on society and economy with a view of 
setting the right conditions for the advent of an open, secure, trustworthy, 
transparent, and EU law-compliant data – and transactional environment.”220 The 
                                                                          
219  European Commission. Call for tender page. Tender press release 12 December 2018. 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/study-blockchains-legal-governance-
and-interoperability-aspects> accessed 06 November 2020 
220  ibid. 
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Study’s outcome can potentially be used to pave the approach for DLT to be 
regulated in the EU. In September 2020, the EU introduced its first initiative to 
DLT-specific regulation – a proposal on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA Proposal) 
and a proposal on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on DLT (Pilot 
Regime) among a package of instruments that is also analysed in this chapter as 
to its regulative strategy. 
The EU Blockchain Study and, separately, Michele Finck, who also led the 
completion of the Study, have identified various strategies for DLT regulation to 
relieve the tension between law and technology. The selection presented in this 
dissertation is not a comprehensive overview of all possible options presented in 
the Study as the author considers some of these as temporary solutions (e.g., sand-
box) or add-ons to other alternatives (e.g., wait-and-see). The overview of alter-
native regulative strategies is based on the categories presented in the EU Block-
chain Study: (1) the wait-and-see approach (innovators operating in ‘quasi-law-
less zones’); (2) application of existing legal frameworks; (3) adapting existing 
regulation (ranging from introducing supranational regime to self-regulation and 
polycentric coregulation).221 However, the author presents regulative models as 
part of these strategies that were not discussed in the EU Blockchain Study as 
models used to address technology regulation. The author does not discuss 
sandbox regime and considers this as part of the three main strategies that is used 
side-by-side with these as the aim of the sandbox regime is to learn about the new 
technology use cases during the wait-and-see phase in order to develop a strategy 
to either apply existing regulation or adapt it. All of the above strategies can be 
fluid phases in the sense that they are adopted temporarily while paving the road 
to the next phase. 
For example, the MiCA Proposal introduced by the EU in late 2020 can be 
considered as a termination of the wait-and-see regulative strategy and the start 
of the strategy of adapting existing regulation by introducing a supranational 
regime – “a bespoke regime for crypto-assets”.222 Furthermore, the Pilot Regime 
is a revolutionary experimentational supranational regime that partly continues 
the wait-and-see regime as it is temporary regulation, nevertheless, it is also an 
adaptation of the existing regulation strategy as well. Both of these instruments 
are discussed further in this chapter as to their approach and impact.  
Of the alternatives presented, Finck considers polycentric coregulation, that 
she calls the 28th regime in the EU, as the most agile and able to both overcome 
the Pacing Problem and achieve the goal of sustainability. However, in the EU 
Blockchain Study no such clear preference for a regulative strategy is issued. 
Furthermore, as seen by the Digital Finance Package, the EU chose the supra-
national regulation as the preferred strategy with the Pilot Regime being a fluid 
and customized regulation full of iterations and adaptations.  
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Consequently, in coherence with the topic of the dissertation, the aim of the 
EU to pave the way for new regulation is important to address from the point of 
view of technology neutrality principle. The EU Blockchain Study suggested three 
different regulative strategies for DLT as presented above and the current chapter 
builds upon these strategies with technology regulation specific models. Each of 
these models are then assessed based on sustainability goal and technology neu-
trality principle as benchmarks. Although the EU Blockchain Study occasionally 
addressed neutrality concerns, the biases of existing regulation were not dis-
cussed and the sustainability goal of regulative strategies received little attention.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this dissertation does not treat DLT regulation as 
a different field of study; however, as EU institutions are preparing to regulate 




3.1 Effects equivalence as a cause for action 
In section 2.5 above, the author identified the components of the principle of 
technology neutrality – functional equivalence and effects equivalence. The 
author further presented in section 2.6 above that the sustainability goal is a key 
element of the principle. Given this context, it is important to stress that, although, 
effects equivalence requires functionally equivalent technology to be granted 
equivalent treatment under existing regulation, this does not necessarily mean 
that existing regulation needs to be amended. Rather, given the sustainability goal 
of the principle, if it is possible to achieve technology-neutrality also through 
implementation neutrality meaning the interpreting of existing regulation in a 
functional-teleological way. Such strategy should be chosen in case no adaptation 
of the existing regulation is pursued to be in line with the sustainability goal.  
If, on the basis of a compliance check with the principle of technology neu-
trality, the regulator establishes that existing regulation fails to comply with said 
principle, the regulator needs to provide solutions for how to comply with the 
principle either through a measure of guidance, the executive branch (central bank, 
ministry, government office, etc.) or guidance in the form of a court ruling or 
request such guidance from the market itself through market-led instructions for 
transparency and compliance.  
This means that effects equivalence is a cause for action, while the first action 
that needs to be taken is the assessment of whether effects equivalence can be 
granted. This leads us to consider the downside of the wait-and-see strategy in the 
effects equivalence context. The following subsections will address the different 
regulative strategies that aim to secure DLT neutrality in a sustainable manner. 
In the following sections, the different regulative models that fall in the three 
regulative strategies of (i) wait-and-see, (ii) application of existing regulation and 
(iii) adaptation of existing regulation discussed in the EU Blockchain Study are 
presented along with their assessment under technology neutrality and sustain-
ability goal. 
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3.1.1 Wait-and-see strategy 
Until the MiCA Proposal, the European Commission also employed the wait-and-
see strategy for “‘actively monitoring’ blockchain technology without taking 
concrete regulatory steps”.223 The identified advantage of the wait-and-see 
approach is the promise that observing and assessing the changed circumstances 
will lead to better regulatory decisions and, hence, better regulation. However, the 
regulative strategy ‘wait-and-see’ actually presupposes that all of the existing 
regulation continues to apply, and this is often missed.224 In this context, it is the 
view of the author that the wait-and-see strategy is largely the same as the ‘appli-
cation of existing regulation’ strategy and has the same concerns and difficulties. 
Still, as wait-and-see requires regulators to ‘see’ meaning in order to actually 
observe, assess and learn about the new technology for the purpose of under-
standing the effect thereof, it would be correct to conclude that the strategy is not 
merely about ‘waiting-and-seeing’, but actually about learning and assessing.  
Nevertheless, the disadvantage of the strategy is that it creates uncertainty 
among innovators and, as can be seen in the de Voogd use case below, also uncer-
tainty and confusion in the regulator, the public and users of the technology. Fur-
thermore, the biases in regulation against any new technology remain intact and 
the non-apparent risk is that not granting effects equivalence to functionally 
equivalent technologies as the regulator is waiting-and-seeing is equally non-
compliant with the technology neutrality principle and therefore, should not be 
accepted as a DLT-neutral strategy. The author concludes that this regulative 




3.1.2 Applying existing regulation strategy 
As wait-and-see regulative strategy cannot be regarded as a separate or a sustain-
able regulative strategy, the other two alternative regulative strategies (applying 
existing regulation and adapting the existing regulation) must be explored. The 
author acknowledges that given the different roles of the regulator (legislative, 
executive and judicial branch), the judicial and executive branch have only one 
alternative of these two strategies – application of the existing regulation – as 
only one branch of the regulator (the legislative) is primarily involved in the 
adapting of the existing regulation. Nevertheless, the author regards the regulator 
representing all these branches and upon the regulator identifying a change on the 
market due to a transformative technology, it has the possibility to assess the 
change and decide how to proceed – the legislative branch may decide to remain 
passive and consequently, allow the judicial branch to apply the existing regu-
lation without any analysis or guidance issued by either executive or legislative 
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branch or it may conduct exploration studies and publish analysis on the changes 
the new technology brings about on the market or it may issue interpretations of 
the existing regulation to guide the market participants or it may decide to adapt 
the existing regulation to react to the changed circumstances and pre-empt legal 
uncertainty given the changes. Consequently, the regulative strategies discussed 
herein treat the regulator as one decision-making actor with three different branches 
and not three different actors which all could have different strategies.  
In this section, the regulative models of functional-teleological interpretation 
and waiver model are discussed along with the concerns of this strategy addressed 
as introduction.  
 
 
3.1.2.1 Concerns in relation to DLT 
As discussed in Chapter 2, regulators often use the functional equivalence sub-
principle to justify the extension of existing regulation to new technology225 with-
out much consideration for the new technology. As Harvey points out, the prin-
ciple of functional equivalence is often used to invoke liability of parties that are 
the easiest to identify and bring claims against.226 Similar liability expansion 
discussions and research can be identified also in relation to DLT. Vast amount 
of publications on the distribution of liability on blockchain and distributed ledger-
technology networks use the same logic of ease of identification and bringing 
claims.227 This liability expansion often presumes similar construction and 
preconditions than those that served as the building blocks for existing regulation. 
The circumstances and construction of DLT is very different from centrally con-
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trolled and governed infrastructure. Only a few scholars228 have in these discus-
sions examined the different layers of the technological setup of DLT networks 
and consequently, introduced also correlated liability layers that are categorized 
as endogenous liability (liability in relation with other nodes aimed at securing 
the sustainability of the network) and exogenous liability (related to third parties 
outside the network). 229 This type of examination of layers serves as an example 
of a functional analysis of a new technology and its different layers that would 
allow the application of the functional equivalence principle and develop new 
regulation, if necessary.  
The application of the functional equivalence principle in cryptoeconomics is 
nothing new, as ever since the arrival of bitcoin in 2008 and subsequently other 
cryptocurrencies, regulators have aimed to apply the anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regulation to these DLT outputs without 
much consideration for the differences in the technology.230 As the de Voogd case 
discussed in Chapter 4 indicates, regulators have subjected cryptocurrency 
exchange service providers to existing AML/CTF regulation, subjecting these 
outputs to more burdensome compliance requirements than even fiat currency 
exchanges, without any regard to the technological specifics.  
Furthermore, since 2016, regulators have been faced with the innovative 
fundraising concept of Initial Coin Offering (ICOs), with the aim to subject these 
to existing regulation and only in some jurisdictions develop customized regu-
lations for ICOs. Since the arrival of ICOs, various regulators have subjected the 
issuance of tokens231 during an ICO to securities laws and regarded ICOs func-
tionally equivalent to initial public offering (IPO).232 The referred qualifications 
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have led to ICO organizers being fined on the basis of existing regulation.233 The 
issue which needs examination in the DLT context is whether ICO and IPO are 
functionally equivalent and, if so, whether existing rules need to be amended con-
sidering the new realm, its functions and characteristics and the qualities of the 
technology used, etc. In summary, the DLT context creates a number of chal-
lenges for the application of existing regulation and, consequently, the application 
of existing regulation should follow interpretational guidelines that also consider 
the DLT context and the related challenges, as discussed above. 
 
 
3.1.2.2 Functional-teleological interpretation 
In order to resolve these concerns raised in relation to DLT, in the opinion of 
Koops, the functional-teleological method of interpretation is the guiding principle 
of interpretation of the existing regulation234 applied to any new technology. 
Koops stresses that existing regulation should be interpreted based on substantive 
values and interests the regulators intended the regulation to obtain, which means 
the regulators – including the executive branch and judiciary – must interpret even 
technology-specific and less abstract regulation in a “functional, teleological 
way.”235  
In the wider context, this means that the regulation applying to any new tech-
nology cannot only be made up of technical specifications, but must include the 
objective of the influence the regulation wishes to achieve, e.g., the list of aims 
in the GDPR in Recital 71 – minimisation of data, risk error and discrimination 
of individuals, etc. Therefore, it is the task of the interpreter of the existing 
regulation to seek to understand the objective of the functions that are set as re-
quirements under existing regulation and consequently interpret existing regu-
lation in a way that does not value the functions but the objective of the regulator’s 
influence. Such interpretation was used by the CJEU in Hedqvist, where the court 
stated that strict interpretation of the VAT regulation does not mean that the 
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functionally equivalent bitcoin should not enjoy the effects equivalence of the 
VAT exemptions.236 
It is the view of the author that, in the DLT context, this requires not only an 
understanding of the principle, existing regulation and DLT, but also the wider con-
text of the technology, which primarily means the modalities of the architecture 
(infrastructure), consent mechanism, network governance rules, protocol as a 
self-regulation and a market on the basis of which the use cases operate. Such an 
approach is in line with Lawrence Lessig’s theory on the four modalities of 
regulation. 237 According to Lessig’s theory, the influence the regulator wished to 
achieve with the regulation should be assessed considering all of the different 
modalities of regulation at its disposal in the wider context of regulation – the 
market, the social norms (e.g., consensus mechanism and governance rules), the 
architecture (e.g., the protocol) and also existing regulation.   
This regulative strategy is better achieved through the issuing guidance on 
interpretation by the regulator. As the EU Blockchain Study revealed, “oftentimes 
there is legislation in place in relation to a specific legal issue that has been 
identified but there seems to be a lack of awareness regarding its existence”.238 
Usually such guidance is issued by an executive branch: the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA)239 and the European Banking Authority (EBA)240 
have on multiple occasions resorted to issuing guidance or reports explaining DLT 
or regulation applying to DLT. However, probably the largest impact by a regu-
lator has been from FINMA241 in Switzerland, which has interactively contributed 
to the understanding of the technology, addressed legal uncertainty and dis-
seminated knowledge of the technology-coherent interpretation of existing regu-
lation, creating compliance and good practice.242 Many financial regulators have 
issued warnings that operate like guidelines in relation to tokens and whether they 
qualify as securities under national regulation.243 Also, the European Data 
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Protection Board is planning to issue a guideline on the application of the GDPR 
to DLT.244  
The lack of guidelines can create legal uncertainty that may cause individuals 
to be subjected to lengthy court proceedings and result in the suspension of all 
market activity in the related field. Such a situation can be identified in the de 
Voogd case, as discussed in Article I and Chapter 4 below. Guidelines allow 
regulators to quickly resolve legal uncertainty; however, it is certainly a burden 
on regulators to be quick in the development of these while the technology is still 
advancing and use cases are expanding.  
Nevertheless, the author concludes that at times, mere interpretation is not 
sufficient and guidelines such as soft law are a temporary solution due to courts 
overturning these or the measures proving to be ineffective for ensuring com-
pliance.245 The adaptation of existing regulation might be a long-term goal, but a 
sufficient transitory alternative in the view of the author is the ‘waiver solution’ 
suggested by Furrer and Müller and discussed in the following section. 
 
  
3.1.2.3 Waiver solution 
On the basis of the articles by Harvey and Savin as well as the de Voogd case 
discussed in Article I and in Chapter 4 below, it appears to the author that the 
regulator and the courts are more light-handedly willing to secure the extension 
of the burden to comply than the equivalence of outcome (such as the validity or 
applicability of exemptions). Consequently, the regulator, including the judiciary 
is focused on expanding the compliance and liability burden to the disruptors 
entering the market dominated by incumbents. However, where the expansion of 
the equivalence of outcome is concerned, regulators are less generous with equi-
valence. Outcomes such as the validity of a smart contract as a contract in an 
electronic form or application of tax deductions or exemptions for cryptocur-
rencies are less light-handedly available. In such a scenario, incumbents receive a 
competitive advantage in comparison with disruptors, and the disruptors are inequi-
valently discriminated against.  
Andreas Furrer and Luka Müller have consequently focused on the equi-
valence of outcome.246 In the opinion of the author, Furrer and Müller have based 
their approach partly on the same idea of functional and teleological inter-
pretation that is also promoted by Koops and the legislative design through 
abstraction of means as suggested by Hildebrandt and Tielemans (discussed in 
the following sub-section). In the authors view this is the meeting point of these 
different theories these different authors have presented. It appears to the author 
that in order to focus on the equivalence of outcome, the functional – and 
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teleological interpretation of existing regulation must allow for the requirements 
of the existing regulation to be complied with by using technical measures built-
in the DLT solutions and not by designing or building additional solutions that fit 
the requirement’s box merely because the new technology meets the objectives 
of these requirements differently.  
Furrer and Müller use examples of the functional equivalence principle from 
transport law and apply these to DLT use cases. According to them, the functional 
equivalence principle is applicable in the context of ICOs and DLT-based smart 
contracts since, in relation to these new phenomena, existing regulation is con-
sulted for guidance and the regulator has the task of assessing whether and how 
to apply e.g., securities law and contract law. Furrer and Müller’s understanding 
of the principle of functional equivalence is in line with the UNCITRAL model 
described in this chapter below, without requiring adaptation of existing regu-
lation. For DLT-based smart contracts in particular, they present the following 
steps for the application of existing regulation on the basis of the functional equi-
valence sub-principle: 
 
“(i)  The aim of the substantive and formal requirements set in the law for the 
validity of a transaction or existence of a legal institution must be analysed. 
(ii)  The functioning of the digital system claiming to achieve the same aims must 
be analysed. 
(iii)  If the aims can be achieved using the digital system, the substantive and 
formal requirements can be waived for the digital system’s functions as there 
is no need for the substantive and formal requirements because the aims of 
these requirements are achieved through the functioning of the system.”247 
 
The UNCITRAL idea is the same as stated in Recital 74 of 2014/24/EU Directive 
as follows:  
 
“Where reference is made to a European standard or, in the absence thereof, to a 
national standard, tenders based on equivalent arrangements should be considered 
by contracting authorities. It should be the responsibility of the economic operator 
to prove equivalence with the requested label. To prove equivalence, it should be 
possible to require tenderers to provide third-party verified evidence. However, 
other appropriate means of proof such as a technical dossier of the manufacturer 
should also be allowed where the economic operator concerned has no access to 
such certificates or test reports, or no possibility of obtaining them within the 
relevant time limits, provided that the economic operator concerned thereby 
proves that the works, supplies or services meet the requirements or criteria set out 
in the technical specifications, the award criteria or the contract performance 
conditions.” 
 
This means that in case the supplies or services meet certain requirements or 
criteria set out in technical specifications of regulation, it should be allowed for 
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the obliged party to prove equivalence with third-party verified evidence or “other 
appropriate means of proof such as a technical dossier of the manufacturer”. 
The interpretation of the principle by Furrer and Müller is different from the 
UNCITRAL model (discussed in the following section) only in the sense that 
there is no need to amend existing regulation for the new realm, technology or 
infrastructure, but rather, if the functions required by the regulation to consider 
the transaction valid or the legal institution active can be achieved by the design 
created or organizational measures taken, there is no need for changes and the 
new digital system (e.g., programme) should be regarded as compliant with 
existing regulation.248 Their definition of the principle is therefore as follows:  
 
“Insofar as ... law attaches the validity of legal transactions or the existence of a 
legal institution to substantive or formal requirements, these requirements shall be 
deemed to be fulfilled if a digital system can functionally replace the legal 
protection concerns behind these requirements on an equivalent basis”.249 
 
As with the solution provided by Hildebrandt and Tielemans (discussed below in 
this chapter), the burden of this solution rests on the role played by compliance 
supervisors and courts who need to be the ones to determine the equivalence of 
the functions of the innovative system and the function of the requirements 
stipulated in regulation. However, as described by Harvey above, the courts have 
difficulty in applying the functional equivalence principle and would most likely 
require the assistance of experts who validate or certify the innovative system. 
This is no different from the analysis of biological evidence for a DNA match, 
which involves scientific testing and a list of experts. The author concludes that 
this means there needs to be a shift of responsibilities and the rearrangement of 
roles from the legal professionals assessing compliance to the software or organi-
zational experts assessing this type of compliance. Nevertheless, this means that 
the supervisory authority or judiciary still need to grasp the objectives of the 
regulation as if the respective authority or judiciary is unable to understand the 
objective of the requirement in the regulation, we can conclude that the regulation 
does not ensure legal certainty and is not transparent as to its aims.  
It is the view of the author that in order to optimize the resources exposed to 
this obligation, the regulator could consider establishing either a stand-alone cen-
tralized certification procedure of the functions of these innovative systems, as is 
established by the Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act250 in 
Malta or the one stipulated by the Pilot Regime that allows the competent authority 
to request an audit to ensure IT and cyber solution chosen.251 Alternatively, the 
regulators could allow for self-regulation similar to that in India where crypto-
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currency exchanges have developed their own good practices252 or allow func-
tional equivalence validation processes be conducted by privately established and 
managed certification bodies, such as self-regulating organizations (SROs).253 
The SROs would assess the specific products, applications or even algorithms 
that the developers of which seek to use on the market and regard the existing 
regulation unfit. Such initiative has been taken by the Virtual Commodity 
Association (VCA) developed from a “working group in 2018 working towards 
the goal of establishing an industry-sponsored, self-regulatory organization for 
the US virtual currency industry, specifically virtual commodity marketplaces”.254  
These alternatives allow the interpretation of the functional equivalence 
principle developed by Furrer and Müller to not be a burden for the supervisory 
authority or the court system by delegating the task to identify equivalence to the 
private sector or enforcing validation procedures prior to entry to the market. 
According to Furrer and Müller, the solution requires only minor amendments in 
the relevant regulations, if at all, such as a clause to state that the authorities need 
to secure equivalence of outcome to functionally equivalent solutions that have 
been subjected to a either a public or private certification or validation assessment 
procedure. Such approach has been adopted in France: as discussed in Article II, 
the French DLT Order stipulated that “the registration of securities on DLT is 
under the law comparable in effect to the registration of securities at CSD so that 
all the benefits enjoyed by CSD-registered instruments are extended to DLT-
registered instruments”.255 Furthermore, such approach can be recognized also in 
the proposed Blockchain Records and Transactions Act of 2020256 that is set to 
amend the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of the 
US to adapt the regulation of electronic signatures to also include smart contracts 
on blockchain under its regulation and consequently, to grant effects equivalence 
to functionally equivalent signatures and transactions.  
The overall benefit of this interpretation of the principle has the same aim as 
the technology neutrality principle, which was to prevent “the legal system from 
continuing to lag behind the de facto technical development and thus behind 
actual practice”257 “without endangering the legal protection functions guaranteed 
by classical law.”258 Furrer and Müller regard the recognition of the functional 
equivalence principle in such a way in accordance with the principle of 
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contractual freedom on the free market, having a positive effect on digital society 
on the whole.259 
In summary, if effects equivalence calls for action and neither interpretation 
nor waiver solution are sufficient to secure DLT neutrality, an adaptation of 




3.1.3 Adaptation of existing regulation strategy 
There are a number of models that regulators could follow for the adaptation of 
existing regulation that are either based on examples used in the past (e.g., 
UNCITRAL model), used in the EU regulations (e.g., GDPR model) or discussed 
in previous literature that can be perceived also as the goals of better regulation 
initiatives of the EU (e.g, polycentric coregulation). The below does not pertain 
to exhaust the list of models or provide a comprehensive overview of all possible 
models, but merely portrays the models that either have been used or can be used 
to sustainable bridge the gap created by transformative innovation such as 
identified in bridging from online to offline dimension and currently from 
centralized to distributed infrastructure.  
 
 
3.1.3.1 UNCITRAL model 
Using the UNCITRAL functional equivalence model used in the drafting of 
model laws for electronic signatures as guidance, the approach of regulators for the 
adaptation of existing regulation should include the following steps: 
 
(a)  recognize the essential differences between the media, technology or infra-
structure; 
(b)  identify the purpose of the rules in existing regulation applicable to the 
existing medium, technology or infrastructure; 
(c)  to make the best effort to identify the characteristics and technical- or model-
setup-related qualities of the new medium, technology or infrastructure, as 
this is needed to understand how the ‘functionally equivalent’ rule could be 
constructed 
(d)  construct the new rule for the new medium, technology or infrastructure260 
or adapt the rule to be technology-neutral to the new context.261 
 
This means that regulators need to understand the functions of the new medium, 
technology or infrastructure, its utility and the purpose of the rules in existing 
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regulation in order to be able to adapt existing regulation in a technologically 
neutral way. The UNCITRAL model was used in relation to DLT in 2017 in the 
states of Delaware and Wyoming for corporate stock-certificate tokens, and the 
use of DLT networks for the creation and maintenance of corporate records along 
with stock ledger as discussed in Article II.262 Malta and Lichtenstein have 
adopted rather comprehensive DLT regulatory frameworks,263 and initiatives to 
this aim have been also taken by Luxembourg264 and Germany265 using the 
UNCITRAL model to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field for incum-
bents and innovators.  
This means that the model can be used to develop national regulation and supra-
national regulation as suggested by Finck and the EU Blockchain Study. Further-
more, it seems to the author that the UNCITRAL model was also used to develop 
the MiCA Proposal in order to introduce the regulation for crypto-assets and partly 
also the regulation in the Pilot Regime. However, as indicated in this chapter, the 
Pilot Regime also includes many other models and regulative strategies as will 
be discussed below. 
The author concludes that the advantage of the UNCITRAL model in general 
is legal certainty. Furthermore, the use of it in supranational regulation is the 
potential to harmonise regulation across the region. However, DLT has a wide 
range of applications across sectors and new use cases are revealed constantly, 
which means that regulation may need constant adaptation. Therefore, the 
UNCITRAL model is challenged by the sustainability goal of the neutrality prin-
ciple. Although used for electronic signatures regulation, this model has not 
proven to be successful, as its adaptation could prove to be slow and require too 
many resources to be able to guarantee a sustainable neutral regulative solution.  
Furthermore, Savin believes that this model where functional equivalence is 
used to draft new regulation on the basis of old regulation should be dismissed as 
a regulative strategy altogether as it is “typifying the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
to ‘legacy’ regulatory models”.266 Savin267 shares this concern as discussed in the 
previous chapter due to the convergence of disruptive technologies. These new 
technologies cannot be as clearly placed under any sector-specific regulation and 
this, unfortunately, leads to the application of unfit regulation on convergent 
technologies.268 His opinion is based on an analysis of the practice of applying 
the principle of functional equivalence to the extension of existing regulation by 
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EU institutions in law-drafting in domains such as (i) telecoms, (ii) media under 
editorial control and (iii) e-commerce. 269 According to Savin, the telecoms regu-
lation is built on ideas developed two decades ago that have now been included 
in the Electronic Communications Code,270 which subjects disruptive innovations 
called ‘over-the-top’ service providers to expired regulatory models because of 
the aim of the level playing field and video-sharing platforms to use regulation 
developed for linear TV.271 Consequently, Savin claims that “the three regulatory 
circles that currently affect the Internet (e-commerce, audio-video and telecoms) 
are essentially based on old and well-tested regulatory models largely developed 
for pre-Internet technology”.272 However, according to Savin, this is not the only 
flaw in the telecoms regulation. The steepest concern is the separation of the 
sectors into regulatory silos273 with typically stand-alone enforcement infra-
structure and supervision authorities. These silos represent separate layers in 
relation to technology as the ‘carrier layer’ is represented by the telecoms who 
provide the infrastructure and the ‘content layer’ is represented by the information 
society services (attached to the regulatory bundle of consumer protection, e-com-
merce, copyright, privacy, etc.) and by ‘media under editorial control’ (attached 
to the regulatory bundle of consumer protection, advertising and protection of 
minors). These regulatory silos are not a good regulatory framework for conver-
gent technology – technology that crosses many layers and sectors. DLT could 
also be one of these technologies; only the future shows whether the MiCA Pro-
posal is sustainable for the development of crypto-assets across silos of financial 
regulation.  
Consequently, it appears that if the innovation does not fit into a pre-assigned 
category, the silos developed in the regulatory framework will always prove to 
be unfit. As Savin claims, such practice has resulted in damaging the innovation 
brought by disruptive technologies. Furthermore, according to Savin, this is 
primarily linked to the lack or limited use of examination of the new technology 
along with its different layers and functions, but also to the limited examination 
of the effect of the application of existing regulation on the use cases of the new 
technology. The result of extending the sector-specific regulation on disruptive 
technologies could potentially be negative because the new technology could 
function in a very different way – compare telephone communication and Skype. 
Hence, even if effects equivalence is granted, existing regulation with its require-
ments may be unfit. 
                                                                          
269  Savin (n. 63), p. 5. 
270  Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) PE/52/2018/ 
REV/1 OJ L 321. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1575871089458& 
uri=CELEX:32018L1972> accessed 09 December 2019. 
271  Savin, (n. 63), p. 6. 
272  Savin, (n. 63), p. 6. 
273  Silos represent the industry or sector specific bundle of regulation. 
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The author stresses that convergence is not an unknown concept for DLT use 
cases. Tokenization challenges the regulatory silos of payments and securities 
regulation, as payment tokens274 and utility tokens275 can also be categorized as 
securities or fluid categories that later transform into securities.276  
The author concludes that the convergence of technologies has caused changes 
in business models and disruptions in specific historically developed sectors that 
are subjected to regulatory framework silos. This has led regulators to search for 
regulative strategies to address the challenge created by the convergence and rapid 
pace of change. Therefore, effects equivalence requires equivalent treatment but 
not necessarily application of the extension of existing regulation through the 
UNCITRAL model, as the entire regulative intention or domain of regulation 
(considering the regulative silos and convergence) might be unfit for the new 
technology. This means that regulators should be guided rather by the waiver 
solution than the UNCITRAL solution as the first has more flexibility to adapt to 
the DLT innovative solutions.  
 
 
3.1.3.2 GDPR model 
Mireille Hildebrandt and Laura Tielemans277 believe that the regulative design 
solution used in the GDPR could be an inspiration to address sustainability and 
neutrality concerns all in one.  
Their claim is that the only acceptable route to future-proof neutral regulation, 
considering the fast-paced digital society, is to include in the text of the regulation 
only the interests, i.e. the objective, of the regulation (minimization of personal 
data, transparency, etc.) that need to be protected and not the specific require-
ments needed for said protection. Hildebrandt and Tielemans believe that the 
interest should be understood as the purpose and aim of the regulation.  
This relates to the subsidiarity principle and the idea of Koops on the abstr-
action of the most sustainable law in the higher-level as presented in chapter 2 
and also to Lessig’s idea that the key in any regulation is to understand the 
influence the regulation wishes to achieve and not merely focus on the specific 
requirements. The regulative design solution described is in line with Koops’ 
                                                                          
274  Also referred to as virtual currencies or cryptocurrencies. EBA (n. 240), p. 7.  
275  In early 2019, the European Banking Authority (EBA) defined utility tokens as follows: 
“Typically enable access to a specific product or service often provided using a DLT platform 
but are not accepted as a means of payment for other products or services. For example, in the 
context of cloud services, a token may be issued to facilitate access.” ibid. 
276  These tokens usually provide either ownership rights or entitlements to profit distribution. 
In the context of an ICO, the asset tokens are issued in exchange for fiat money or other crypto-
assets. EBA (n. 240), p. 7. 
277  Mireille Hildebrandt and Laura Tielemans, ‘Data protection by design and technology 
neutral law’, (2013) Computer Law & Security Review 29, p. 516.  
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position that the regulator’s aim should be to secure the effect of protection and 
not to dictate the means of protection.  
Koops stresses that existing regulation should be interpreted on the basis of 
these substantive values and interests under protection, which means the regulator – 
executive branch and judiciary – must interpret even technology-specific and less 
abstract regulation in a “functional, teleological way.”278 This is especially 
important because the regulation (specifically with a set of requirements and 
compliance norms) needs to identify first of all the interests that existing regulation 
aims to protect as well as the technical solution or business model currently under 
use in order to establish whether the interests that need protection are at risk given 
the technical solution or business model. It is possible that the set of requirements 
or compliance norms are out of place and that the development of rules for these 
to be complied with through a procedure other than a built-in solution could be 
unfounded. Similar to the Uber or Bolt drivers’ example – if the consumer pro-
tection interests are not at risk if the business model is built on transparency and 
real-time economy – the need for burdensome compliance requirements may be 
obsolete.  
This GDPR model is partly in line with the model for regulative strategy 
developed in the Lamfalussy report already in 2001 addressing the law lag in the 
European securities market. The report proposed 4 levels of regulatory frame-
work in which level 1 – framework principles what would serve as the values and 
goals and be adopted through a lengthy regulative procedure; and level 2 – more 
dynamic and agile regulative process for technical implementation measures by 
using various newly founded committees and including stakeholders; and levels 3 
and 4 dealing with implementation and monitoring.279 These levels were intro-
duced to speed up the regulative responses to dynamically changing securities 
market in Europe, but the challenge concerns the regulation of the dynamically 
changing financial system in general and is not only securities market specific.280 
In the larger financial sector regulation the level 1 and level 2 regulation is also 
sometimes referred to as macroprudential and microprudential regulation281 
respectively that need to address different market failures based also on functional 
approach to regulative design as discussed in section 3.1.3.6 below. It appears 
that this legislative solution would allow the innovators to design a technical 
solution or employ proper organizational measures which do not necessarily 
follow a technology-specific regulation, but instead aim to attain the fundamental 
                                                                          
278  Koops (n. 59), p. 25. 
279  Alexandre Lamfalussy et al. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN 
ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, Brussels, 15 February 
2001. <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/lamfalussy_report.pdf> 
accessed 8 March 2021. 
280  Steven L Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 Minnesota 
Law Review 1441–1494 (2016) <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3309> 
accessed 8 March 2021. 
281  ibid.  
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values the regulation protects through a novel technical or organizational (also 
business model-based) design.Therefore, the author concludes that the functional 
equivalence sub-principle guides the regulator on the basis of Lessig, Hildebrandt 
and Tielemans to use goals and objectives in higher-level laws that are vague as 
to the specific technical solution and more precise as to the objectives of the 
regulation and the interests the regulator wishes to protect.  
This setup would give the market the option to come up with compliant 
solutions and business models to protect these interests. Hildebrandt and Tielemans 
regard the regulation provided in the GDPR under the ‘privacy by design’ heading 
to follow this construction exactly. They call the ‘privacy by design’ solution an 
open-ended solution, which is potentially in compliance with both the principle 
of technology neutrality and functional equivalence, as such a legislative design 
solution does not attach any value to a pre-existing technology, business model 
or infrastructure. In essence, the ‘privacy by design’ solution creates a require-
ment for the data processor, who is the obligated party, to design their product or 
service in such a way that the interests the GDPR aims to protect could be achieved 
but leaves it to the obligated party to come up with an effective system with 
“appropriate technical and organisational measures”. 282 In order to allow the 
obligated parties to organize themselves under this design solution, the regulator 
specified “a general requirement stipulating that, at the level of the technical 
design, data protection obligations must be met, if technically and economically 
feasible.”283 According to Reed, a similar approach was also taken by the UK in 
the Financial Services and Markets Act from 2000, which laid down the general 
principles of law and iterated specific sets of lower-level rules in order to address 
difficulties presented by the online domain.284  
                                                                          
282  Recital 78 and Article 25 clearly leave it to the data processor to design an effective system 
of protection. Article 25 states:  
“1. Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, 
context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for 
rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at 
the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself, 
implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, 
which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an 
effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet 
the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.  
2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for 
ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of 
the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, 
the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, 
such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the 
individual’s intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons.  
3. An approved certification mechanism pursuant to Article 42 may be used as an element to 
demonstrate compliance with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.” 
283  Hildebrandt and Tielemans (n. 282), p. 516.  
284  Reed (n. 60), p. 251. 
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Hildebrandt and Tielemans are of the opinion that such a model allows the dis-
ruptors and innovators to develop new technological solutions that are com-
pliance-oriented and the regulation does not prevent innovation from coming up 
with more effective and advanced tools and techniques to protect the interests of 
data subjects. Hildebrandt and Tielemans concede that the solution is difficult for 
the judiciary to adopt as the judges need to somehow understand the technology 
through the inclusion of trustworthy technical experts who validate or even 
certify that the built-in technical system meets these protection obligations techni-
cally and organizationally. 
Philipp Hacker and others have also found this form of regulation, which they 
refer to as a method of open-ended regulation, as the most suitable in case of 
DLT.285 According to Hacker and others, this open-ended regulation would include 
an objective to influence and motivate the disruptors to design their solutions in 
accordance with the values under protection by the regulation by rewarding com-
pliance. Hacker and others call this form of regulation ‘regulation by design’.286 
As discussed in sub-section 3.1.3.5, the Pilot Regime is partly the GDPR 
model and waiver model all at once – from one side, the protection interests are 
stated elsewhere – in regulation that governs the non-DLT solutions, and the Pilot 




It is the view of the author along with other authors287 that DLT has an internalised 
organic self-regulation mechanism in the form of the functioning of its protocol, 
the protocol inherent governance rules and consensus mechanism that could 
potentially transcend the problem of territorial fragmentation of regulation of 
global technology networks. This means that self-regulation and compliance with 
it is not something foreign or imposed by different national or regional govern-
ments on DLT networks but instead internal, or as suggested by Carla Reyes, 
“endogenous theory of decentralized technology regulation”.288  
                                                                          
285  Hacker, Lianos, Dimitropoulos, and Eich (n. 69), p. 2. 
286  ibid. 
287  Finck (n. 41), p. 167. 
288  Reyes (n. 145), p. 195.  
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Self-regulation can either be required by the state or regional authorities289 or 
initiated by the private sector or industry,290 and its aim might be to promote the 
sector, make it more transparent or even prevent intervention by public authorities 
with statutory regulation. DLT-specific self-regulation examples are the ICO-
regulated codes of conducts drafted and complied with by market participants 
during 2017–2018291 and currently also the prevalent practise of DLT businesses 
in India who operate under self-imposed compliance rules in the context of legal 
uncertainty and ambiguity as the regulator has issued conflicting guidelines in 
relation to this innovation.292  
The self-regulation idea is also included in Recital 27 of the EU Framework 
Directive, which states that “a cautious approach to ex ante regulation of newly 
emerging markets which ‘should not be subjected to inappropriate obligation’”293 
should be adopted. Self-regulation in the EU has been defined as “the possibility 
for economic operators, social partners, non-governmental organisations or 
associations to adopt among themselves and for themselves common guidelines 
at the European level (particularly codes of practice or sectoral agreements)”,294 
                                                                          
289  In relation to the Digital Single Market, the European Commission promotes self-regu-
lation in the data portability and free flow of data (non-personal) areas as this leads to wider 
interoperability and technical standards. Article 6 (1) of European Commission, “Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the free flow 
of non-personal data in the European Union’COM (2017) 495 final, 8. M. Finck (n. 41), 
p. 169. 
290  An example from Estonia is the crowdfunding best practice principles and badges of 
compliance to those who comply with it (that are annually reviewed) developed by the finance 
sector public-private partnership FinanceEstonia. FinanceEstonia. Ühisrahastuse platvormid 
muutuvad läbipaistvamaks. [FinanceEstonia site. Crowdfunding platforms become more 
transparent]. <http://www.financeestonia.eu/news/uhisrahastuse-platvormid-muutuvad-labi-
paistvamaks/> accessed 4 April 2020. 
291  Jonathan Keane. Switzerland’s Crypto Valley launches an ICO code of conduct to protect 
investors and businesses. Tech.eu [blog] (9 January 2018). <https://tech.eu/brief/crypto-
valley-ico-code-of-conduct/> accessed 21 November 2020. 
292  Report by Samvad Partners. NOTE ON REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 
EXCHANGES IN INDIA. 3 November 2020, p. 2 [held by author]. 
293  Kamecke and Körber (n. 65), p. 335. 
294  Self-regulation in the EU has been defined as “the possibility for economic operators, the 
social partners, non-governmental organisations or associations to adopt amongst themselves 
and for themselves common guidelines at European level (particularly codes of practice or 
sectoral agreements)”. European Commission, ‘Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-
Making’ [2003] OJ C 321/01, para 22. As defined by Julia Black self-regulation is “the situ-
ation of a group of persons or bodies, acting together, performing a regulatory function in 
respect of themselves and others who accept their authority”. Black, Julia Constitutionalising 
Self-Regulation, (1996) Modern Law Review 59, pp 24–27. Hence, according to Michele 
Finck, self-regulation means “a situation in which regulation is devised through the col-
laboration of private actors with no or little involvement from the state”. Finck (n. 41), p. 168.  
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which are used in “complex sectors such as nuclear energy and finance”,295 but 
also in the platform economy.296 In the context of sharing economy platforms, the 
argument is that the industry or individual platform is much more aware of its 
users’ needs and complaints than the regulator and is regularly introducing new 
iterations of its policies (terms of use, privacy policy, etc.). The platforms are also 
using technological constructs in order to be in compliance, and their business 
model is designed to incentivize the users and service or product providers to 
comply with the expected levels of performance (Uber drivers’ car cleanliness, 
driving quality, customer service, etc.).297  
As said, according to Kamecke and Körber,298 upon establishing effects 
equivalence, the principle of technology neutrality does not guide the regulator 
to treat new technologies as old and rather the principle restricts than calls for an 
extension of existing regulation (designed for pre-existing technology) to the new 
technology.299 Consequently, Kamecke and Körber argue that the principle of 
technology neutrality primarily rather supports self-regulation in relation to new 
technology than any other model of regulation. The self-regulation strategy is 
also known to Koops, who, nevertheless, calls for technology neutrality to be 
respected also in self-regulation.300 
However, self-regulation is separated from customized regulation per regu-
lation subject, also called ‘individualised regulation’301 or ‘personalized regu-
lation’302 which could be hazardous (justice and equality between the treatment 
of individuals) and beneficial (all obligations and rights consider special needs 
and circumstances) at the same time. Nevertheless, as algorithmic regulation as a 
phenomenon growing out of the emerging data economy is able to develop 
individualized or personalized law that is customized per person into these new 
                                                                          
295  Finck refers to examples discussed by Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees in ‘Industry 
Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective’ (1997) Law & Policy 19, p. 363 and by Eliza-
beth Howlett et al. ‘The Role of Self-Regulation, Future Orientation and Financial Knowledge 
in Long-Term Financial Decisions’, (2008) Journal of Consumer Affairs 42, p. 223.  
296  Platforms are regarded as the “de facto “rule-makers””. Marta Cantero Gamito, ‘Regu-
lation.com Self-Regulation and Contract Governance in the Platform Economy: A Research 
Agenda’, (2017) European Journal of Legal Studies 9, p. 53. According to Parker, van Alstyne 
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platforms, and the social gals of preventing harm, encouraging fair competition, and main-
taining respect for the rule of law”. Parker, Geoffrey G, Van Alstyne, Marshall W. and 
Choudary, Sangeet Paul Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming the 
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298  Kamecke and Körber (n. 65), p. 335.  
299  Kamecke and Körber (n. 65), p. 331.  
300  Koops (n. 59), p. 27. 
301  Black (n. 294), pp. 24–27.  
302  See more in the forthcoming Busch/De Franceschi, Algorithmic Regulation and Perso-
nalized Law. A Handbook (2021 Beck Hart Sowon). 
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types of “granular legal norms” 303 and just might be able to overcome its per-
ceived limitations.  
Furthermore, self-regulation rules for blockchain have also been introduced 
by organizations termed as ‘self-regulating organizations’ (SROs).304 According 
to Finck, “at an early stage of the technology’s development, such processes [of 
setting up SROs] can be helpful, as they create awareness around the regulation, 
disincentivize ‘lawless’ behaviour and generate information as to where regulation 
is needed most”.305  
Nevertheless, different authors do not see self-regulation as a viable alternative 
as there is no oversight executed and might grant innovation to weigh less than 
compliance.306 Also, the self-regulatory oligopolies or “transnational private regu-
latory regimes”307 can breach competition law by potentially creating the same kind 
of protection regulation around the members of these oligopolies.308 In the view 
of the author the incumbents are right now similarly lobbying the regulators to 
maintain the existing regulation that is tailored to them and that is not considerate 
of innovative new business models or technology. Consequently, in a way, the 
drawbacks of self-regulation, in the view of the author, are the same as the current 
existing regulation that is enforced by the states. In the opinion of the author, the 
code-based regulation discussed in this chapter below, would allow for the 
regulation to be more endogenous while requiring technology assisted com-
pliance making it, therefore, susceptible to oversight. The author views the 
technology-assisted self-regulation as a viable option for DLT, as it is in line with 
                                                                          
303  ibid. 
304  The SRO concept in general is not new as there are a number of SROs operating, re-
cognized and even obligatory to join in many countries. In some countries SRO regulations 
are approved by the authority, e.g., in Switzerland by FINMA, and SROs have to meet certain 
standards and requirements to become a recognized SRO and all the rules and regulations 
these SROs propose undergo a commenting period by the public. See: U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission SRO page for such commenting rounds. <https://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
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organisations-sros/> accessed 04 April 2020. See also: Korean Blockchain Association also 
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uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4977&context=journal_articles> accessed 04 April 
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wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2011.00537.x> accessed 04 April 2020. 
308  ibid. 
80 
the organic compliance-orientation and rule-enforcement mode of action inherent 
to DLT. The suggested model is discussed further in section 3.1.3.6 below. 
Nevertheless, the less contradictory but still flexible and sustainable alternative 




3.1.3.4 Polycentric coregulation 
Polycentricity in the wider context of command-and-control regulation, self-
regulation and coregulation is itself not a new concept, as it stems from law and 
economics309 and argues for multiple sources of regulation instead of merely single 
source of regulation. Finck believes that for constantly evolving technology, 
polycentric coregulation is the most efficient regulation as it is drafted involving 
key stakeholders and not solely by the regulator, allowing neutrality to be con-
stantly challenged and securing sustainability through the subsidiarity principle. 
Polycentric coregulation as a strategy can also be used to develop supranational 
regulation, as the abstract general norms are introduced by the regulator in the 





Coregulation, polycentric or not, is based on the general presumption that “dif-
ferent regulatory designs [exist] for different problems, societies and institutional 
settings”310 and that design-thinking should be taken as the foundation for rapid 
innovation-based solutions as “the fast-paced, iterative world of disruption does 
not mesh easily with the deliberative, slow-moving process of traditional rule-
making”.311  
Coregulation, as defined by the European Commission, is a “mechanism 
whereby an [EU] legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined 
by the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field (such as 
economic operators, social partners, non-governmental organizations or 
                                                                          
309  Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Legal Tradition. (Harvard 
University Press, 1983), p. 10. Erika Ilves, Polütsentriline õigus: riik ja õigus ei ole lahuta-
matud. [Polycentric law: state and law are not inseparable] (1999) Juridica 3, pp. 106–109.  
310  Jonathan Wiener quotation in M. Finck (n. 41), p. 171. 
311  Alice Armitage, Andrew Cordova and Rebecca Siegel ‘Design-Thinking: The Answer to 
the Impasse Between Innovation and Regulation’ (2017). UC Hastings Research Paper 
No. 250, p. 15. <https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2568&context= 
faculty_scholarship> accessed 5 April 2020. 
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associations).”312 This may mean that command-and-control regulation is mixed 
with self-regulation or something also termed as ‘regulated self-regulation’.313  
Coregulation allows the regulator to include private stakeholders in the 
development, enforcement and oversight of the codeveloped regulation and to be 
considerate towards the code or technology it regulates in a flexible and inclusive 
way.314 This is also nothing new, as similar goals were set by the EU to improve 
regulation at the turn of the century.315 Furthermore, coregulation is extensively 
used in relation to the Internet (e.g., control of counterfeit goods and intellectual 
property rights) as the joint effort of the cooperation of rights-holders, govern-
ments, non-state actors and service providers that Natasha Tusikov calls “revenue 
and access chokepoints”316 on the basis of “informal nonbinding enforcement 
agreements”.317 Furthermore, “the E-Commerce Directive has been portrayed as 
a coregulatory legal framework as it entrusts the private sector with the enforce-
ment of norms on the Internet”.318 The key aspects of coregulation are similar to 
the life of a computer code or a startup – iteration and pivoting – dubbed as “experi-
mental learning and uncertainty”319 that is “designed to adapt over time as the 
defined standards are constantly evaluated and reviewed”.320 This might not sound 
sustainable, but meets the expectations of the subsidiarity principle and Koops’ 
description of higher-level and lower-level legal norms described in chapter 1.  
The difference from self-regulation is primarily its goal and objective; contrary 
to self-regulation, its objective and aims are not only stated and configured by 
private stakeholders, but also by public authorities who have stated the values 
compliance requirements should aim for so that individual rights do not suffer. 
The private stakeholders involved, however, reduce the information asymmetry 
among the regulator and the Pacing Problem and address the Law of Disruption 
discussed by Downes, allowing the industry, the innovators and the stakeholders 
to address the specifics of the fast-paced technology challenge.  
Furthermore, coregulation allows the necessary amount of flexibility to adapt 
to rapid change in a technologically neutral way and allows the innovators to keep 
                                                                          
312  European Commission ‘Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making’ (2003), OJ 
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innovating and experimenting with the technology. As “the need for adaptive 
legal frameworks in relation to blockchain is evident”,321 co-regulation as pre-
sented under GDPR model’s principle-based approach in order to ensure sustain-
ability should be considered. The principle-based approach coregulation is built 
on allows the framework to be flexible so that “it can take into account the 
evolving need of users, providers and national authorities’”.322  
Finck further seems to claim (without explicitly stating it) that coregulation 
helps to address “sociotechnical change”323 and solve the Collingridge dilemma324 
by allowing the adaptation of existing regulation to the new technology to be led 
by private stakeholders, thus avoiding the Pacing Problem. Furthermore, the 
polycentricity of coregulation allows stakeholders, regulators and also the users 
of these networks to participate and through this collaboration to create a “fluid 




Polycentricity in this context allows knowledge to be pooled from where knowl-
edge rests and not depend on its transfer to the authority which is often the furthest 
away from knowledge. This kind of inclusion and engagement level is in line 
with the EU’s 2015 Better Regulation Agenda326 and Article 11 of the TEU327 
which promotes ad hoc consultations with stakeholders, obligates EU institutions 
to give citizens and representative associations the floor in public debate and 
“maintains open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associa-
tions and civil society”. The inclusion of multiple parties in coregulation estab-
lishes feedback and interaction channels but divides the regulation drafting 
authority among parties in a wider circle, including those within the industry, both 
as service providers and service users supporting pluralism on regulatory drafting.  
Polycentric coregulation seems to allow the technology to be considered and 
respects the wider context of DLT. This conclusion is also supported by the 
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323  Wiebe Bijker. Of Bicycles, Bakelites and Bulbs: Toward a theory of Sociotechnical Change 
(MIT Press 1995). 
324  Collingridge (n. 3). 
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to Governance in the European Union’ (2002) European Law Journal 8/1, pp. 4–6 in Finck
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research of Hagemann, Skees and Thierer,328 who predicted in 2018 that, given 
these shortcomings in relation to the sustainability goal, the traditional regulatory 
system will gradually be replaced by “an amorphous and constantly evolving set 
of informal ‘soft law’ governance mechanisms”,329 including multi-stakeholder 
processes and “informal governance mechanisms”330 that are, according to Hage-
mann and others, already used today in the case of nanotechnologies.331  
The reason for such development, according to them, is exactly as described 
above: the inability of the regulator to keep up with the demand to change the 
regulation at a very fast pace and with a high level of agility. The soft law, which, 
according to Hagemann, operates with the foundation in hard law, includes quasi-
regulatory open-ended regulation that can be issued in the form of standards or 
guidelines developed by the private sector or regulators,332 “proactive principles, 
policy guidance documents, best practices and voluntary standards, white papers, 
reports, advisory circulars, opinion letters and amicus briefs”.333  
Such research is in line with the initiative of the European Commission from 
2016 to boost standardization as a competitiveness-enhancing regulatory tech-
nique,334 EU’s Rolling plan of ICT standardization335 and the European Multi-
Stakeholder Platform on ICT Standardisation.336 It is very likely that standardiza-
tion has already and will continue to replace command-and-control regulation in 
many complicated and fast evolving sectors in the future.337 Furthermore, research 
indicates that adopting standardisation as a self-regulatory or coregulatory 
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84 
technique allows for a more tailored and efficient regulatory framework,338 and 
standards are also seen as a necessary measure in order to “become a leader in 
producing, adopting and governing new digital technologies such as blockchain 
and [DLT]”.339 Much effort has been put in to this goal by the ISO (developing 
several standards in relation to DLT with three finished standards340 and nine 
under development), the IEEE Blockchain Working Group341 and the ITU Focus 
Group on Application of Distributed Ledger Technology.342 This is not to say that 
standardisation solves all possible problems, as there are numerous problems 
related to standardisation from constitutional concerns343 to the overwhelming 
scope of these, but it does lead to the better consideration of technology and its 
wider context.344 
Furthermore, part of this polycentric coregulation model of regulation is sand-
boxes and experimentation clauses. As recently as 16 November 2020, the Council 
of the EU adopted its conclusions on regulatory sandboxes and their role in EU 
regulatory framework. The conclusions identify that these experimentation clauses 
allow the enforcement of regulation on a case-by-case basis in order to ensure 
flexibility in “testing innovative technologies, products, services or approaches.”345  
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Finally, coregulation also reconciles the centralized versus decentralized 
contrast that is dominant in blockchain technology networks and is the basis for 
the idea of the ‘28th regime’ of supranational legal framework in the EU for 
maintaining a sustainable distributed ledger ecosystem with the purpose of 
avoiding “fragmentation between member states and a race to the bottom”.346 The 
very essence of this is to connect technological capabilities and innovations with 
regulatory challenges and find a socio-institutional solution that is integrated in 
“techno-economic reality”.347 
In the view of the author coregulation would allow neutrality to prevail 
sustainably only in case the stakeholders themselves can also set the boundaries 
between the regulation borders – where the amorphous and constantly evolving 
self-regulation in the form of “informal governance mechanism” ends and the 
traditional force-based regulation starts.  
In the following sub-section, the author briefly examines the MiCA Proposal 
and Pilot Regime in the context of the regulative strategies discussed above in 
order to identify the regulative strategy pursued with these instruments by the EU.  
 
 
3.1.3.5 MiCA Proposal and Pilot Regime 
The MiCA Proposal and Pilot Regime are the only elements of the Digital 
Finance Package348 that are discussed in this dissertation as follows. 
 
 
3.1.3.5.1 Pilot Regime 
The impact assessment conducted by the Commission identified various 
regulative strategies for the EU to use to address the digital finance package and 
the scope now addressed by the Pilot Regime. Among these were (a) an issuing 
interpretation in the form of guidance on the applicability of EU framework on 
financial services specifically to the crypto form of financial instruments; (b) the 
adaptation of existing EU regulatory framework on financial services and (c) an 
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experimental and iterative regulation now known as the Pilot Regime.349 The 
latter was considered the most appropriate as “there is presently not sufficient 
evidence to support more significant and wide-ranging permanent changes to the 
existing financial services framework in an effort to allow the use of DLT.”350  
In the opinion of the author, the further advancement of the waiver solution is 
a sandbox – or a pilot regime that waives the non-compliance of an innovative 
solution with formal or substantive requirements to observe and assess the 
suitability of the existing regulation or alternatively the need for adaptation of the 
existing regulation. These sandbox or pilot regimes require some level of new 
regulation to be adopted that also separate it from self-regulation. The need for 
regulation is either needed for the purpose of creation of a ‘virtual environment’ 
where experimentation is allowed or merely in recognition of the functions of the 
new technology on the basis of functional analysis. The Pilot Regime introduced 
as a proposal by the EU is based on this type of regulated waiver solution that is 
experimenting with the use of DLT for a temporary period of five years. This 
proposal is unique at the EU level and shows that, in EU law, experimentations 
and iterative law-making is an option to consider.  
The Pilot Regime is an implementation of the Commission’s FinTech Action 
plan351 and aims to address the concern raised by EBA and ESMA, which, in their 
advice, argued that “provisions in existing EU legislation may inhibit the use of 
DLT”.352 Furthermore, the Pilot Regime text clearly states that it aims “to 
promote the uptake of technology and responsible innovation”.353 As the 
Commission recognizes that legal certainty is needed to be successful in this goal, 
the aim of the Pilot Regime is “to provide legal certainty and flexibility for market 
participants who wish to operate a DLT market infrastructure by establishing 
uniform requirements for operating these”.354 Furthermore, the Pilot Regime 
responds to the recommendations of the High-Level forum on the Capital 
Markets Union’s final report recommending that the EU recognize the underused 
potential of crypto-assets and calling for the Commission to increase legal 
certainty for issuing and trading these.355 
The EU Blockchain Study, the EU-developed Digital Finance Package along 
with the MiCA Proposal, the Pilot Regime and the Council’s conclusions on 
sandboxes also show that these different regulative strategies have been tabled 
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and considered in response to the challenges stemming from the use of DLT. The 
Pilot Regime clearly states the sustainability goal356 of the regulation and the 
challenges the existing regulation creates in respect of the technology neutrality 
principle in the EU. The Pilot Regime states that the proposal makes Europe’s 
economy “future-ready”357 and identifies its priority area to ensure that “regu-
latory framework is innovation-friendly and does not pose obstacles to the appli-
cation of new technologies”.358  
In essence, the Pilot Regime temporarily waives certain requirements for the 
DLT market infrastructures that could potentially operate as hurdles to the devel-
opment of DLT solutions in the financial sector.359 This way, the Pilot Regime is 
a revolutionary instrument as, while being a regulation that is an approximation 
of laws under Article 114 TFEU, for the purposes of experimentation it creates a 
wide selection of transitional derogations from the requirements and compliance 
measures of other EU legal instruments which are part of the financial sector 
regulation and supports the use of DLT outputs defined as crypto-assets. The 
specific category of crypto-assets addressed is those that qualify as financial 
instruments and consequently fall under substantially tougher compliance regu-
lation.360 According to the Pilot Regime, the DLT application developer may 
apply for permission indicating the exemptions it needs for the infrastructure 
from the national competent regulator, and the national regulators are authorized 
to “remove regulatory constraints that can inhibit the development of DLT market 
infrastructures”.361 The regulator consults with ESMA to unify the practice on the 
market and ensure consistency, fair competition and a level-playing field to all 
participants.362 On the basis of its assessment, ESMA issues a non-binding 
opinion and makes recommendations on the exemptions requested or the actual 
solution. The virtue of the Pilot Regime is that it grants these DLT solutions per-
missions that allow market participants to operate their network, referred to “a 
DLT market infrastructure”, and provide their services in the EU.363 
This means that the Regime follows both the waiver solution – permitting 
waivers and exemptions from formalized and substantial compliance require-
ments – and the GDPR solution – allowing the existing regulatory framework to 
stipulate the protection interests and the regulators’ intention as an abstract goal. 
At the same time, the Pilot Regime aims to harmonize fragmented legal certainty 
on the EU market, allowing for a regional unified address of the market using the 
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competent regulators in the respective national market as interpreters of the 
customizable regulation per respective DLT solution.  
The author is of the opinion that the setup of the Pilot Regime could have 
included more elements of polycentric coregulation and more participation by 
innovation-focused stakeholders and not incumbents (CSDs and investment 
firms) in the functional analysis needed to grant the exemptions to a wider group 
of subjects than just CSDs and investment firm-type subjects. Only time will tell 
how sustainable this regulation and the approach will be; however, the author is 
looking forward to an abundance of research as to its success or failure. 
 
 
3.1.3.5.2 MiCA Proposal 
The MiCA Proposal identified an even wider selection of alternative regulative 
strategies than the Pilot Regime, from (i) an opt-in regime that allows to passport 
licenses regionally, (ii) full harmonisation, (iii) bespoke regulation for stable-
coins, (iv) an expanding eMoney Directive for stablecoins, and (v) limiting the 
use of stablecoins. The MiCA represents Option 1 and 2 together to address the 
risks the Commission has identified in relation to stablecoins.364 
The functional equivalence sub-principle has been expressed in the MiCA 
Proposal through the extension of the existing EU regulation qualifying some of 
these crypto-assets as financial instruments under Directive 2014/65/EU365 
irrelevant of the technology used to issue or transfer them. This means that the 
EU approach employs regulative strategy (ii), application of existing regulation, 
and regulative strategy (iii), adapting existing regulation by developing bespoke 
crypto-asset regulation for the hybrid DLT outputs that are jointly referred to as 
crypto-assets.  
The concern here is similar as that presented in Chapter 2 – the application of 
the existing regulation could hinder DLT-based outputs in the case that the 
existing regulation is not considerate of the contextual changes and technological 
differences of DLT and its outputs. Similar concerns were identified in relation 
to the differences of publishers in the offline and online domain and telecommu-
nication services versus OTT services. However, as the Pilot Regime addresses 
this concern by allowing for waivers or derogations from existing regulation for 
DLT-based experimentation according to MiCA Proposal, the majority of crypto-
assets fall outside existing regulation under Directive 2014/65/EU and con-
sequently, the MiCA Proposal creates a new bespoke regime that addresses the 
services related to trading platforms, exchange and the custody service of crypto-
assets categorized into sui generis categories of:  
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(i)  crypto-assets other than asset-referenced and e-money tokens; 
(ii)  asset-referenced tokens; and 
(iii)  electronic money tokens (e-money tokens). 
 
Both categories (ii) and (iii) include a certain type of stablecoins, which the EU 
sees as a potential risk for financial stability366 and which are completely new 
hybrid categories specific only to DLT. This is again an example of a contextual 
change, similar to that discussed in Chapter 2, which has resulted in the develop-
ment of a completely new regulation while aiming to achieve effects equivalence 
across technologies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the difficulty of achieving 
neutrality in such case is related to the fact that these sui generis categories partly 
are and partly are not similar to existing categories of e-money, securities, etc. 
Given this fact, the questions remain whether the effect of the MiCA Proposal is 
neutral across technologies since it was introduced as a DLT-specific bespoke 
regulation, and whether the EU regulator, by placing crypto-assets into bespoke 
categories, is compliant with the technology neutrality principle. The author 
anticipates an abundance of legal research to be pursued also in relation to this 
regulation. 
As the last section in this chapter, the author explores the last mile paved in 
the context of cyberspace regulation already by Lawrence Lessig in the 1990s 




3.1.3.6 Code-based, endogenous and functional approach to regulation 
While the opt-in regime, the pilot regime and full harmonisation might be the 
regulative strategies presently suggested for the digital finance regulation in the 
EU, de Filippi and Wright are of the opinion that such a path is difficult due to 
the global reach of DLT infrastructure. DLT infrastructure is neither national nor 
regional phenomena and any regulative strategy taken will have a territorial 
scope. Consequently, all competing territorial regulative strategies will create a 
fragmented legal certainty for the use of the global infrastructure and the trading 
of these crypto-assets within this infrastructure.  
Consequently, de Filippi and Wright are suggesting that regulators should 
experiment with code-based regulation to achieve certain policy goals and 
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3.1.3.6.1 Code-cased regulation 
Using the MiCA Proposal as an example, the crypto-asset could be included in 
the content layer, and regulation of the transportation layer (similar to the way 
the Tom Kabinet case showed) could dictate its ownregulation. Introducing 
regulation through code is further explained by Carla Reyes, who states that the 
regulators could  
 
“undertake the dual task of enacting a law or regulation via statute and then 
implementing that statute through code by engaging in an iterative and cooperative 
process with the technologies’ core developers and with consensus from the net-
work, so that regulation is endogenously incorporated into the decentralized ledger 
technology and the applications running on top of the technology”.367  
 
Furthermore, as explained by de Filippi and Wright, both statutory and con-
tractual terms can be systematically translated into “simple and deterministic 
code-based rules that are automatically executed by the underlying blockchain 
network”,368 and this in turn can pave the way to the endogenous theory of regu-
lation that Carla Reyes believes DLT can endure.  
The idea is simply understandable if you consider stating something in English 
in the normative text and including it in the programming language in the 
respective protocol. This means that DLT does not only challenge the substance 
of law, model or strategy but as seen in this chapter – the delivery of regulation 
or the form of its expression e.g., model and strategy. Consequently, DLT not 
only innovates the content layer of regulation (the substance), but also enables to 
deliver regulation to subjects in a different form – a code. Such path of using the 
code itself for delivery of regulation is presented by de Filippi and Wright in their 
concept of “lex cryptographica”369 using the examples of Lex Mercatoria and Lex 
Informatica. However, it is noted by the said authors that while Lex Mercatoria 
and Lex Informatica provided rules for the private law relationships, DLT infra-
structure needs to be also governed by public law, e.g., anti-money laundering 
regulation, financial compliance regulation, public registries related regulation, 
etc.  
Furthermore, code-based regulation could, similarly to the Pilot Regime and 
the MiCA Proposal, operate an opt-out or opt-in regulation, allow compliance 
measures to be performed through real-time economy methods, use the trans-
parency of the networks as disclosures, etc. Nick Grossman has also suggested 
similar opt-out real-time economy-based compliance solutions for platform 
economy,370 as the compliance subjects “implement mobile dispatch, e-hailing 
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and e-payments and 360-degree peer-review of drivers and passengers and 
provide an open data API for the public auditing of system performance with 
regard to equity, access, performance and safety”.371 This allows the regulator to 
obtain live data on the compliance subjects and their data that is subject to taxation 
or should be monitored for the protection of the interests of users. 
On the basis of Grossman’s work, the author concludes that Grossman is 
recommending to ease the compliance rules and requirements applicable to plat-
forms because (i) aims of the regulator can be achieved through other means; 
(ii) compliance and supervision are more effective using the related technology 
in the same way it is used in the innovative solution; and (iii) applying the existing 
regulation on these platforms (due to cumbersome licensing and compliance 
regulation that tends to be different per jurisdiction) would be impossible to 
enforce or at least ineffective. The solution suggested by Grossman is based on 
open innovation and “tempered by data-driven transparency and account-
ability”372 but has the same regulatory aim as existing regulation of “creating trust 
and fostering fairness, security and safety”.373 The same aim is fulfilled if com-
pliance is executed through screening and certifying taxi drivers, requiring 
insurance coverage, monitoring the cleanliness and safety of hotels, etc. The 
solution suggested by Grossman is similar to the transparency secured by open-
source software solutions, such as Bitcoin, due to the transparency of the code 
that all users can inspect and analyse. In the case of a code-based regulation, 
(either regulator-backed or self-enforced) the transparency theoretically functions 
in a similar way: as a feature of discipline hidden in the programming language 
functions of the code but detectable and recognizable to those able to inspect it. 
In the words of de Filippi and Wright, “the best way to regulate a code-based 
system is through code itself.”374  
By enabling the delivery of the regulation to be in the form of the code, DLT 
also enables to fulfil the compliance requirements of regulation by self-executing 
code. Furthermore, such can be seen in the Pilot Regime proposal that allows the 
financial sector to waive certain requirements for financial compliance. This 
means the regulators must recognize also the potential use case of DLT as not 
merely influencing the content layer (the content of the provisions of regulation 
themselves), but also through transport layer (the delivery tool of the content of 
the provisions) paving the way for code-based regulation that would also poten-
tially allow compliance through the use of the same code (DLT used as comp-
liance tool).  
However, the problem of territorial scope of national and regional regulation 
(even if translated into code) will remain unless a self-regulative strategy or 
private international law assists in solving such a challenge.  
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Nevertheless, given the general task of regulation – to guide the behaviour of 
the subjects – and relying on the example of the DLT network governance rules 
already inherent in its protocol, it can be concluded that the goal of implementing 
regulation in the protocol itself should be possible.  
 
 
3.1.3.6.2 Endogenous regulation and functional approach to regulation 
A step further from lex cryptographica is endogenous375 regulation that was pro-
moted for DLT by Carla Reyes already in 2016. Reyes reiterated that the endo-
genous regulation is known in the regulatory strategy discussion as there has been 
endogenous approach used in the financial regulatory research and theory. The 
approach is also known as functional approach to financial regulation. 
This functional approach is premised on the fact that rapid changes take place 
in unpredictable ways in the financial system and that makes the market very 
dynamic. On the basis of this premise, the approach guides the attention away 
from the financial architecture and rather focuses on the economic functions. 
Such an approach allows to react with agility to dynamic changes in highly 
complex and rapidly changing structure.376  
As stated by Steven Schwarcz:  
 
“In thinking about regulating a dynamically changing financial system, it may be 
more effective – or at least instructive – to focus on the system’s underlying, and 
thus less time dependent, economic functions than to tie regulation to any specific 
financial architecture.”377 
 
As further explained by Schwarcz, this functional or “black box” approach focuses 
on investigating the functions rather than the structure allowing to analyze the 
unknown rapidly changing structure in a systematic manner even if it is highly 
complex like the financial system. The functions are economic functions and the 
fundamental functions of financial markets can be listed as the provision, allo-
cation, and deployment of capital. Consequently, the primary task of the regu-
lation is to address and resolve failures that restrict or hamper these listed functions.  
Such approach that is based on the investigation of functions allows to over-
come the complexities in order to resolve market failures through regulation. 
Nevertheless, regulation is endogenous in the financial system as without regu-
lation the economic functions would lack effect, therefore, “the financial system 
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can be characterized as a law-related system”378 having elements of private law 
and public law. 
The application of the functional equivalence and the functional method of the 
comparative theorists described in chapter 2 above could be used to resolve the 
dynamic change inflicted disruption. The functional method would guide the 
comparative theorist rather to the question which legal institution in the DLT 
infrastructure would be able to successfully resolve the challenge and conse-
quently, resort to exploration onto endogenous regulation path. DLT in the con-
text of the comparative legal theory can be considered as the foreign legal system 
with its protocol, built-in governance rules, programming language and con-
sensus mechanism. Given these circumstances the legal analysis should rather 
revolve around the foundational tools and concepts already used in DLT and how 
these could be employed to achieve the behaviour of subjects participating in the 
DLT networks. This, in the opinion of Reyes, leads to “two-way regulation design 
process that requires the participation of core developers in the decentralized 
ledger technology ecosystem”379 that could potentially develop “in a holistic, 
organic, and functional way – an endogenous way”380 “flexible, adaptable, and 
feasible regulation that minimizes a variety of risks to a high degree”.381  
However, the problem of territorial scope of national and regional regulation 
(even if translated into code) will remain unless a self-regulative strategy or private 
international law assists in solving such a challenge.  
Nevertheless, given the general task of regulation – to guide the behaviour of 
the subjects – and relying on the example of the DLT network governance rules 
already inherent in its protocol, it can be concluded that the goal of implementing 
regulation in the protocol itself should be possible. This non-comprehensive intro-
duction to code-based, endogenous and functional approach to regulation is merely 
a reflection of the discussions present in this domain and aims to promote the con-
sideration for code-based or algorithmic regulation as a regulatory technology382 
for DLT. This might expand the conventional dimensions of regulative strategies, 
however, DLT is the technology removing intermediaries from infrastructures 
including potentially also the national – or regional regulators themselves. The 
topic of regulation and algorithms, and their impact on one another seems to be 
obtaining more and more relevance and therefore, should not be overlooked.383 
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3.2 Conclusions  
As clearly stated in the Pilot Regime, the EU follows the principle of technology 
neutrality, but existing regulation is created for centralized structures and has not 
been designed with DLT in mind. This results in accepting the possibility that 
existing regulation may be hindering the use of DLT and creating discrimination 
against its use. In order to establish which regulation specifically is discrimi-
natory and has a bias included in its text, use case analyses must be conducted as 
presented in the following chapter. However, in order to resolve this non-
compliance with technology neutrality principle, in this chapter the author 
presented different regulative strategies, such as (i) wait-and-see; (ii) application 
of existing regulation and (iii) adapting existing regulation that are based on the 
EU Blockchain Study. Furthermore, the author presented regulative models 
specifically used for technology regulation that were not discussed in the named 
study. Regulative strategies (i) to (iii) along with the models introduced by the 
author were assessed in terms of their compliance with neutrality principle and 
sustainability goal. In the current chapter, the author also provided examples of 
these regulative strategies and models pursued in the DLT context by either 
national regulators or the EU.  
As the presented research shows, the different regulative strategies and models 
discussed in this chapter have their shortcomings and advantages in relation to 
sustainability and neutrality, and wait-and-see and self-regulation seem to be 
often merely transitional phases on the path to another model or strategy. Further-
more, as seen in the chapter, various national regulators and the EU have taken 
up different strategies to respond to the challenges stemming from DLT. While 
in line with the Pacing Problem, the wait-and-see solution and the application of 
existing regulation is often the most used strategy. It is the view of the author that 
instead of the wait-and-see strategy, the models such as the functional-teleo-
logical interpretation and the waiver model can be adopted as these strategies can 
be used in a technology neutral way. Nevertheless, the application of these two 
models requires the respective regulators to observe, research and understand 
DLT in a similar way as they need to do the impact assessment when designing 
any new regulation.  
Furthermore, the GDPR model, self-regulation and polycentric coregulation 
models seem to grant a certain level of sustainability and flexibility that allows 
regulators or multi-stakeholders to iterate technology neutral regulatory responses 
to the fast-paced technological and use-based changes that DLT brings about. 
These models challenge the balance between legal certainty and sustainability but 
allow the market players themselves be involved in rule-making and often also in 
the enforcement. This development is based (as also portrayed by the Pacing 
Problem) on the inability of regulators to keep up with the fast paced techno-
logical and high level of agility that is needed to support innovation. Therefore, 
soft law and hard law functioning together in a Hagemann’s “quasi-regulatory 
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open-ended regulation” that includes codes of conducts, standards and guidelines 
that are developed by the market or regulators.384  
The code-based regulation discussion presented in the chapter merely opened 
the door to this wide and fast-paced developing topic that could soon find a number 
of applications in developing personalized algorithm-based regulation. As a result 
of these presented models, the author suggests to recognize that regulators are 
also intermediaries that DLT is potentially able to replace both in law-making 
and also in compliance enforcement.  
This chapter showed that, upon choosing a regulative strategy, regulators must 
first aim to understand (i) the technology and (ii) the intention of the regulator 
with regulation. As described in Chapter 2, after conducting a functional analysis 
and identifying functional equivalence, the principle of technology neutrality 
calls for effects equivalence to follow. Effects equivalence can be secured in two 
ways: (i) under existing regulation or (ii) by adapting existing regulation. The 
first alternative requires not only waiting and seeing, but also action - to interpret 
existing regulation in a functional-teleological way or to apply the waiver 
solution suggested on the basis of the sub-principle of functional equivalence by 
Furrer and Müller. The second alternative is to adapt existing regulation in a 
sustainable way, thus securing DLT neutrality.  
Lastly, the EU-developed Digital Finance Package along with the MiCA 
Proposal and the Pilot Regime show that the different regulative strategies and 
models described above have been considered and employed to respond to DLT 
challenges. As mentioned, the Pilot Regime is nothing short of a revolutionary 
instrument, as it is a directly applicable customized list of exemptions from 
compliance requirements based on specific DLT applications. The Regime shows 
the willingness of the EU regulator to be flexible and iterate in their regulations 
and clearly aims for sustainability and adaptation to the needs of distributed 
infrastructure. However, both the MiCA Proposal and the Pilot Regime address 
the financial sector and, as shown above, DLT has an array of use cases across 
sectors and is not only a financial sector tool. This means that the national regu-
lators along with EU regulators need to come up with regulative strategies to 
address non-financial regulation and the wider regulatory framework of the 
digital society in a technology neutral and sustainable way. Considering that 
DLT, after all, is a globally used technology and that crypto-assets usually also 
target global markets, the author briefly discussed the code-based regulation 
presented by previous research qualifying it merely as a transport layer or a 
delivery tool of content. Nevertheless, this regulative delivery measure is an alter-
native to consider when considering the expansion of DLT-specific regulative 
initiatives. 
The chapter aimed to find an answer to the research question: how to ensure 
DLT neutrality in regulation? This chapter addressed the research question on a 
foundational level. This means that, in responding to this question, regulators 
should not only search for the response on how to amend a certain specific pro-
                                                                          
384  ibid, p. 47. 
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vision in a fragmented and isolated context of one specific DLT use case, but there 
should be a wider perspective considered. Furthermore, the choice of regulative 
strategy and the models therein should consider the wider context of the DLT, 
specifically its functions and potential to replace intermediaries. The chapter is a 
portrayal of alternatives and is not arguing for any specific regulative strategy or 
model as all of these should be considered as part of impact assessment research. 
Nevertheless, all regulators should take it as their goal to ensure DLT-neutrality 
sustainably and choose carefully the regulative model or models for achieving 
this goal considering the strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives. As said, 
many of these strategies and models can be utilized in parallel or to complement 
each other and none of these can be regarded as an end result but rather as a 
constant work in progress.  
The following chapter presents an analysis of the chosen use cases of DLT on 
the basis of the principles of technology neutrality and the sub-principle of 
functional equivalence in order to identify the specific biases in specific existing 
regulation against DLT. Upon discovering non-compliance with the principle of 
technology neutrality, the author suggests sustainable and DLT-neutral regulative 
strategies on the basis of the selection of regulative strategies provided in this 
chapter. Therefore, the overview provided in this chapter should be regarded as 
relevant to finding sustainable and neutral solutions to the functional analysis 
conducted in Articles I–III and the following chapter.  
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IV APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES  
OF TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY AND  
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE IN DLT USE CASES 
In this chapter the author applies the principles introduced earlier in this disser-
tation to a selection of DLT use cases and upon identifying non-compliance 
explores how to resolve the non-compliance on the basis of the regulative strategies 
and models presented above. The selection of use cases is related to different 
substantive regulation from private – and public law and the aim of the choice of 
these use cases is to provide an overview of different sectors where DLT can be 
used and to show that bias and causes for bias vary per use case. 
The discrimination can be either apparent, such as the preferred treatment of 
existing technology, or non-apparent, such as the involvement of centralized 
intermediaries in order to gain trustworthiness without any consideration for the 
technology’s functions. The problem with such discrimination is the effect on the 
development of the technology and its applications. If the requirements of the 
regulation render the advantages of the new technology useless, the technological 
innovation has lost all of its assets.  
The current chapter includes the analysis of the three DLT use cases as problem-
clusters and the respective cluster-based existing regulation for application of the 
technology neutrality principle and identification of bias against DLT in these 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
4.1 Bitcoin exchange use case 
The use case under examination is related to the operation of an exchange service 
provider of virtual currency (bitcoin) to and from fiat currency. The analysis is 
based on two court cases during the period from 2013–2016, one originating from 
Estonia (de Voogd) and the other from Sweden (Hedqvist), and the then existing 
regulation of Estonia and the EU. The CJEU has not addressed the issue of 
qualification of bitcoin or cryptocurrency in cases other than Hedqvist. In the use 
case analysis, the author uses the problem-cluster approach and delves into the 
existing regulation valid at the time to be able to test the compliance of the 
existing regulation with the principle of technology neutrality. In the examination 
of this use case, the author explores the categorization of bitcoin and bitcoin 
exchange-service providers on the basis of the then existing regulation under 
different versions of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention 
Act (MLPA)385 of Estonia, different versions of the AML Directive (also referred 
                                                                          
385  Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act of Estonia [rahapesu ja 
terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus] – RT I 2008, 3, 21(MLPA I), Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act [rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise 
seadus] – RT I 06.07.2016, 13 (MLPA II) and Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Prevention Act of Estonia [rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus] – RT I, 
17.11.2017, 2 (MLPA III).  
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to as AMLD)386 and different versions of the VAT Directive.387 The research 
question addressed in the current DLT use case is whether the anti-money 
laundering regulation in Estonia and its application to bitcoin and its traders was 
technologically neutral in a similar manner to the VAT regulation and its appli-
cation to bitcoin and its traders in the EU? As the respective regulation analysed 
based on Estonian law is no longer in force, the research conducted is valuable 
for the purpose of identifying biases in the respective regulations against bitcoin 
and its traders that were the grounds for the difference in the treatment of bitcoin 
and its traders under Estonian anti-money laundering regulation. 
 
 
4.1.1 Description of the problem 
The legal problem related to DLT in this use case is (i) the treatment of a DLT 
output – bitcoin – in comparison with the treatment of fiat currency and (ii) the 
treatment of bitcoin exchange service providers in comparison with fiat currency 
exchange service providers. The substantive law focus in this use case in relation 
to the treatment of bitcoin exchange service providers is based on the MLPA, the 
AMLD and the VAT Directive. The problem addressed is the difference in the 
treatment of these categories and the bias for centralized system output as the 
cause for the difference in treatment.  
The court cases analysed were based on similar facts that took place approxi-
mately at the same time (2012–2015) in different jurisdictions, although the core 
dispute was in relation to different substantive law. The individuals involved were 
either considering or accused of operating a virtual currency-fiat currency 
exchange service platform.  
In the case of Hedqvist, the individual planned to buy and sell bitcoin as a 
trader and profit from the exchange rate difference. In search of legal certainty, 
he asked the Swedish Revenue Law Commission for clarification on whether his 
activities would be tax exempt, similar to the same activity if it were conducted 
                                                                          
386  Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15–36 (hereinafter: 
AMLD). Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering 
or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (hereinafter: 
the 4th AML Directive or AMLD), OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73–117. On 30 May 2018 the 4th 
AMLD was amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending 
Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) (hereinafter: the 5th 
AML Directive or AMLD) PE/72/2017/REV/1, OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, pp. 43–74. 
387  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value 
added tax OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1–118 (VAT Directive). 
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with fiat currency on the basis of the VAT Directive and relevant Swedish 
national regulation. In essence, the dispute, which was sent for preliminary ruling 
to the CJEU, was about whether bitcoin should be qualified as equal to legal 
tender and whether transactions with bitcoin should be qualified as equivalent to 
fiat currency for the purpose of VAT-related obligations. 
In the case of de Voogd, the individual was accused of already operating a 
bitcoin exchange platform and the essence of the dispute was related to whether 
bitcoin can be treated equally with fiat currency or whether it falls under the sui 
generis category of ‘alternative means of payment’ which existed under the then 
existing regulation. The qualification under the sui generis category would have 
subjected the operator to more strict compliance requirements under anti-money 
laundering regulation.  
 
 
4.1.2 Statement set for defence 
For the purposes of value-added taxation regulation, bitcoin (as a virtual currency) 
and fiat currency are considered functionally equivalent under Hedqvist ruling 
and granted effects equivalence under VAT regulation. Furthermore, the service 
of exchange with virtual currency and that with fiat currency are functionally 
equivalent and should be granted effects equivalence under the compliance regu-
lation with consideration for the specifics of DLT. Equivalence was established 
under the Hedqvist ruling for the purposes of the treatment of the traders with 
bitcoin and fiat currency. Similar treatment of bitcoin should have been granted for 




To ease the understanding of the reasoning the section on reasoning is divided 





Mr Hedqvist, as the potential operator of the currency exchange platform, was 
seeking to understand what the VAT treatment of bitcoins and the exchange 
service provider activity were under the Swedish law and sought legal certainty 
and clarity from local tax authorities. The comparative analysis executed by AG 
Kokott of multiple language versions of Article 135 (1)(e) of the VAT Directive388 
showed that the text of the existing regulation was ambiguous and not transparent, 
as in some languages the text of the Article referred to the term ‘currencies’, 
                                                                          
388  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 16 July 2015 in Hedqvist, para 34. 
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which could include both centralised and decentralised currencies and, in other 
language versions, the Article was less neutral389 in regard to the issuer and the 
issuing process of the currency and consequently resulted in excluding virtual 
currencies from its scope. However, as stated in earlier cases by the CJEU, “the 
concepts used in that provision must be interpreted and applied uniformly in light 
of the versions in all languages of the European Union”.390 The English version 
of the text afforded VAT exemption to: 
 
“transactions, including negotiation, concerning currency, bank notes and coins 
used as legal tender, with the exception of collectors’ items, that is to say, gold, 
silver or other metal coins or bank notes which are not normally used as legal 
tender or coins of numismatic interest”.391 
 
On the basis of the VAT Directive and the national regulation, the Swedish 
Revenue Law Commission (the Commission) regarded bitcoin as “a means of 
payment used in a similar way to legal means of payment”, which according to 
the Commission was also an interpretation that was consistent with the “objective 
of the exemptions laid down in Article 135(1) (b)–(g) of the VAT Directive, 
namely, to avoid the difficulties involved in making financial services subject to 
VAT.”392 On the basis of this qualification, the Commission granted bitcoin equal 
treatment to that of fiat currency on the grounds that bitcoin functions equivalently 
as any other means of payment, including legal tender. Consequently, according 
to the author, the Commission’s interpretation complied with the principle of 
technology neutrality and its sub-principle of functional equivalence by treating 
the categories of bitcoin (as virtual currency) equivalently to those of fiat 
currency for the purposes of VAT regulation.  
Unfortunately, the Swedish tax authority (Skatteverket) disagreed with the 
Commission, stating that the VAT exemptions did not apply to bitcoin as it was 
not legal tender. The respective authority stated that the VAT exemptions of the 
VAT Directive applied only for fiat currency that was legal tender and not to any 
other means of payment, such as virtual currency. This led the case to go to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling under the VAT Directive.  
The CJEU used the teleological and functional interpretation of the VAT 
Directive aiming to identify the aim of the existing regulation, stating that “the 
transactions exempt from VAT under those provisions are, by their nature, 
                                                                          
389  English version ‘currency, bank notes and coins’ referring to ‘currency’ in the singular – 
meaning that as long as one side used fiat currency the wording was inclusive, German version 
used the term ‘Devisen’ meaning foreign currencies in plural meaning that both currencies 
must be fiat currencies, the Italian and Finnish versions did not even require that any of the 
currencies be legal tender meaning that also transactions with no fiat currencies included could 
be covered by that Article. Veerpalu (n. 85).  
390  Hedqvist, para 45. See also Velvet & Steel Immobilien, CJEU Case C‑455/05, paragraph 
16 and the case-law cited, and Commission v Spain, CJEU Case C‑189/11, paragraph 56. 
391  Article 135(1) (e) of the VAT Directive. 
392  Hedqvist, para 17. 
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financial transactions”393 and “the exemptions laid down by Article 135(1)(e) of 
the VAT Directive are intended to alleviate the difficulties connected with de-
termining the taxable amount and the amount of VAT deductible, which arise in 
the context of the taxation of financial transactions”.394 The CJEU was of the 
opinion that bitcoin as a virtual currency “is a direct means of payment between 
the operators that accept it”395 and any transactions with bitcoin are financial 
transactions.396 Such conclusion is coherent with the VAT Directive’s intent, as 
the aim of the exemption – alleviating the difficulties connected to the determi-
nation of taxable amount – is equivalent in relation to bitcoin as to legal tender.397  
The author concludes that with this line of argument, the court addressed the 
effects equivalence or the equivalence of outcome, stating that it “follows from 
context and the aims of Article 135(1)(e) that to interpret that provision as 
including only transactions involving traditional currencies would deprive it of 
part of its effect.”398  
Consequently, the CJEU ruled in the Hedqvist case that according to “the 
requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system 
of VAT”,399 transactions with bitcoin as financial transactions must enjoy equal 
treatment with other financial transactions for the purposes of VAT treatment. 
The ruling, in the opinion of the author, is in compliance with the technology 
neutrality principle, including its sub-principle of functional equivalence. 
In order to reach this position, the CJEU, Advocate General Kokott (AG) and 
earlier also the VAT Committee needed to examine the functions of bitcoin. To 
that effect, AG stated that currencies used as legal tender “have no other practical 
use than as a means of payment”400 and, therefore, “that which applies for legal 
                                                                          
393  ibid, para 37. 
394  ibid, para 48. 
395  ibid, para 42. 
396  The CJEU stated that: “Transactions involving non-traditional currencies, that is to say, 
currencies other than those that are legal tender in one or more countries, in so far as those 
currencies have been accepted by the parties to a transaction as an alternative to legal tender 
and have no purpose other than to be a means of payment, are financial transactions.” ibid, 
para. 49. 
397  In the ruling, the CJEU accepts the argument of Mr Hedqvist that “the case of exchange 
transactions, in particular the difficulties connected with determining the taxable amount and 
the amount of VAT deductible, may be the same, whether it is a case of the exchange of 
traditional currencies, normally entirely exempt under Article 135(1)(e) of the VAT Directive, 
or the exchange of such currencies for virtual currencies with bi-directional flow, which – 
without being legal tender – are a means of payment accepted by the parties to a transaction 
and vice versa.” ibid, para 50. 
398  ibid, para 51. 
399  Hedqvist, para 35. 
400  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Hedqvist, para. 14. 
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tender should also apply for other means of payment with no other function than 
to serve as such”401 as, “for VAT purposes, they perform the same function”.402  
Without any assessment visible in the ruling, the court contended that “it is 
common ground that the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency is neither a security conferring 
a property right nor a security of a comparable nature”403 and also “it is common 
ground that the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency has no other purpose than to be a means 
of payment”.404  
In the ruling, the earlier analysis of the VAT Committee on bitcoin was not 
used as a basis for qualification, but in order to understand the scope of functional 
analysis that needs to be conducted, the alternative considerations of the Working 
Papers should be considered. The Committee considered the qualification of 
bitcoin as “(i) electronic money; (ii) a currency; (iii) a negotiable instrument; (iv) 
a security; (v) a voucher; or (vi) a digital product”.405 In the October 2014 analysis, 
the VAT Committee dismissed bitcoin from being e-money, currency, a security 
and a voucher and, consequently, a negotiable instrument or a digital product being 
the runner-up categories without a single winner. It was unclear whether for the 
decision of the Committee to consider bitcoin a digital product (electronically 
supplied service) was regarded as “a step too far”. The other category suitable for 
bitcoin was referred to as a negotiable instrument described on the basis of CJEU 
ruling Granton Advertising406 as “a right to claim a sum of money, closely linked 
to a payment instrument”.407  
In April 2015, the VAT Committee issued another Working Paper analysis on 
the VAT treatment of bitcoin,408 under which the alternative categories for quali-
fication were the same as the two alternative categories for bitcoin; however, the 
digital product was examined more than it was earlier.  
In the post-Hedqvist Working Paper No. 892 issued by the VAT Committee 
in February 2016, none of these two alternative categories suitable for bitcoin 
(negotiable instrument or digital product) were further discussed, as the court 
                                                                          
401  ibid. 
402  ibid, para 15. 
403  Hedqvist, para 55. 
404  ibid, para 52. 
405  European Commission. Directorate-General Taxation and Customs Union, VAT Com-
mittee (Article 398 of Directive 2006/112/EC), Working Paper No. 811, Question concerning 
the application of EU VAT provisions, Subject: VAT treatment of Bitcoin, 23 October 2014, 
p. 5. 
406  Granton Advertising BV versus Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Haaglanden/kantoor 
Den Haag, CJEU C-C‑461/12, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) 12 June 2014. 
407  VAT Committee (n. 385), p. 23. 
408  European Commission. Directorate-General Taxation and Customs Union, VAT Com-
mittee (Article 398 of Directive 2006/112/EC), Working Paper No. 892, Question concerning 
the application of EU VAT provisions, Subject: CJEU Case C-264/14: Bitcoin, 4 February 
2016. 
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regarded bitcoin “a direct means of payment between the operators that accept 
them”409 and equated bitcoin and legal tender currencies for VAT purposes.410  
Consequently, the author concludes that in the earlier working papers, the 
VAT Committee used textual interpretation of the wording of Article 135 (1) (e) 
and allowed the terminology to restrict the effect of the VAT Directive. By failing 
to consider the functional – and teleological interpretation of the exemption 
grounds, the VAT Committee interpreted the legal norm in a technologically 
discriminatory way, which the CJEU later ignored and rectified. The author 
points out that such analysis of functions and effect of the regulation that was 
conducted by the CJEU and earlier by the VAT Committee was needed and 
should be executed by each regulator upon trying to implement and enforce the 
applicable existing regulation.  
 
 
4.1.3.2 de Voogd 
In the de Voogd case, the dispute was similarly related to bitcoin qualification 
under the existing regulation in Estonia. The Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing Prevention Act of Estonia valid at the time of proceedings (MLPA I) 
stipulated the sui generis category ‘alternative means of payment’411 in subsection 
4 of § 6 of MLPA I and subjected the providers of alternative means of payment 
services to this customized regulation. The legal norm stipulating the sui generis 
category in MLPA I was worded broadly and under subsection 4 of § 6 of MLPA 
I included the following definition:  
 
“funds of monetary value by which financial obligations can be performed or 
which can be exchanged for an official currency.”412  
 
Furthermore, the service provider who used the alternative means of payment was 
defined in subsection 4 of § 6 of MLPA I as “a person who in its economic or 
professional activities through communications, transfer or clearing system buys, 
sells or mediates”413 this category of funds.  
The supervising authority for MLPA I is the Financial Intelligence Unit of the 
Estonian Police and Border Guard (FIU), who notified Mr de Voogd, who ope-
rated the domain btc.ee, claimed that he was selling and buying bitcoin to 
interested parties. The FIU qualified Mr de Voogd as a provider of alternative 
means of payment service and requested, with precept no. 1-9/1011, that he 
provide evidence of his compliance with the compliance measures customized 
for ‘alternative means of payment’ service providers under MLPA I.  
                                                                          
409  Hedqvist, para 51. 
410  VAT Committee (n. 408), p. 7. 
411  Subsection 4 of § 6 of MLPA I. 
412  ibid. 
413  ibid. 
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The case ended up in administrative court as Mr de Voogd challenged this 
interpretation as well as due to the applicability of MLPA I to his activities. 
According to the Supreme Court ruling in the de Voogd case, the court concluded 
in favour of the FIU, reasoning that “on the basis of the wording of the legal norm, 
the providers of the cryptocurrency exchange service are, under the valid law, 
considered the providers of an alternative means of payment service.”414  
As the grounds for such conclusion, the Supreme Court identified certain 
characteristics: (i) bitcoin can be exchanged to fiat currency; (ii) on exchange 
platforms, bitcoin has an exchange rate measurable in money; and (iii) instead of 
official currency, bitcoin can be used as a means of payment on the basis of trans-
actions. However, no separate functional analysis of bitcoin or its difference from 
fiat currency was conducted. No functional interpretation of the specific legal 
norm was made in the ruling to assess whether the legal norm constructed prior 
to DLT was discriminatory or proportional for the use case of DLT. Also, the 
characteristics of alternative means of payment service providers were not 
explored in the ruling. The court identifies that bitcoin has the sole function of 
being used as means of payment but does not state that bitcoin is functionally 
equivalent to fiat currency.  
The de Voogd Supreme Court ruling was issued on 11 April 2016 and the 
Hedqvist CJEU ruling on 22 October 2015 (AG opinion on 16 July 2015). In the 
de Voogd case, the Supreme Court did not discuss, mention or refer to the 
Hedqvist ruling or AG’s opinion or mention why the ruling is not relevant. 
 
 
4.1.3.2.1 Alternative means of payment 
The respective legal norm on the new sui generis category was termed very 
broadly, using as a definition the wording “funds of monetary value by which 
financial obligations can be performed or which can be exchanged for an official 
currency”. The definition of the sui generis category of ‘alternative means of 
payment’ is as vague as the definition of crypto-assets based on the MiCA Pro-
posal, which defines ‘crypto-asset’ as “a digital representation of value or rights 
which may be transferred and stored electronically, using distributed ledger 
technology or similar technology”;415 however, the MiCA Proposal has sub-
categories of crypto-assets in order to explain the types of crypto-asset for which 
the regulator envisions to provide more content. Contrary to the crypto-assets sui 
generis category, the ‘alternative means of payment’ category under MLPA I had 
no sub-categories to explain neither its scope nor the intention of the regulator to 
treat it differently from fiat currency.  
                                                                          
414  de Voogd, para 5.4. 
415  Article 3 Section 1 subsection (2) of the MiCA Proposal. 
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According to the explanatory memorandum416 of the respective legal act, the 
sui generis category was introduced on the basis of concerns raised by the FATF, 
the IMF and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime over risks stemming from the 
category referred to as ‘Internet money’. ‘Internet money’ was described as 
enabling “instantaneous, easy, safe and anonymous transfers of monetary value”.417 
The explanatory memorandum of the respective legal act in the context of Internet 
money discussed the existence of electronic purses (wallets) and e-silver and e-
gold potential payment methods. 
Under Directive 2005/60/EC (AMLD) no such category for an alternative 
means of payment service provider as an obliged entity category was introduced 
in the EU. Consequently, this specific sui generis category in MLPA I was intro-
duced in Estonia not on the basis of EU law but as an initiative of the national 
regulator in order to address e-silver and e-gold payment methods and ‘Internet 
money’.  
The respective version of the MLPA was adopted by the parliament on 
19 December 2007 and entered into force on 28 January 2008. The whitepaper 
for bitcoin, as the first example of cryptocurrency, was published on 31 October 
2008.418 As explained by Kiel Institute, bitcoin is merely a limited subcategory 
of all virtual currencies: 
 
“Cryptocurrencies are a special case of digital/virtual currencies. While crypto-
currencies use cryptographic functions in the processes of e.g. authorizing or 
verifying transactions, digital currencies include all currencies that are imple-
mented on computer systems (including, for example, in the form of a simple data-
base). Cryptocurrencies can therefore be considered a special case of digital 
currencies. Characteristic features include the absence of a central counterparty, 
non-discriminatory public access, and security against fraudulent spending.”419  
  
Furthermore, as pointed out in the proposal for the Directive 2015/849 (5th AMLD) 
by 30 May 2018, which was the first legal instrument in the EU that introduced 
regulation for virtual currencies and their exchange platforms as obliged entities, 
                                                                          
416  137 SE Eelnõu seletuskiri, Seletuskiri rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise 
seaduse eelnõu juurde (Explanatory Memorandum of Draft Law 137 SE on Money Laundering 
and Terrorism Financing Prevention Act 2007). <https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/ 
eelnou/046802d9-335d-415b-c4a1-650aa487eb33/Rahapesu%20ja%20terrorismi% 
20rahastamise%20t%C3%B5kestamise%20seadus> accessed 02 May 2020. 
417  Veerpalu (n. 86), p. 69. 
418  Marie Huillet, ‘11 Years Ago Today Satoshi Nakamoto Published the Bitcoin White Paper’ 
(Cointelegraph 31 Oct 2019) [blog]. <https://cointelegraph.com/news/11-years-ago-today-
satoshi-nakamoto-published-the-bitcoin-white-paper> accessed 21 November 2020. 
419  Kiel Institute ‘Virtual Currencies Monetary Dialogue’. In-depth analysis requested by the 
ECON committee. Study for the World Economy Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 
(July 2018) Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, PE 
619.016. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/149902/KIEL_FINAL%20publication.pdf> 
accessed 21 November 2020. 
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no Member State had any legislation on virtual currencies (nor had ever notified 
of having any) until 2018.420  
Lastly, before Mr de Voogd was approached by the FIU case, the regulator in 
Estonia (e.g., the Estonian central bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FSA)) had on several occasions stated in the media or press releases that virtual 
currencies, cryptocurrencies and bitcoin, along with the activity of exchanging 
them, is unregulated and does not fall under supervision in Estonia.421 Only after 
fiat currency exchange service provider Tavid, operating on the Estonian market, 
submitted a query on 23 January 2014 to the regulator seeking legal certainty as 
to the regulation of bitcoin exchange service providers422 did the regulator’s 
communication and also actions change. The FIU contacted Mr de Voogd for the 
first time on 13 February 2014 requesting proof of compliance with anti-money 
laundering regulation. Only nine days after Tavid’s query, the regulator (specifi-
cally the FIU) for the first time stated publicly that it considered bitcoin to fall 
under the alternative means of payment regulation under MLPA I. Mr de Voogd 
later inquired from the FIU why the regulator did not inform the public of their 
interpretation of the law earlier, to which the FIU responded “we just did not saw 
[sic] the need for composing something like that earlier”.423  
 
 
4.1.3.2.2 Extension of AMLD obligated entity categories 
The AMLD is a minimum harmonisation directive, leaving the EU Member 
States discretion to issue stricter regulation and widen the scope of regulation “to 
counter the important threats they maybe face with at the national level”.424 
Consequently, under Article 4 of the AMLD: 
  
1.  Member States shall ensure that the provisions of this Directive are extended 
in whole or in part to professions and to categories of undertakings, other 
than the institutions and persons referred to in Article 2(1), which engage in 
                                                                          
420  MiCA Proposal, p. 12. 
421  Rainer Saad, ‘Mida arvab Eesti Pank bitcoinist?’ [What does the Bank of Estonia think of 
bitcoin?], (Äripäev 18 December 2013) <https://www.aripaev.ee/uudised/2013-12-18/mida_ 
arvab_eesti_pank_bitcoinist>; Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘Virtuaalraha pakkujad ei 
kuulu järelevalve alla’ [Providers of virtual currency do not fall under supervision], (Website 
of Financial Supervisory Authority 05 February 2014) <http://www.fi.ee/index.php?id=21561> 
accessed 14 November 2018. 
422  Kadri Inselberg, ‘Tavid kaalub Bitcoiniga kauplemise alustamist’ [Tavid is considering 
trading Bitcoins] (Postimees.ee 23 January 2014) <https://majandus24.postimees.ee/2671592/ 
tavid-kaalubbitcoiniga-kauplemise-alustamist> accessed 14 November 2018. 
423  Btc.ee website. Court documents. <http://btc.ee/appeal.html> accessed 22 December 2018. 
424  Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUN-
CIL on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
and terrorist financing (Text with EEA relevance){SWD(2013) 21 final} {SWD(2013) 22 
final}, p. 9. 
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activities which are particularly likely to be used for money laundering or 
terrorist financing purposes. 
2.  Where a Member State decides to extend the provisions of this Directive to 
professions and to categories of undertakings other than those referred to in 
Article 2(1), it shall inform the Commission thereof. 
 
The Article 4 notification obligation is a flexible way to expand the directive’s 
scope, which is certainly in line with the sustainability goal of the technology 
neutrality principle, but for legal certainty and further development purposes 
requires states to notify the Commission of new categories of obligated entities. 
As the Supreme Court also confirmed, no such notification had been sent by 
Estonia.425  
The Supreme Court stated that the fact that Estonia did not inform the Com-
mission that Article 4 of the AMLD provides grounds for extension “has no 
relevance as to the validity and applicability of the regulation”. The Supreme 
Court also noted that Article 5 allows the EU Member State to “adopt or retain in 
force stricter provisions in the field covered by this Directive to prevent money 
laundering and terrorist financing”. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
Articles 4 and 5 of the AMLD are “clearly understandable and sufficiently clear” 
and, consequently, there is acte clair and there is no basis or reason to request 
preliminary ruling on these norms by the Court of the European Union.426  
To the author, however, first, it remains unclear whether the extension of the 
scope of the AMLD under Article 4 (1) of the AMLD is allowed for a global 
phenomenon such as bitcoin or whether the extension option was intended to 
counter important threats Member States may be faced with at the national level. 
Second, if it is not allowed to extend the AMLD to a global phenomenon such as 
bitcoin, does the extension become non-compliant with the AMLD? Furthermore, 
does Article 5 of the AMLD allow stricter provisions in the field covered by the 
AMLD only within the scope of the obliged entities named in the AMLD (the 
wording is “stricter provisions in the field covered by this Directive”) or are 
stricter provisions also allowed for the obliged entities to which the AMLD scope 
is extended? Lastly, if stricter provisions are allowed for obliged entities not 
covered by the AMLD, does Article 5 allow stricter provisions and difference in 
treatment based on the technology used for the transfer of funds?  
Given these circumstances as provided above and the aim of the freedom to 
provide services, freedom establishment in the EU, the general proportionality427 
and non-discrimination principle of administrative law and procedure,428 and § 14 
                                                                          
425  de Voogd, p. 18. 
426  de Voogd, p. 18. 
427  § 3 section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the administrative acts and measures 
shall be appropriate, necessary and proportionate to the stated objectives. Administrative 
Procedure Act [haldusmenetluse seadus] – RT I 2001, 58, 354; RT I, 13.03.2019, 55. 
428  SCALC judgment, 17th February 2003, case 3-4-1-1-03, p. 14. 
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of the Constitution429 that obligates the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, 
and of local authorities, to guarantee the rights and freedoms provided in the Con-
stitution, the author suggests that in order to support legal certainty the Supreme 
could have responded to these questions in the de Voogd ruling or in order to find 
legal certainty also in the EU on this issue the Supreme Court could have clarified 
the issue on the basis of a preliminary ruling request to CJEU. 
 
 
4.1.3.2.3 Difference in treatment 
Under subsection 8 of § 15 of MLPA I, the person who was qualified as to 
providing the alternative means of payment service was obligated to identify the 
customer while being present in the same place as the customer (meaning face-
to-face meetings) and the measures needed to be taken  
 
(a)  upon initiation of the business relationship; and  
(b)  in the case of transactions with the customer exceeding EUR 1000 a calendar 
month.  
 
Under subsection 2 of § 12 of MLPA I, the provider of fiat currency exchange 
services needed to take similar measures as point (a) but, in regard to point (b), 
only when transactions with the customer exceed EUR 15,000 per transaction. 
This meant that the alternative means of payment exchange service provider was 
treated differently than the fiat currency exchange service provider due to the 
risks associated with ‘Internet money’ and e-gold and e-silver.430  
Consequently, as pointed out, the AML compliance requirements for fiat 
currency exchange service providers and alternative means of payment service 
providers have substantial differences. For alternative means of payment, the 
transaction amounts were grouped together for an entire calendar month and 
AML compliance was triggered at a very low level of 1,000 euros’ worth of trans-
actions per month. This means that the difference in transaction amounts that were 
triggering compliance were more than 15 times lower for bitcoin than fiat 
currencies without any proper explanation for such difference in the explanatory 
memorandum of the legal act. The negative effect of the qualifying bitcoin under 
the sui generis category was the face-to-face identification requirement starting 
from a very low monetary value which meant that for virtually every transaction 
the user and the service provider should have met in person.  
                                                                          
429  Constitution of the Republic of Estonia [Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus] – RT I, 15.05.2015, 2. 
430  137 SE Eelnõu seletuskiri, Seletuskiri rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise 
seaduse eelnõu juurde [Explanatory Memorandum of Draft Law 137 SE on Money Laundering 
and Terrorism Financing Prevention Act 2007]. <https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/ 
eelnou/046802d9-335d-415b-c4a1-650aa487eb33/Rahapesu%20ja%20terrorismi%20 
rahastamise%20t%C3%B5kestamise%20seadus> accessed 02 May 2020. 
109 
The Supreme Court conceded with the position that the effect of this com-
pliance measure of the practice is unclear and instructed the legislature to con-
sider assessing the impact of the specific legal norms in question.431 Said compli-
ance measure certainly had the effect of completely stopping any such bitcoin 
exchange business in Estonia. This was due to the fact that bitcoin was a globally 
used virtual currency existing only virtually and the clients interested in the 
currency were not only the individuals or businesses in close proximity to one 
another. Such circumstances made the face-to-face identification requirement 
difficult to comply with.  
 
 
4.1.4 Findings and alternative courses of action 
The research question addressed in the current DLT use case was whether the 
anti-money laundering regulation in Estonia and its application to bitcoin and its 
traders was technologically neutral, similarly to the EU VAT regulation and its 
application to bitcoin and its traders in the EU? The separation of a new sui generis 
category such as ‘alternative means of payment’ from fiat currency in MLPA I 
cannot be regarded as contrary to the principle of technology neutrality. However, 
considering the CJEU categorisation of bitcoin as functionally equivalent to fiat 
currency for, VAT purposes under the EU law in Hedqvist, the difference in the 
treatment of fiat currency and ‘alternative means of payment’ for AML com-
pliance purposes can be considered contrary to the principle of technology 
neutrality under Estonian law. 
Considering that in Hedqvist, the functions of bitcoin and those of fiat cur-
rencies were regarded by the CJEU as functionally equivalent for VAT purposes, 
then for the purposes of assessing the compliance of MLPA I and the ‘alternative 
means of payment’ regulation with the technology neutrality principle, it is neces-
sary to assess whether the Supreme Court in the de Voogd case identified any 
grounds related to anti-money laundering regulation objectives that justified this 
difference in treatment. Considering the statements of the Supreme Court in the 
de Voogd ruling, the court was not of the opinion that the treatment was pro-
portionate to, sustainable or considerate of the technological and global use 
aspects of bitcoin.432 The court clearly states these concerns in the ruling, but, 
unfortunately, these findings did not affect the ruling to apply the relevant existing 
regulation for alternative means of payment.  
The effects of MLPA I on bitcoin and its traders were not equivalent to those 
on fiat currency and its traders, although, according to Hedqvist, effects equi-
valence was demanded from VAT regulation, the same was not by AML regu-
lation. The author agrees with the Supreme Court in de Voogd, that the AML 
compliance requirements were not considerate of technological innovation, the 
features of bitcoin and its global use. It is the opinion of the author that on the 
                                                                          
431  de Voogd, para 25. 
432  ibid, paras 26–28. 
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basis of the principle of technology neutrality, it is the task and obligation of the 
regulators, including the executive authority and the judiciary, to evaluate the 
effect of existing regulation on the new technology or its use cases in order to 
make sure that the effect does not restrict innovation and decrease competition 
simply for the reason that the regulators are not familiar with the new technology.  
Although, in the ruling of the de Voogd case, the court urged the legislature 
(i) to consider amending the existing regulation in order to take into consideration 
the characteristics of bitcoin transactions, (ii) to assess the effect of existing regu-
lation on this business and as a result (iii) to ensure sufficient flexibility in the 
regulation that applies to the innovative technology. Nevertheless, the court itself 
failed to interpret MLPA I in a functional-technological way, as it could have 
used the Hedqvist qualification and placed bitcoin under fiat currency compliance 
measures.433 In essence, such a solution would not have been substantially dif-
ferent for bitcoin and its trading, as their trading would have still required face-
to-face identification measures to be followed and such compliance measure 
could have still had the same cumbersome effect on bitcoin trading as the appli-
cation of the ‘alternative means of payment’ compliance measures had, but at 
least the thresholds for these measures to be complied with would have been higher.  
Of separate importance is the value of legal certainty and clarity in relation to 
the sui generis category and the related regulation. In this legal certainty context, 
the court partially applied the technology neutrality principle by stating the 
sustainability goal as follows: 
 
“the obligated entity is determined on the basis of general characteristics and the 
law does not include reference to traders of virtual or cryptocurrencies, however, 
this cannot be regarded as a reason for the existing regulation to be legally un-
certain. The legal act must be worded with a high-level of abstraction to ensure 
avoidance of gap in legislation and to ensure flexibility, the law cannot enlist all 
existing and future alternative means of payment.”434  
 
The irony of it all is that the court regards it as understandable to any ‘reasonable’ 
person dealing with bitcoin that this is regarded as a non-traditional or alternative 
means of payment.435 This is ironic because the authorities had themselves con-
stantly reassured the subjects of law that activities with virtual or cryptocurrencies 
were unregulated436 and, when an incumbent inquired about it from the FIU, the 
FIU responded that they did not see any need for such clarification.437 
                                                                          
433  de Voogd, para 28. 
434  ibid, para 6.4. 
435  ibid, para 6.4. 
436  On 18th December 2013 Head of the Payments and Settlement Department of the Bank of 
Estonia, Mr. Mihkel Nõmmela: “First of all, with virtual currency schemes we have an area 
which, thus far, is unregulated and no authority is supervising the area of activity”. Rainer 
Saad (n. 426). 
437  Upon Mr de Voogd inquiring from the FIU why they have not informed the public of their 
interpretation of the law earlier to which the FIU responded that: “We will public [sic] our 
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Therefore, based on the above, the author is of the opinion that, considering that: 
 
(i) subsection 4 of § 6 of MLPA I created an additional category of obliged 
entity that was not established under the AMLD; 
(ii) under Article 4 of AMLD, a Member State was under an obligation to inform 
the Commission thereof of any new categories of obligated entities; 
(iii) the Estonian regulator had not informed the Commission of any new 
category of undertaking as obliged entities to which it has decided to extend 
the relevant provisions of the AMLD, including of the new category ‘alter-
native means of payment service provider’; 
(iv) the regulator had repeatedly told the public through the media that bitcoin is 
unregulated,  
(v) in the Hedqvist case, the CJEU had ruled that bitcoin is considered function-
ally equivalent to fiat currency for the purposes of EU VAT regulation and 
is consequently treated equivalently; and  
(vi) the principle of technology neutrality is aligned with the primary purpose of 
the procedure in administrative courts – “to protect the rights of individuals 
against unlawful actions performed in the course of the exercise of executive 
authority” – described in subsection 1 of § 2 of the Code of Administrative 
Court Procedure438 (CACP), 
 
the Supreme Court, in line with the technological-functional interpretation goal 
and aiming for legal certainty, should and could have asked the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. The preliminary ruling could have addressed at least the 
following issues:  
 
(a) Whether the extension of the scope of the AMLD under Article 4 (1) of the 
AMLD is allowed for a global phenomenon such as bitcoin or whether the 
extension option is intended to counter important threats the Member States 
may be faced with at the national level? 
(b) If it is allowed, whether failure to notify the Commission under Article 4(2) 
of the AMLD on the extension of the regulation to a global phenomenon 
such as bitcoin leads to the extension not being compliant with the AMLD? 
(c) If the failure to notify does not lead to non-compliance with AMLD, does 
Article 5 of the AMLD allow stricter provisions only for the obliged entities 
named in the AMLD (the wording is “stricter provisions in the field covered 
by this Directive”) or are stricter provisions also allowed for the obliged 
                                                                          
opinion regarding the matter of bitcoins on our website soon.[...] and for your information we 
have not kept our opinion in [sic] secret – we just did not saw [sic] the need for composing 
something like that earlier” (Court documents. <http://btc.ee/appeal.html> accessed 02 May 
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438  Code of Administrative Court Procedure [halduskohtumenetluse seadustik] – RT I, 
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entities which the AMLD scope does not cover and to which the respective 
Member State extends the regulation?  
(d) If stricter provisions are allowed for obliged entities not covered by AMLD, 
does Article 5 allow stricter provisions and, consequently, difference in 
treatment based on the technology used for the transfer of funds, such as 
bitcoin, which was considered for EU VAT regulation purposes under 
Hedqvist functionally equivalent to fiat currency? 
 
As a conclusion, the analysis of the bitcoin exchange use case shows that the court 
itself needs to conduct functional equivalence and effects equivalence analyses 
and be diligent in securing the application of the principle of technology 
neutrality in order to not discriminate against the innovators and early adopters 
of any new technology, as this has a chilling effect on any development related 
to DLT technology and its use cases.  
 
It is the opinion of the author that:  
 
(i) in the Hedqvist case, the CJEU analysed the functions of bitcoin by con-
ducting a functional and technical interpretation of the relevant norms and, 
in conclusion, applied the EU VAT Directive in compliance with the 
principle of technology neutrality;  
(ii) in de Voogd case, although the court conducted a functional interpretation of 
the relevant norms and found these to be disproportional and unfit (point 26–
28 of de Voogd ruling), it nevertheless upheld these discriminatory legal 
norms, the application of which to bitcoin and its traders did not pass the 
technology neutrality compliance check; 
(iii) the case facts in the Hedqvist case show that the referring court in Sweden 
was interested in securing technology neutrality and legal certainty in the 
context of regulatory uncertainty in relation to bitcoin, and the CJEU applied 
the existing regulation in a functional-teleological way; 
(iv) the case facts in the de Voogd case show that the Supreme Court was 
sceptical as to the suitability of the compliance measures for the DLT use 
case due to reasons of proportionality and confirmed that the impact of these 
measures on the use case (considering the face-to-face identification require-
ment) is unclear; nevertheless, the court still applied the existing regulation 
to bitcoin traders and in taking that step created legal certainty in relation to 
bitcoin trade in Estonia, which, due to its cumbersome compliance measures 
on traders, lead to all such activity being temporarily suspended until the 
respective regulation was amended and eventually repealed by the legislature.  
 
As a final note, MLPA I and the respective difference of treatment that was the 
subject of the dispute in the de Voogd case were amended by MLPA II to allow 
online identification just a few months after the Supreme Court ruling in de Voogd 
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case.439 Lastly, the entire regulation on the sui generis category of alternative means 
of payment was repealed along with MLPA II by MLPA III in November 2017 
(1 year and 7 months after the de Voogd case) due to early transposition of the 
5th AMLD. Though the respective regulation analysed is no longer in force, the 
research conducted is valuable to identify methods to reveal biases in regulation 
against DLT use. 
 
 
4.2 Shareholder ledger use case 
The second DLT use case discussed in this dissertation and in more detail in 
Article II is focused on the administration of a shareholder ledger for a private 
limited liability company (OÜ) in Estonia. To the knowledge of the author, no 
analysis of the use of DLT in shareholder ledger maintenance in Estonia has been 
previously conducted.  
 
 
4.2.1 Description of the problem 
DLT at its core is a ledger technology and, consequently, the wider question in 
relation to shareholder ledgers is whether DLT can be used to operate private or 
public ledgers in order to facilitate trade in shares and the liquidity of this asset. 
In this subsection, the author explores whether the existing regulation in Estonia 
allows DLT to be used for the shareholder ledger maintenance of the shares of 
private limited liability companies (OÜs) not registered in the central securities 
depository (CSD).  
As stated in Chapter 1, in the EU Blockchain Study, the analysis of the MiCA 
Proposal and Pilot Regime has shown that regulation developed for centralised 
structures hinder the use of DLT. Such hindrance may present itself by either not 
granting DLT-based solutions effects equivalence based on functional equi-
valence or subjecting the functionally equivalent solution to unnecessary com-
pliance requirements as is visible from the Pilot Regime. Consequently, the use 
case in question explores whether the shareholder ledger maintenance regulation 
addressing OÜs includes similar types of biases that result in hindrances in the 
use of DLT for the administration of the non-CSD shares of an Estonian OÜ.  
Given the recent Digital Finance Package introduced by the EU, it is clear that 
the existence of DLT-based crypto-assets is changing the reality of capital 
markets, multilateral trading and securities settlement. Furthermore, it is antici-
                                                                          
439  Act Amending the Identity Documents Act, Credit Institutions Act and Money Laundering 
and Terrorism Financing Prevention Act [isikut tõendavate dokumentide seaduse, krediidi-
asutuste seaduse ning rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seaduse muutmise 
seadus] – RT I, 06.07.2016, 2. 
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pated that DLT will also substantially impact company law.440 Consequently, the 
use of DLT to facilitate shareholder ledger maintenance and trading of shares for 
the purpose of easing trading and ledger maintenance and increasing investor 
protection is an equally relevant issue.441 The present DLT use case addresses this 
issue in a scope limited to the maintenance of the shareholder ledgers of private 
limited liability companies (OÜs) in Estonia. Specifically, the current section and 
Article II seek to explore the existing regulation in Estonia that applies to the 
shareholder ledger maintenance of OÜs from the perspective of compliance with 
the principle of technology neutrality and in order to identify whether currently 
valid existing regulation holds biases against the use of DLT.  
The relevance and objective of the analysis is in line with the goal of the Pilot 
Regime – to allow for the use of DLT to “expedite and condense trading and 
settlement to nearly real-time and enable the merger of trading and post-trading 
activities”442 related to OÜ shares. The Pilot Regime, which surfaced only at the 
end of September 2020, is proposing exemptions to certain requirements of the 
CSDR443 and MIFID II444 to enable DLT to be used in the trading of financial 
instruments and also to allow “a DLT MTF445 to perform some activities normally 
                                                                          
440  Florian Möslein, ‘Blockchain Applications and Company Law’ (2020) Legal Technology 
Transformation in Practice (October 27). <https://ssrn.com/abstract=> accessed 26 December 
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444  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU Text with EEA relevance OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349–496 (Market in Financial 
Instruments Directive, MiFID II). 
445  According to Recital 7 of the Pilot Regime, a “DLT market infrastructure should be 
defined either as a DLT multilateral trading facility (DLT MTF) or a DLT securities settlement 
system.” Furthermore, according to Recital 8, “DLT MTF should be a multilateral trading 
facility that is operated by an investment firm or a market operator that operate the business 
or a regulated market and maybe the regulated market itself, authorised under Directive 
2014/65/EU (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, MiFID II), and that has received a 
specific permission under this [Pilot Regime]. Such a DLT MTF should be subject to all the 
requirements applicable to a multilateral trading facility under the framework of Directive 
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performed by a [central securities depository]”.446 Consequently, the EU regu-
lator is making policy decisions and regulatory amendments to accommodate 
DLT use in securities settlements and trading.  
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, the changes brought 
about by the Digital Finance Package are motivated among other objectives by the 
goal of technology neutrality in regulation. This is a testament to the position that 
technology neutrality is a general principle of law and does not need to be 
reiterated in each separate substantive law.  
Also, the use case analysis in this subsection is conducted from the perspective 
of the technology neutrality principle and whether the regulation is compliant 
with the principle, even though the principle is not specifically stated as appli-
cable in this specific area of substantive law in Estonian regional law. 
Consequently, the research question of the second use case is whether the 
regulation of the Estonian Commercial Code (CC) on the shareholder ledger 
administration of the non-CSD shares of an OÜ is technology-neutral and allows 
for the effective use of DLT in ledger maintenance. Shareholder ledger adminis-
tration using DLT is aimed at the ease of record-keeping and trading with the 
respective asset. Therefore, for the purposes of the use case analysis, the regu-
lation on ledger maintenance and share transfer is of relevance. Under Estonian 
law, depending on the administrator of the shareholder ledger (either the CSD or 
the management board), the share transfer regulation has different requirements, 
and the trustworthiness of the ledger data also differs. To be more specific, the 
shares maintained in the management board shareholder ledger have more 
stringent share transfer requirements than CSD-registered shares. On the basis of 
existing regulation, all of these more stringent requirements are waived in the 
case that the shareholder ledger is administered by the CSD.447 Therefore, in the 
present use case analysis, it is explored whether these more stringent require-
ments for share transfer should be waived in the case that DLT is used for share-
holder ledger maintenance by the management board and whether the entries in 
the DLT-based shareholder ledger should be granted effects equivalence with the 
entries in the CSD-maintained register.  
The present use case analysis has posed a list of challenges as, since the publi-
cation of Article II, not only has the CC been amended, but also substantial amend-
ments have been proposed by the EU in the form of the Digital Finance Package, 
which influences the analysis and relevance of the use case. The compendium text 
will address the CC amendments that have entered into force and partly also the 
EU initiatives under consideration at the time of writing this dissertation.  
                                                                          
2014/65/EU (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, MiFID II), Regulation EU No. 
600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Regulation, MiFIR) or any other EU financial services legislation, except if it has been granted 
one or several exemptions by its national competent authority in accordance with this [Pilot 
Regime].” 
446  Recital 9 of Pilot Regime. 
447  Veerpalu (n. 88). 
116 
4.2.2 Statement set for defence 
On the basis of the principle of technology neutrality, the regulator should not 
prefer a centralised ledger maintenance system, such as a CSD register, to a 
decentralised ledger-maintenance system, such as a DLT-based ledger. Such 
technology preference can be expressed in the existing regulation by (i) assigning 
trustworthiness to ledger entries based on their administrator and (ii) the dif-
ference in the share transfer rules applied to the shares maintained by the different 
ledger administrators. Any different and biased treatment of non-CSD shares re-
corded in a functionally equivalent DLT-based ledger granted effects equi-
valence. On the basis of the functional equivalence sub-principle, if the functions 
of a human intermediary or centralised administrator can be performed in an 
equivalent manner by any chosen administrator using the DLT solution, the use 
of such solution should receive equivalence of outcome (effects equivalence) 




The shareholder ledgers contain important source information as to the power to 
control and govern the company. Now more than ever, shareholder ledgers are 
digitally maintained and, therefore, there often is no paper attached to the owner-
ship of shares. As a result of this development, the voting rights at respective 
management bodies depend on the reliability of the data entered into shareholder 
ledgers. The ledger data entries are also the source for the right to dividends and 
therefore the trustworthiness of the data entries is of utmost importance. The 
entries must be true and the amendment process must be tamper-proof. Therefore, 
the ledger maintenance must be transparent and based on auditable logs and rules. 
As DLT is a ledger technology and permissionless ledger networks use auditable 
and transparent protocols for ledger maintenance, DLT seems to be a technology 
worth considering for maintaining shareholder ledgers.  
The main substantive law addressed in this analysis is the existing regulation 
on shareholder ledger administration based on the CSDR, the Commercial Code 
(CC), the Public Information Act (IPA)448 and the Securities Register Maintenance 






                                                                          
448  Public Information Act [avaliku teabe seadus] – RT I 2000, 92, 597; RT I, 14.11.2018, 5.  
449  Securities Register Maintenance Act [väärtpaberite registri pidamise seadus] – RT I 2000, 
57, 373; RT I, 26.06.2017, 1. 
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4.2.3.1 Specifics of OÜ shareholder ledger maintenance 
As regulated in § 148(6) of the CC, OÜ shares are recorded in book-entry form 
as required by the CSDR450 and no share certificates are issued. Furthermore, there 
can only be one true source of information, meaning that there is only one share-
holder ledger per business entity. To administer the shareholder ledger of an OÜ 
in Estonia, there are currently two options available under existing regulation: 
  
1) Shares are registered at any central securities depository (CSD)-maintained 
register operating under Estonian law – so-called CSD registered shares or 
CSD shares.  
2) Shareholder ledgers are maintained by the management board of an OÜ – 
so-called non-CSD registered shares or non-CSD shares.  
 
Under Article 23 (1) of the CSDR, an authorised CSD in the EU may provide 
services provided that said services are covered by the authorisation. The CSD 
option is the lesser used of the two in Estonia, amounting to less than 5% of all 
OÜs.451 Consequently, more than 95% of shareholder ledgers in Estonia are main-
tained by management boards. This is not unique, as management boards also 
maintain shareholder ledgers in the UK, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, 
Germany and the Netherlands.452 





                                                                          
450  Article 3(1) of the CSDR “any issuer established in the Union that issues or has issued 
transferable securities which are admitted to trading or traded on trading venues, shall arrange 
for such securities to be represented in book-entry form as immobilisation or subsequent to a 
direct issuance in dematerialised form.” 
451  The Chamber of Notaries has data stating that in 2018 the indicator was 1.7%, yet the 
Explanatory Memorandum of 148 SE indicated that the % is less than 5%. Chamber of 
Notaries (2018). Notarite Koja arvamus ühinguõiguse revisjoni muudatusettepanekute kohta. 
Opinion on the analysis-concept paper of company law revision working group, 17 December 
2018, p. 2 [online] Available from: <https://www.just.ee/> [12 January 2019]. Explanatory 
Memorandum for the draft law 148 SE to amend Commercial Code, Notarisation Act and 
Notary Fees Act (Explanatory Memorandum 148 SE). Seletuskiri äriseadustiku, tõestamis-
seaduse ja notari tasu seaduse muutmise seaduse 148 SE eelnõu juurde. Available at:  
<https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/a771f589-ef25-4298-802b-2532822eb4b90/ 
%C3%84riseadustiku%20muutmise%20seadus%20(osa%20v%C3%B5%C3%B5randamine)> 
[9 May 2020] 
452  Ministry of Justice. (2018) Ühinguõiguse revisjon Analüüs-kontseptsioon (Revision of 
Company Law, hereinafter Analysis-concept paper), 15 September 2018, p. 489. [online] 
<https://www.just.ee/sites/www.just.ee/files/uhinguoiguse_revisjoni_ 
analuuskontseptsioon.pdf> accessed 12 January 2019. 
453  § 149 sections 4–5 of CC. 
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(i) Share transfer transaction requires no specific form.  
(ii) Due to the freedom of form,454 transaction costs are lower as no notary fee 
is applicable.  
(iii) Theoretically, there is more transparency and data integrity as to ledger data 
and transaction history.  
 
The latter is theoretical, as the data submitted to the CSD is still initially submitted 
by the same management board, whose role and responsibility was to maintain 
the ledger up until registration and whose role is also to update the CSD ledger 
data in cases other than share transfer transactions. 
In effect, the difference for shareholders between the two options is still the 
liquidity and ease of transfer related to shares, which is in turn closely related to 
the form requirement for share transfers that was substantially amended in 2020 
as described in the following section below. However, considering that, as 
described in Article II, access to the CSD alternative is limited due to fees and 
issues related to the difficulties of opening securities accounts in credit insti-
tutions, the option of having the management board maintain the shareholder 
ledger is still the most popular. Therefore, it is of relevance to examine whether 
management boards can employ DLT in maintaining shareholder ledgers as 
opposed to whether CSDs are allowed to use this technology. Furthermore, the 
use of DLT in the latter option has already been sufficiently addressed by the 
regulation suggested by the Pilot Regime.  
 
 
4.2.3.1.1 Recent amendments to CC affecting ledger maintenance 
Depending on the administrator of the shareholder ledger – either the CSD or the 
management board – the share transfer requirements are different and shareholder 
ledger entries are treated and valued differently. For example, the non-CSD-
registered share transfer rules are more stringent than the CSD-registered share 
transfers. More specifically, at the time of writing Article II, both the disposition 
for a transfer of non-CSD-registered shares and a transaction constituting an 
obligation to transfer non-CSD-registered shares required a notarially authenti-
cated transaction under § 149 Section 4 of the CC. At the same time, as stipulated 
in § 149 Section 5, the CSD-registered shares were and still are exempted from 
fulfilling such form requirement and, consequently, CSD shares can be trans-
ferred on the basis of any form of transaction. Therefore, the aim of the research 
presented in Article II and herein is to identify whether existing regulation should 
also allow for a similar exemption for non-CSD shares in the case that the 
                                                                          
454  Sein, K. Tehingu vorminõuded ja nende järgimata jätmise tagajärjed [The form require-
ments of the transaction and the consequences of failure to abide by these requirements], 
(2010) Juridica VII, p. 509; Section 77 (1) of the GPCCA; § 8(1) and § 11(1) of the Law of 
Obligations Act. 
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management board uses DLT in shareholder ledger maintenance on the basis of 
the functional equivalence sub-principle.  
However, in between the publication of Article II and the writing of this 
dissertation, the existing regulation was amended. The amendments were lobbied 
by the startup community in Estonia and formalised into a request on 3 September 
2019, which led to a draft law by 24 October 2019 and entered into force on 
expedited schedule on 24 May 2020. Therefore, the new version of § 149 Section 
4 of the CC only requires that the disposition for the transfer of the non-CSD 
registered share be notarial and grants all transactions that constitute an obligation 
to transfer non-CSD registered shares in free form. The latter change was moti-
vated by the burden of using notaries to conclude shareholder agreements and 
option agreements (as these contain obligations to transfer shares as part of drag-
along, tag-along or co-sale rights), which is common practice in startup com-
panies. Along with these amendments, there was also a limited liberation as to 
the disposition for the transfer agreement form. The liberation is reflected in the 
new regulation in the form requirement under § 149 Section 6, which currently 
allows the notarial requirement of the disposition for the transfer of non-CSD 
shares to be waived in addition to CSD-registered shares by the OÜs that meet 
the following conditions (‘Startup Exemption’):  
 
(i) Share capital is at least EUR 10,000.  
(ii) Share capital is fully paid. 
(iii) All shareholders must be in favour of this resolution to waive the notarial 
requirement. 
(iv) The articles of association must include such waiver. 
  
Upon meeting these conditions, the disposition for transfer transactions does not 
enjoy full freedom of form, instead, under § 149 Section 6 of the CC, the transfer 
transaction needs to be at least in a format that can be reproduced in writing.  
This means that, upon the writing of this dissertation, the existing regulation 
has different content than it did during the writing of Article II, and the summary 
herein conveys said differences. Nevertheless, in both versions of the existing 
regulation, there are certain functions to be fulfilled, which the regulator has 
decided can only be fulfilled by a human intermediary, such as a notary. Given 
that the notarial authentication rule remains in place, the functions the notary 
fulfils upon authentication of these transfer contract are of interest. As explained 
in Article II, the notarial authentication involves four functions:  
 
(i) evidentiary function455  
(ii) identification function – also discussed in Article III 
 
                                                                          
455  Sein, K. (n. 454), p. 509 
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(iii) warning function456 
(iv) consulting function457 
 
Consequently, the existing regulation requires additional functions to be per-
formed in the case that the ledger is administered by the management board. The 
amendments to share transfer regulation have an impact on non-CSD share-
holders; however, currently less than 5% of the shares of OÜs are registered in 
the CSD and only approximately 9.6% of OÜs458 can make use of the Startup 
Exemption. This leaves 85% of OÜs still struggling with the more stringent 
regulation on share transfer. Consequently, this majority did not experience any 
effects from the amendments, and the conclusions of Article II are still relevant.  
 
 
4.2.3.1.2 Applicable requirements 
There is no requirement of medium (form) or technology as to the management 
board’s task of administering the shareholder ledger stipulated in existing regu-
lation. According to § 182 Section 1 of the CC, “the management board shall keep 
a list of shareholders which shall set out the names, addresses, personal identi-
fication codes or registry codes and the nominal value of their shares” and, under 
11 of the same § 182, shareholders must “immediately inform the management 
board about any changes in the information on the shareholders”. Therefore, it 
appears that there are no specific or other functions required to be performed by 
the management board to maintain the ledger other than keeping the ledger up to 
date on the basis of information submitted by specific individuals – the share-
holders.  
The management board does not perform any identification function on the 
shareholders, does not collect the transfer documents (other than in cases where 
the other shareholders have the right of pre-emption under § 149 Section 2 of the 
CC) and does not validate any data, which in turn makes the regulation on ledger 
maintenance technology-independent, as it stipulates the content of the ledger and 
the obligated subject (the management board) but remains mute as to the process 
and functions.  
                                                                          
456  SCCLC Case No. 3-2-1-49-03 and SCCLC Case No. 3-2-1-85-04. 
457  According to Section 18(1) of the Notarisation Act “the notary shall also explain to parties 
the meaning and legal consequences of the transaction and the different possibilities for entry 
into the transaction” and “the notary shall ensure that errors and doubts are precluded and the 
rights of inexperienced or incompetent parties are not damaged”. See also SCCLC case no. 3-2-
1-49-03; SCCLC case no. 3-2-1-127-03 (2003), SCCLC Case No. 3-2-1-141-14, paras. 34–35. 
458  Appendix to the Explanatory memorandum of draft law 148 SE. [148 SE Eelnõu Seletus-
kirja lisa (märkused ja ettepanekud). Äriseadustiku muutmise seaduse (osa võõrandamine) 
eelnõu seletuskirja juurde] <https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/a771f589-
ef25-4298-802b-2532822eb4b9/%C3%84riseadustiku%20muutmise%20seadus%20 
(osa%20v%C3%B5%C3%B5randamine)> accessed 29 November 2020.  
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As discussed in Article II, under § 12 Sections 2 and 3 of the Securities Register 
Maintenance Act (SRMA), the CSD register is a database for the registration of 
shares, debt obligations and other securities and operations performed with such 
securities. The CSD maintained register is a public register belonging to the state 
information system and consequently falls under the legal category of database 
in the meaning of § 431 Section 1 of the IPA. The SRMA and the CSDR regulate 
the activity of the registrar. Under § 12 Section 3, the CSD is a central depository 
that has been granted the right to maintain the register based on § 25 of the 
SRMA, which grants the decision on the registrar to the respective minister who 
is entitled to enter into a contract under public law with the registrar for not more 
than ten years. The said contract is supervised by the Ministry of Finance for 
compliance. Furthermore, there are a number of CSDR Level 2 measures adopted 
which set the technical standards, settlement disciplines and prudential require-
ments459 established for CSDs, creating a complex web of regulations aimed at 
securing settlements and harmonising regulation. As mentioned, for the purposes 
of allowing DLT to be used for functions performed by CSDs on securities 
registration and settlement under the CSDR, the Pilot Regime has been intro-
duced by the EU regulator which creates a number of exemptions from SCDR 
and MIFID II requirements. 
 
 
4.2.3.1.3 Replication of data in the Commercial Register 
The Commercial Register is relevant in the scope of this use case because the 
entries in the shareholder ledgers administered either by the management board 
or the CSD are duplicated in the Estonian Commercial Register (CR). Under § 182 
Section 7, all data in the shareholder ledger, except for the addresses of share-
holders, can be examined through the CR as the data of the business file. Con-
sequently, under the new amendments to § 182 Section 12 of the CC, the manage-
ment board must immediately inform the CR of any changes in the shareholder 
ledger data unless a notary has already informed the CR of the respective change.  
Unfortunately, this practice degrades the trustworthiness of all CR data, as the 
users do not separate which data they can trust and which data they should not 
trust. Such a situation has created confusion among consumers of this data, 
including the courts.460 Also, the Supreme Court has regarded such entry of this 
                                                                          
459  Societe General. PUBLICATION OF LEVEL 2 MEASURES FOR CSDR [Press release]. 
1 January 2017 <https://www.societegenerale.lu/en/societe-generale-luxembourg/press-release- 
news/press-release-news/news/publication-level-measures-for-csdr/> accessed 28 November 
2020. 
460  Kõve V. Kas kinnistusraamatu ja teiste kohtulike registrite korraldus vajab reformi? [Does 
the public title book and the maintenance of other registries operated by the courts need a 
reform?] (2013) Juridica VII, p. 461. <https://www.juridica.ee/article_full.php?uri=2013_ 
7_kas_kinnistusraamatu_ja_teiste_kohtulike_registrite_korraldus_vajab_reformi_&pdf=1> 
accessed 01 January 2018. See also Case no 3-2-1-133-11, Estonian Supreme Court (Civil 
Chamber), 14 December 2011, para. 24. Case no 3-2-1-163-11, Estonian Supreme Court (Civil 
Chamber), 22 February 2012, para. 33. 
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kind of data in the business file of the CR as “somewhat misleading”461 because 
the data has no constitutive value in comparison with other data entered into the 
CSD and cannot be relied on by third parties. 462  
In essence, this duplication of ledger data in the CR is not a hindrance for DLT 
use per se, as it supports user friendliness (one-stop-shop for data), rather the 
question is whether DLT-based ledger data has a similar value as ledger data 
without CR entries. The research herein also examines this aspect for the purpose 
of a technology neutrality compliance check. 
 
 
4.2.3.1.4 Value of ledger data 
As stated by the Supreme Court, the CSD’s aim is to ensure the truthfulness of 
data in the register and the unity of the data in the register that verifies rights and, 
through such activity, the CSD contributes to the protection of the rights of the 
shareholders.463 The existing regulation grants shareholder ledger entries consti-
tutive value only in cases where the shareholder ledger is administered by a CSD.464 
The CSD pulls the data directly from the securities accounts and makes this 
visible in the CSD register. This means that only through the use of a CSD as an 
administrator aggregating data is the ledger is presumed to fulfil certain functions 
that allow for the constitutive value of a ledger entry.  
The data of CSD is a source of both positive and negative trust,465 meaning 
that a person acting in good faith can rely on the data stored on the securities 
account to be correct and complete (negative trust means that a person acting in 
good faith can rely on the fact that the rights not entered in the securities account 
do not actually exist).466 This gives the ledger entry constitutive value. Con-
sequently, the function of the register maintained by the CSD is to be a trust-
worthy source of information on the data category (shareholders and shares) and 
                                                                          
461  “Mõneti eksitavalt kajastatakse äriregistri infosüsteemis lisaks n-ö ehtsatele registri-
andmetele kodukorra § 311 lg 1 p-de 4 ja 13 järgi “registrikaardiväliste andmetena” ka nõu-
kogu liikmeid ja nende ametiaja kestust, kuid neil andmetel õiguslikku tähendust ei ole.” 
[“Under § 311 section 1 point 4 and 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court Registry Depart-
ment [kohtu registriosakonna kodukord], the Commercial Register is recording additionally 
to real registry data also somewhat misleadingly also the members of the supervisory board 
and their term as the “non-registry data”, although such data has no legal meaning.”] Case no 
3-2-1-133-11 (2011), Estonian Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 14 December 2011, para. 24 
462  Case No. 3-2-1-163-11 (2012), Estonian Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 22 February 
2012, para. 33; Case No. 3-2-1-133-11 (2011), Estonian Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 14 
December 2011, para. 24; Saare, K. et al, Ühinguõigus I, (2015) Juura, pp. 53–54. 
463  Case No. 3-4-1-3-12 (2012) Estonian Supreme Court (Constitutional Review Chamber), 
6 July 2012, para. 52. 
464  § 9(2) of SRMA. 
465  Case No. 3-4-1-3-12 (2012) Estonian Supreme Court (Constitutional Review Chamber), 
6 July 2012, para. 52. 
466  ibid. 
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the history of transactions linked to this specific data category. Consequently, the 
CSD is a centralised trustworthy source of information on (i) the current status of 
the shareholder ledger, (ii) shareholder data and (iii) the historic overview of the 
transactions leading to the current status. 
As further explained in Article II, the entries of data on shareholders in the 
management board-maintained shareholders ledger, even with the CR replication, 
have no constitutive value, which makes share acquisition in good faith impos-
sible for the non-CSD shares of an OÜ. The question is whether this treatment of 
entries in a DLT-based shareholder ledger is technology-neutral or whether the 
entries in the DLT-based shareholder ledger are functionally equivalent to CSD 
register entries and should therefore be granted effects equivalence with the 
entries in the CSD register. 
 
 
4.2.3.2 Using DLT in shareholder ledger maintenance 
Under Recital 1 of the CSDR, CSDs “contribute to a large degree in maintaining 
post-trade infrastructures that safeguard financial markets and give market 
participants confidence that securities transactions are executed properly and in a 
timely manner”.467 The CSDs and their registers “play an important role in main-
taining investor confidence”.468 Given that the aim of the CSDR was to contribute 
to the openness of the internal market to cross-border securities settlement that 
should allow investments in all securities offered in other EU Member States,469 
the use of DLT in the maintenance of shareholder ledgers of shares could assist 
in targeting the same goal in relation to cross-border transactions with the non-
CSD shares of OÜs. Similar path has been taken with DLT-specific adaptations 
in regulation both in France470 and Germany.471 
As shown by the Pilot Regime, which created a number of exemptions for 
crypto-assets trading on the internal market, and as maintained by the EU 
Blockchain Study and the MiCA Proposal, the compliance rules drafted for cen-
tralised structures are often unfit for the new technology built using decentralisation 
and distributed networks. Reed calls such unfit requirements ‘legal impurities’ 
and states that, “building those requirements into any blockchain-based system 
                                                                          
467  Recital 1 of CSDR. 
468  ibid, Recital 2. 
469  ibid, Recital 4. 
470  See more in details in Veerpalu (n. 88), p. 287. 
471  Steve Kaaru, ‘Germany passes law legalizing electronic securities on blockchain’ (Busi-
ness Coingeek 21 December 2020) <https://coingeek.com/germany-passes-law-legalizing-
electronic-securities-on-blockchain/> accessed 27 December 2020. See also discussion on the 
shortcomings of previous regulation and solutions DLT offers in Florian Möslein, ‘Blockchain 
Applications and Company Law’ (2020) Legal Technology Transformation in Practice 
(October 27) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720222> accessed 
26 December 2020. 
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introduces features which are not necessary for performing its core functions”.472 
These legal impurities are the same as those referred to as biases by the author in 
this dissertation. The bias in the ledger maintenance system allocates preferential 
treatment to CSDs – a shareholder needs the participation of this particular trusted 
intermediary in order for constitutive value to be granted to the data in the ledger 
and freedom of form for share transfer transactions to be enjoyed.  
According to Reed and others, “the primary legal function which blockchain 
performs is to provide reliable evidence”473 and DLT is “a technologically ‘pure’ 
system for recording entitlements to assets and undertaking transactions relating 
to those assets”.474 He explains that, by this purity, he means that the technology 
is not specifically built to fit the requirements of the existing regulation and is 
purely structured as a tamper-resistant ledger not allowing the regulator (including 
the judiciary) “to interfere and restrict or reverse a transaction”.475 Given the 
purity of the ledger as to the evidentiary function, the ledger records can be trust-
worthy as to the entitlement of the asset, and any transaction that amends the 
ledger records is authorised “using the private key that corresponds to the public 
key recorded in the ledger, and the ledger is the definitive record of rights”476 
related to these datapoints recorded in the ledger.  
As previously mentioned, the CC does not require the use of any technological 
or organisational measures for the maintenance of the shareholder ledger by the 
management board. Therefore, without a doubt, it is possible under the CC to use 
DLT to maintain the shareholder ledger of non-CSD shares. However, the question 
is: will this actually ease liquidity and transactions with shares? Unfortunately, if 
the CC does not enable the same waivers it allocated to CSDs to DLT-based 
ledgers, the positive effect that DLT use can have on shareholder ledger mainte-
nance is rather limited. So, instead of comparing DLT-based shareholder ledger 
maintenance to CSD register maintenance requirements, the functional equi-
valence analysis in this case is conducted against the requirements that apply for 
non-CSD share transfers. As in the majority of cases, share transfer transactions 
require notarial authentication, which needs to fulfil evidentiary, identification, 
warning and consultation functions, a functional analysis of DLT in share transfer 





                                                                          
472  Chris Reed, Uma M. Sathyanarayan, Shuhui Ruan, Justine Collins, ‘Beyond BitCoin—
legal impurities and off-chain assets’, (2018) International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 26/2, p. 160. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eay006> accessed 28 November 2020. 
473  ibid, p. 161.  
474  ibid, p. 162.  
475  ibid. 
476  ibid. 
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(i) evidentiary function 
According to Reed, “the main function of any distributed ledger system is to 
provide evidence about assets, participants and transactions between partici-
pants”.477 Given the technical functions of DLT, any ledger using DLT certainly 
fulfils the evidentiary function, as it is a timestamped, tamper-resistant, append-
only ledger and reflects the trail of transactions in a trustworthy manner. The use 
of DLT for share transfers is of a higher evidentiary value than a transfer trans-
action agreement in a paper format or a form that can be reproduced in writing 
due to the use of encryption keys used as attributes in DLT-based transactions.478 
Furthermore, Article III provides an analysis of DLT-based smart contracts in the 
context of the typology of contract forms and argues that DLT-based smart 
contracts perform the functions of a contract in an electronic form. 
  
 
(ii) identification function 
Furthermore, as stated by Reed, the ledger also records “important attributes which 
are relevant to ownership but do not necessarily evidence ownership”.479 By this, 
Reed means attributes like a wallet address or public key that are linked to the 
asset and no one else; however, the one controlling the private key has control 
over this specific asset. Though the technology is built to link participants 
pseudonymously and without an identification function, as described in Article 
III, it is possible to use applications on DLT to fulfil the identification function.  
Furthermore, if the replication of data to the CR remains, the wallet addresses 
or public keys can serve as security account numbers in CSD aggregation, linking 
the names known to the CR to the wallet address or public key. Lastly, in the 
context of DLT, the idea of self-sovereign identity could be considered. This 
means that identification data is not placed in the public domain and, in order to 
protect the personal data of shareholders, the identity data is actually controlled 
by the person whom that data identifies. This idea is discussed in more detail by 
Christopher Allen,480 who proposes that “individuals should own and be in 
control of their own online identity”.481 It is claimed that in the digital world, “it 
                                                                          
477  Reed et al. (n. 472), p. 165. 
478  According to Reed: “distributed ledger systems produce evidence of entitlement and 
attributes which are of even higher evidential value than signed paper documents.” Reed et al. 
(n. 477), p. 168. 
479  ibid, p. 161.  
480  Christopher Allen, The Path to Self-Sovereign Identity. (Life with Alacrity [blog], 25 April 
2016). <http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html> 
accessed 29 November 2020 
481  Reed et al (n. 472), p. 173.  
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is the natural evolution of online identity mechanisms”482 and the EU has fol-
lowed this evolution by introducing the EBSI platform that is implementing this 
concept of self-sovereign identity model in Europe in essence allowing indi-
viduals to have more control over their own identity across the national borders.483 
In line with this evolution, DLT would only allow the parties to reveal their 
identity to one another, thereby controlling the closed loop of information on a 
need-to-know basis.484 Reed is of the opinion that regulators need to adapt 
existing regulation to be fit for DLT systems used to perform the identification 
function, otherwise these systems and the centralised practise of identification 
will remain in conflict and act as a deterrent to the use of DLT.485 
 
 
(iii) warning and consultation function  
As the warning and consultation functionality are not required from CSD share 
transactions, the question remains as to whether these functions are considered 
necessary for non-CSD share transactions, otherwise this differentiation is unfair 
treatment and not technology-neutral. As with any technology, these functions 
could be automated and added to DLT to a certain degree as well, though they 
will not be comparable to how these functions are performed by the notary.  
In summary, DLT is efficient in fulfilling the evidentiary function but has to 
be adapted for or is unable to fulfil all of the other functions, leading to the 
conclusion that the existing regulation should be adapted to not differentiate 
between the value of data and share transfer transaction requirements in the case 
that the shares are maintained by a management board under DLT or by the CSD. 
Any difference in the treatment of OÜ shares simply due to the administrator in 
cases where the solutions provided by these administrators are functionally 
equivalent is not in compliance with the principle of technology neutrality. Con-
sequently, as discussed, it is possible to use DLT for shareholder ledger mainte-
nance for non-CSD shares under the CC; however, this would be pointless if share 
transfer transactions would still need to go through a notary. Therefore, the 
Estonian regulator should consider adapting existing regulation by either intro-
ducing a similar waiver for these transfer requirements as has been implemented 
for CSD-registered shares or altogether deleting the form requirements for the 
transfer of non-CSD shares.  
                                                                          
482  Andrew Tobin and Drummond Reed. The Inevitable Rise of Self-Sovereign Identity. Sovrin 
Foundation White Paper September 2016, updated March 2017, pp 6–9. <https://sovrin.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/The-Inevitable-Rise-of-Self-Sovereign-Identity.pdf accessed 
29 November 2020 
483  EBSI platform. <https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/EBSI>  
accessed 02.12.2020. 
484  Reed et al (n. 472), p. 173.  
485  Reed et al (n. 472), p. 176.  
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Using DLT for ledger maintenance with the form requirement still intact 
creates a hurdle to the use of DLT that can be considered non-compliant with the 
technology neutrality principle. The bias identified by the author is the fact that 
effects equivalence (free form of share transfer and value of entry data) is attached 
to the subject and not a process or a set of functions. This means that the existing 
regulation does not attach value to the functions used in shareholder ledger main-
tenance or the aims these functions have or the values these functions protect, but 
rather waives certain requirements for CSDs and does not waive these require-
ments in cases where the management board uses a functionally equivalent 
solution. This means that the existing regulation of the CC has a bias towards 
centralised intermediaries, such as the CSD and the notary. The author proposes 
to consider extending similar waivers to DLT-based shareholder ledgers as those 
granted to CSD in identifying the functions shareholder ledgers must meet in 
order to be granted these waivers. This solution is similar to the regulative stra-




(i) that the Estonian regulator considered the warning and consultation functions 
irrelevant for CSD-registered shares and shares meeting the Startup 
Exemption conditions;  
(ii) that the Revision Working Group reiterated that no such form requirement 
for share transfer transactions exists in Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania 
or Delaware; 486  
(iii) the arguments used to introduce the CC amendments;  
(iv) that presently 85% of all OÜs do not fulfil the conditions set for the Startup 
Exemption, 
 
it remains unclear to the author why is it necessary to treat certain non-CSD 
shares and their transfer transactions differently from others, thereby creating a 
technology-favouring hurdle to the use of DLT in relation to the shareholder 
ledgers of the majority of OÜs in Estonia.  
 
 
4.2.4 Findings  
In conclusion, the shareholder ledger of CSD-registered shares has a legal validity 
that is not comparable to the shareholder ledger entries of the non-CSD registered 
shares. There is no effects equivalence for these two ledgers no matter the techno-
logy or application used or the functions performed by the solution used by the 
                                                                          
486  Explanatory Memorandum, p. 3. For more information: Ministry of Justice. (2018) Ühingu-
õiguse revisjon Analüüs-konseptsioon (Revision of Company Law), 15 September 2018. 
[online] <https://www.just.ee/sites/www.just.ee/files/uhinguoiguse_revisjoni_analuus-
kontseptsioon.pdf> accessed 12 January 2019. 
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management board for shareholder ledger administration. Consequently, the bias 
in existing regulation is attached to the subject that administers the shareholder 
ledger and not to the process of how the ledger is administered. This means that 
existing regulation subjectively waives the more stringent requirements of share 
transfers for CSDs and grants value subjectively to CSD entries without any 
consideration for how ledger maintenance is organised by the management board 
and without providing the option to grant effects equivalence if a functionally 
equivalent solution is used. This means that the existing regulation of the CC is 
biased towards centralised intermediaries such as the CSD.  
The technical – and organisational measures for maintaining the ledger can be 
chosen by the management board. However, the regulator is mute as to these 
measures and the effect of the entries does not depend on the differences related 
to the measures. The author is of the opinion that the existing regulation and the 
recent amendments to the CC do not provide the company with the opportunity 
to choose between equal alternatives, even if DLT-based or other technology-
based shareholder ledger maintenance is used to maintain non-CSD shares, as the 
functions of the management board-maintained ledger will never, under existing 
regulation, be able to receive equivalent effects to the ledger maintenance of 
CSD-registered shares as there is no waiver clause allowing for such treatment.  
As said, DLT is a ledger technology and theoretically has the functionality to 
ensure trust, transparency and verification of data. This means that any DLT-
based shareholder ledger could potentially perform the functions performed by 
the CSD equivalently. The existing regulation in essence does not restrict the 
management board in using DLT or any other technology in shareholder-ledger 
maintenance. However, as mentioned, the existing regulation is technology-
independent and does not require or forbid the use of any technological solution. 
Given the exemptions allowed under the Pilot Regime, on the basis that “the 
exemption requested is proportionate to and justified by the use of its DLT”,487 to 
certain requirements of the CSDR and MIFID II, it is proportional to expect the 
Estonian regulator to enable the use of distributed ledger technology in the share-
holder ledger maintenance of non-CSD shares of OÜs, granting such mainte-
nance effects equivalence under the CC.  
Even with the recent amendments, the existing regulation is not in compliance 
with the principle of technology neutrality because of the bias towards CSDs, as 
only CSDs can enjoy the constitutive value of the ledger entry, and 100% of CSD-
registered shares can be transferred enjoying freedom of form. The regulation 
would be technology-neutral if the shareholder ledgers of non-CSD shares, upon 
meeting certain objectives (without becoming a CSD), are given the chance to 
enjoy effects equivalence, i.e. the same treatment as CSD shares under existing 
regulation. Given the Startup Exemption, the problematic effect of existing regu-
lation would partly be solved if the majority of OÜs increase their share capital 
to EUR 10,000 and pay it in, as well as pass a unanimous shareholder resolution 
and amend the articles of association stating such waiver of form. Nevertheless, 
                                                                          
487  Article 5 of the Pilot Regime. 
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the author fails to grasp the reason the regulator requires OÜs to make the 
aforementioned changes.  
 
 
4.3 Hybrid smart contract agreement 
The third DLT use case involves exploration into contracts used in Initial Coin 
Offerings (ICO). ICOs sprung into popularity in 2016 and 2017 as a new way to 
raise capital for innovative and, initially, DLT-employing services and products. 
The capital raised during ICOs was in the form of virtual currencies (e.g., BTC 
and ETH). The individuals participating in the capital raise were usually globally 
dispersed and the project material disseminated electronically. In return for the 
virtual currency transferred, the ICO organizer typically issued tokens directly to 
the individuals who had participated in the ICO. In order to automate and simplify 
the ICO process, the tokens were often issued by the ICO organizer using an 
automatically executing protocol called a ‘smart contract’.  
In this dissertation, the author explores the qualification of such ‘smart contract’ 
and the surrounding elements typically used in the ICOs, which the author calls 
‘hybrid smart contract agreement’. The exploration is executed on the basis of 
the EU and Estonian existing regulation. The key question in this use case for the 
author is whether DLT-based smart contract signature can be regarded function-
ally equivalent to be qualified electronic signature under eIDAS and conse-
quently, whether eIDAS regulation is technology-neutral. 
 
 
4.3.1 Description of the problem 
For transferring certain property or rights, including shares or real estate, a specific 
form of contract is needed. In ICOs, all sorts of tokens were transferred or issued 
that represented different rights or claims. The qualification of the form of 
contract the parties have entered into in these ICOs is therefore of importance to 
maximize the odds of these contracts being regarded as valid. Consequently, the 
dissertation presents the finding to the question whether ICO smart contracts can 
be qualified as contracts in an electronic form, which in some jurisdictions are 
equivalent to written form contracts. This matter is also marked as an important 
aspect to observe by the EU Blockchain Study.488  
In order to qualify an agreement as an agreement in an electronic form, the 
requirements need to be fulfilled for this purpose under the existing regulation 
and whether the agreement meets these requirements securing the required level 
of trust must be examined. Moreover, for this qualification, not only contract law 
is relevant, but also regulation applying to electronic signatures. Therefore, in this 
use case, the author explores the EU electronic signature regulation. The existing 
                                                                          
488  EU Blockchain Study (n. 15), pp. 8, 9, 52, 59–89. 
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EU electronic signature regulation aims to be technology-neutral. Such aim has 
been stated even in Recital 27489 and Recital 16490 of the eIDAS.491  
In order to enable growth through globalization in the interconnected online 
market, there is a high demand for trusted online services. The eIDAS aims to 
establish common standards for electronic identification and trust services in 
order to enable electronic transactions in the EU. For this purpose, the eIDAS 
aims to harmonise the regulation of electronic signatures so that these can be 
trusted across borders to enable online transactions and pursue online business 
opportunities. Therefore, the eIDAS is a regulatory tool that applies the principle 
of technology neutrality by enabling the use of cross-border electronic trans-
actions, which, in effect, creates the preconditions for electronic transactions to 
be considered functionally equivalent to paper-format transactions. Nevertheless, 
each existing regulation has been drafted on the basis of the understanding of how 
electronic signing works in practice using existing technology. In relation to the 
electronic signature required for the electronic form of a contract the legacy 
model the eIDAS has been built on is the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model. 
PKI is:  
 
“a combination of policies, procedures and technology needed to manage digital 
certificates in a public key cryptography scheme. A digital certificate is an 
electronic data structure that binds an entity, being an institution, a person, a 
computer program, a web address etc., to its public key. Digital certificates are 
used for secure communication, using public key cryptography, and digital signa-
tures. The purpose of a PKI is to make sure that the certificate can be trusted.”492 
 
This means that although the eIDAS claims to be technology-neutral, it is still 
built on the PKI model. The PKI model depends on the use of the digital certifi-
cates and cryptographic keys issued by verified sources. The verified sources can 
be both public – and private service providers who have been granted qualified 
status by a national competent authority and included in so-called ‘trusted lists’ 
known as the Trusted List Browser or the European List of Trusted Lists 
(LOTL).493  
These trust service providers need to be trusted as they issue certificates and 
private keys to users to enable the users to be linked to the signature. The issue 
                                                                          
489  Recital 27 states among other things that “this Regulation should be technology-neutral”.  
490  Recital 16 states among other things that “the requirements established should be techno-
logy-neutral”.  
491  Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 
2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal 
market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (eIDAS). 
492  European Union Agency for Cybersecurity. Glossary <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
topics/csirts-in-europe/glossary/public-key-infrastructure-pki> accessed 10 May 2020. 
493  Trusted List Browser is a tool to browse the so-called national eIDAS Trusted Lists and 
also the EU List of eIDAS Trusted Lists also referred to as LOTL <https://webgate.ec. 
europa.eu/tl-browser/#/> accessed 10 May 2020. 
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of the certificates is done through the use of a qualified signature creation device 
discussed further below. Consequently, as stated by Anna Nordén, the existing 
EU electronic signature regulation often fails to be technology-neutral as it is 
meant to achieve trust using the PKI model even though the regulation termino-
logically hides behind more neutral terms.494  
 The PKI model is not the only solution for electronic signatures that is required 
for a contract to be regarded in an electronic form, but it is a model that the 
regulator understands. As stated earlier, due to the Pacing Problem, it is difficult 
for the regulator to amend and adjust existing regulation on the go in order to 
adapt to any new alternative technical solution. DLT as described in introduction 
involves a bundle of technologies and as explained in Section 4.3.3 below some 
of these are similar or equivalent to the technologies used in electronic signing 
that use the PKI model. However, DLT-based infrastructure is based on the 
assumption that trust is built into the protocol and its governance. Consequently, 
DLT-based electronic signing does not depend on certificates and private keys 
issued by verified entities. The keys used in the DLT cryptography are (depending 
on the users’ preferences) issued directly to the user by the protocol and, unlike 
the PKI model, there is no other entity or authority centrally controlling these 
keys or protocols. This change in the DLT infrastructure challenges the PKI-
model-based existing regulation in an unexpected way, as the centralised trust 
system is no longer the only option.  
In this dissertation, the author researches the criteria built into existing regu-
lation that results in the trusted electronic signature and also whether the set 
criteria can be fulfilled by an alternative model based on DLT infrastructure. Con-
sequently, the third DLT use case explores the regulation of the qualified electronic 
signature of the eIDAS (which is the required signature for a contract to be 
regarded as in an electronic form) in order to examine whether the ICO smart 
contract qualifies under the hierarchy of contracts as a contract in an electronic 
form. If these requirements of the eIDAS are not met by the ICO smart contract, 
the ICO contract form cannot be qualified as in an electronic form, which, under 
existing regulation, could turn out to be a hindrance to the use of smart contracts 
in certain transactions that require electronic form or hand-written form in order 
for the contract to be considered valid.  
The key resources used for the legal analysis under this DLT use case are 
primarily the eIDAS, in parts also the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts of 2016 (UNIDROIT Principles)495 and, in relation to the 
electronic form of contracts and the hierarchy of forms, the General Part of the 
Civil Code Act (GPCCA)496 and the Estonian Electronic Identification and Trust 
                                                                          
494  Nordén, Anna (2005). ‘Electronic signatures in a legal context’ in Magnusson Sjöberg, 
Cecilia (ed.), IT Law for IT Professionals – an introduction (Studentlitteratur 2005), p. 173. 
495  Full text available <https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-
principles-2016> accessed 23 July 2018. 
496  General Part of the Civil Code Act (GPCCA) [tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus] – RT 2002, 
35, 216; RT I, 23.05.2020, 4. 
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Services for Electronic Transactions Act (EEITSETA)497 in Estonia. As the quali-
fication of a smart contract as a contract under the UNIDROIT Principles is 
discussed in Article III, the analysis in the present compendium will primarily 
focus on the problems related to the qualification of the electronic signature of 
the hybrid smart contract agreement as a qualified electronic signature under the 
eIDAS and the respective qualification of the contract as in an electronic form 
under Estonian law. A specific national law is chosen for this qualification as 
there is no regional or international regulation to guide such determination.  
 
 
4.3.2 Statement set for defence 
The signature used in the DLT-based smart contracts of the ICO process can be 
considered functionally equivalent to the qualified electronic signature under the 
eIDAS in cases where the identification function has been fulfilled either off-
chain or on-chain and the users use non-custodial wallets. The Centralized 
Authority (CA)-centric PKI-model-based trust system is not needed for key 
management in the case of DLT-based smart contracts as the keys are generated 
by the DLT network protocol and managed by the individual. The electronic 
signature regulation of the eIDAS is not in compliance with the principle of 
technology neutrality because of the dependence on the PKI model and LOTL’s 
centralized trust system, as it does not grant effects equivalence to the functio-
nally equivalent DLT-based solution. As an extension of the above, DLT-based 
hybrid smart contract agreements should be regarded as functionally equivalent 
to contracts in an electronic form and should therefore receive equivalence of 




The smart contract protocol exists in a larger context and not in silos. In this dis-
sertation, the term smart contract is used to include more components than merely 
the protocol. Rather, it includes the terms agreed between the parties and the 
processes the user needs to complete in order to conclude the Token Sale 
Agreement,498 such as accepting the terms and conditions (T&C)499 in order to 
                                                                          
497  §24(1) of the Estonian Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Trans-
actions Act defines a digital signature as “an electronic signature that conforms to the require-
ments for a qualified electronic signature set out in Article 3(12) of [eIDAS].” Estonian 
Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [E-identimise ja 
e-tehingute usaldusteenuste seadus] RT I, 25.10.2016, 1, English version  
<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/511012019010/consolide 
498  Terms and Conditions of the Ethereum Genesis Sale. 21 July 2014 <https://web.archive. 
org/web/20140723212709/https://www.ethereum.org/pdfs/TermsAndConditionsOfTheEther
eumGenesisSale.pdf> accessed 1 May 2019. 
499  Ethereum Website. <https://www.ethereum.org/terms-of-use/> accessed 1 May 2019. 
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register on the ICO launch site and make a transfer of virtual currency in return 
for issue of the token. 
 
 
4.3.3.1 The components of the smart contract 
To be more specific, the smart contract analysed in this dissertation is referred to 
as either ‘ICO smart contract’ or ‘hybrid smart contract agreement’,500 a term 
coined by Primavera de Filippi and Aaron Wright, and is considered to have the 
following three components: 
 
a. The offer made to the public by the ICO organizer (including the terms indi-
cated in the White Paper, the Token Sale Agreement, the T&C and the audit-
able protocol of the smart contract). 
b. The acceptance of the offer with all of its components by the user, which is 
usually executed by either:  
i. user registration (including accepting the T&C) and possibly also comp-
letion of the Know-Your-Customer (KYC) procedure;501 and 
ii. the transfer of funds in the virtual currencies accepted by the ICO orga-
nizer to a specific wallet address. 
c. The execution of the protocol designed or employed by the ICO organizer in 
the form of issuing tokens to the user as an automatic process.502  
 
Therefore, if the ICO smart contract includes the components as described above, 
it is possible to identify the different features of a contract, e.g., identifiable 
substance, terms and parties. The exact qualification of whether the components 
can be regarded as identified, whether these meet the requirements of a contract 
and, if so, which form of contract, depends on the components included in every 
separate ICO smart contract. The question addressed in this use case is rather: is 
an ICO smart contract a contract in an electronic form? 
                                                                          
500  de Filippi and Wright (n. 12), p. 80. 
501  Statistics show that the KYC procedure is executed only 45% of the ICOs monitored. 
Statistics by Rhue, Lauren (2018). Trust is All You Need: An Empirical Exploration of Initial 
Coin Offerings (ICOs) and ICO Reputation Scores (May 16, 2018), p. 14. <https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3179723 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179723> accessed 24 July 2019. While 
some ICO organizers, such as Tezos, completed the KYC procedure after the ICO period in 
relation to the subsequent litigations that still are ongoing. Read more of the recent develop-
ments with litigation here: <https://www.civic.com/blog/4-key-takeaways-decentralized-kyc-
for-icos-and-token-sales/> accessed 24 July 2019. Coleman, Lester (2018). Tezos Investors 
Forced to Undergo KYC Nearly 1 Year after ICO. 12 June 2018. <https://www.ccn.com/tezos-
investors-forced-to-undergo-kyc-nearly-1-year-after-ico/> accessed 24 June 2019 
502  As this executes the code prepared by the ICO organizer and the execution involves a 
similar process as that of electronic signing under the eIDAS, this process can also be regarded 
as the electronic signing of the contract by the ICO organizer. If point (a) is merely considered 
as an invitation to make an offer, then point (b) is the offer and (c) is the acceptance. 
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4.3.3.2 Does an ICO smart contract comply with the electronic form? 
Under §80 of the GPCCA, in order to comply with the requirements for the 
electronic form, a contract must meet the following preconditions:  
 
1. It must be entered into in a form that enables repeated reproduction.  
2. It must contain the names of the persons entering into the transaction. 
3.  It must be electronically signed by the persons entering into the transaction. 
 
The author explores these preconditions further in the following subsections. 
 
 
(i) Enabling repeated reproduction  
On the basis of the functions of contract forms as discussed in Articles II and III, 
the author concludes that the aim of this specific criteria is to perform the 
evidentiary function of the contract. The evidentiary function means that the intent 
and substance of the parties can be evidenced by the object at any later stage. 
Considering that there is a list of components of the ICO smart contract as listed 
above (including the Token Sale Agreement and the T&C provided in a durable 
medium that contain the terms the smart contract protocol executes), the author 
concludes that the ICO smart contract enables repeated reproduction.  
A further aspect to consider is the fact that the transaction of transferring funds 
to ICO organizers and the issuing of tokens are also recorded on the DLT network 
ledger (blockchain); these transactions are publicly visible and available for 
repeated reproduction. This means that there is sufficient evidence, without an in-
depth investigation, that the ICO smart contract enables repeated reproduction for 
the purposes of evidentiary function.  
 
 
(ii) Contains the names of the persons entering into the transaction 
This criterion is meant to execute the identification function as described in 
Article III. In the DLT protocol, there is usually no identity attached to the keys 
used to conclude or execute transactions. The same protocol generates the keys 
and facilitates the conclusion of these transactions. However, neither the protocol 
itself nor the developer of the protocol that generates the keys usually identifies 
or records the identity data of the holder of the keys.  
Nevertheless, it is possible for the ICO organizer to separately collect and 
record such KYC data outside the blockchain network (also referred to as off-
chain). If the ICO organizer needs to fulfil KYC compliance obligations under 
the existing regulation, the identification function may be fulfilled as part of the 
onboarding process. Alternatively, the ICO organizer may opt to use a separate 
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on-chain KYC solution to identify the names of the persons participating in the 
transaction, such as AuthCoin,503 CertCoin,504 SCPKI,505 Civic.506  
Furthermore, given that in the offline world, anonymous or pseudonymous 
transactions are allowed between the parties, perhaps it is time to grant these 
options for online world transactions and allow the users of online contracts to 
remain either anonymous or pseudonymous while still being party to a contract 
in an electronic form. This option would be in line with the rising trend of 
individuals to use private browsing,507 TOR or a VPN508 than ever before. Said 
liberalisation would promote the principle of freedom of contract, as the parties 
                                                                          
503  Its security features are discussed here: Norta, A., Matulevĭcius, R., & Leiding, B. 
Safeguarding a Formalized Blockchain-Enabled Identity-Authentication Protocol by Applying 
Security Risk-Oriented Patterns. (2019) Computers & Security <https://www. sciencedirect. 
com/science/article/pii/S0167404818302670?dgcid=author> accessed 10 July 2019. 
504  Polyswarm. Blockchain in Cyber Security: Who is Who. (10 January 2018)  
<https://medium.com/polyswarm/blockchain-in-cyber-security-who-is-who-269d89feadc1> 
accessed 10 July 2019. 
505  “The primary proposition of SCPKI is to write such a smart contract with functionality for 
the operation of a public key infrastructure and identity management system, where public 
keys and identity attributes are stored on the blockchain and can be managed by the smart 
contract.” Al-Bassam, M. (2017, April). SCPKI: a smart contract-based PKI and identity 
system. In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies and Contracts 
ACM. <http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/M.AlBassam/publications/scpki-bcc17.pdf> accessed 
3 July 2019. 
506  Civic provides a reusable KYC service depending on multi-factor authentication without 
a third-party authenticator or physical hardware. <https://www.civic.com/solutions/kyc-
services/ accessed: 25 July 2019 
507  According to statistics, the younger the users are, the more they use private browsing 
(incognito mode) and around two-thirds of Americans wish their browser would give better 
privacy protection – no tracking, no cookies, no ads, no saving user data, etc. Bojan Jovanović. 
‘Browser statistics: Catching the best surf on the Web.’ DataProt [blog], December 2, 2019. 
<https://dataprot.net/statistics/browser-statistics/> accessed 03 October 2020. “…online 
anonymity is now regarded as a fundamental factor in the protection of private information 
and in reducing the dangers of the Web, such as hacking and malware (Hoang and Pishva, 
2014), as a facilitator for participation in discussions about sensitive topics, health issues, for 
instance, in computer-mediated communication (McLeod, 2011), and as an option for citizens 
to avoid government surveillance in highly repressive as much as highly liberal contexts 
(Jardine, 2016).” Thais Sardá, Simone Natale, Nikos Sotirakopoulos, Mark Monaghan. 
‘Understanding online anonymity.’ Media Culture & Society 41(4):016344371984207, (April 
2019). DOI: <10.1177/0163443719842074> accessed 03 October 2020. 
508  Technically, the anonymity in exchanging information or engaging in transactions on the 
Internet can be achieved through different measures in addition to private browsing on 
traditional Internet browsers, such as through the use of a proxy, a VPN and The Onion Router 
(Tor). Sardá, Natale, Sotirakopoulos, Monaghan (n. 487). Tor being a browser that provides a 
certain level of confidentiality by linking a computer network and layers of encryption 
between the information source and the actual user seeking this information, allowing both 
sides anonymity. Tomas Minárik, Anna-Maria Osula, ‘Tor does not stink: Use and abuse of 
the Tor anonymity network from the perspective of law.’ (2016) Computer Law and Security 
Review, 32 (1), 111−127.10.1016/j.clsr.2015.12.002. 
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themselves can choose the conditions of the contract and whether they know the 
counterparty’s identity or not. Such choice would also strengthen the pursuit of 
privacy in relations that are conducted entirely online. 
Nevertheless, according to Harlev and others, anonymity and pseudonymity 
on DLT networks might already be a concept of the past. This is due to the 
possibility “to cluster together Bitcoin addresses and link such clusters to real-
world identities”509 using already developed technology.  
Even the US Securities and Exchange Commission in January 2019 publicly 
called upon vendors dealing with wallet addresses to provide insight as “to whom 
a particular address belongs”,510 knowing that technologies are being developed 
towards this end constantly. Furthermore, while in common law jurisdictions there 
is a “purely evidence-based approach” which does not require the technology to 
perform the identification function, civil law jurisdictions approach the matter 
differently and “considered independent evidence of the identity of a signatory to 
be an important factor if electronic signatures were to be given legal validity”.511 
Lastly, the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum report of 2019 also revealed 
that “while not always identifiable at the moment of the transaction, given enough 
time and effort, many parties to a transaction can be unmasked.”512 
On the basis of the above, the author concludes that, upon the conclusion of 
the ICO smart contract, it is possible to perform the identification function 
employing multiple techniques using either on-chain and off-chain solutions or 
separating the identification function altogether from the signature. Conse-
quently, even though the DLT-based smart contract itself typically does not tie 
the identities to the keys used for signing the transactions, the parties are still 
identifiable through the use of additional technology or a policy decision could 
be made that this function is not required at all.  
 
 
(iii) Is electronically signed by the persons entering into the transaction 
This criteria appears to be for evidentiary function, but as can be seen from its 
components, the criteria aims to additionally link the evidence (the existence of 
the signature) with the identity and consequently aims to execute the identi-
fication function. In order to find out what electronic form and electronically 
                                                                          
509  Harlev et al. ‘Breaking Bad: De-Anonymising Entity Types on the Bitcoin Blockchain 
Using Supervised Machine Learning’, (2018) Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143481278.pdf> accessed 
8 July 2019. 
510  More information on this: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id= 
c18a03f93cf06df47dab8a1c1a7f87a9&tab=core&_cview=0 accessed 08 July 2019. 
511  Reed (n. 100), p. 273. 
512  EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum. Legal and regulatory framework of blockchains 
and smart contracts. A thematic report prepared by the EU Blockchain Observatory and 
Forum, v1.0 – Published on 27 September 2019, p. 14. <https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/ 
sites/default/files/reports/report_legal_v1.0.pdf> accessed 26 January 2020. 
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signed mean in this context – the national law of Estonia, specifically the GPCCA 
and the EEITSETA, and regional law, specifically the eIDAS, are explored.  
 
 
4.3.3.3 Electronic signature for electronic ICO smart contract 
Under the EEITSETA,513 the electronic signature514 requirements stipulated in the 
GPCCA are equivalent to the signature with the highest assurance level under the 
eIDAS, known as a qualified electronic signature. The requirements for a qualified 
electronic signature under the eIDAS are stipulated in Article 3(11), (12), (23). 
In the following subsection, the author explores these criteria on the basis of the 
ICO smart contract.  
The CA-centric PKI-model-based existing regulation raises concerns as to its 
applicability to any DLT-based signature on ICO smart contracts. Firstly, as 
discussed, a traditional permissionless public blockchain-based smart contract 
involves no CA in LOTL and there is no issue of digital certificates.515 Specifi-
cally, the ICO organiser and network operators such as the nodes or wallet service 
providers typically do not issue qualified or non-qualified516 certificates and none 
of the participants offering services are typically listed as qualified trust service 
providers. However, the existing regulation does not prohibit any of these partici-
                                                                          
513  §24(1) of the Estonian Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic 
Transactions Act defines digital signature as “an electronic signature that conforms to the 
requirements for a qualified electronic signature set out in Article 3(12) of [eIDAS].” Estonian 
Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act, [E-identimise ja 
e-tehingute usaldusteenuste seadus] – RT I, 25.10.2016, 1, English version   
<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/511012019010/consolide> 
514  Anna Nordén the term “digital signature” was traditionally avoided in regulation as the 
term “electronic signature” was considered more neutral. The term digital signature is known 
as the term that covers any technical solution that can be used as an electronic confirmation of 
declaration of intention. However, GPCCA Section 80(3) stipulates that a digital signature is 
also an electronic signature that fulfills GPCCA Section 80(3) requirements (the highest 
assurance level). Estonian legislature mostly uses the term digital signature in national legal 
acts instead of qualified electronic signature. It is unclear why Estonian legislature, upon 
transposing the EU Directive 1999/93/EC, did not translate electronic signature into Estonian 
as “elektrooniline allkiri” (in English electronic signature) and instead started to use the term 
in Estonian “digitaalallkiri” (in English digital signature). The terminological situation was 
also unaffected by the eIDAS. The regulation creates uncertainty due to the term “also” in 
GPCCA Section 80(3), as if suggesting that in addition to qualified electronic signatures there 
are other electronic signatures that could be accepted as having equal weight as qualified 
electronic signatures. However, as far as the author understands, there are no such signatures. 
Nordén, Anna (2005). Electronic signatures in a legal context, in Cecilia Magnusson Sjöberg, 
(ed.) IT Law for IT Professionals – an introduction, (Studentlitteratur 2005), p. 173. 
515  ESMA (n. 55). 
516  The wallet where the virtual currency is stored can be created and maintained using 
multiple alternative service providers, e.g., hardware wallets, MetaMask or Parity Signer. 
Read more here <https://support.mycrypto.com/how-to/getting-started/how-to-create-a-wallet>  
accessed 09 July 2019. 
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pants from applying to be registered as a trust service provider;517 the question is 
rather whether the registration would serve any purpose.  
The function provided by trust service providers is the generation and issue 
of keys and certificates to link the keys to the individuals performing both 
evidentiary and identification functions. In the case of DLT-based signatures, the 
participants of the DLT network do not generate or issue the keys needed for 
electronic signing nor do they tie the keys to the individual through the issue of 
digital certificates. The keys are typically generated by the protocol and the keys 
are therefore not tied to an individual, rather to a hardware device which operates 
the protocol. The interactions on the network, including transactions between 
participants are either anonymous or pseudonymous. Upon assessing functions as 
seen in Article II (specifically in Table 2), the technology used in the different 
infrastructure of electronic signatures is the same. Consequently, as a conclusion, 
the author is of the opinion that the functional capabilities of the PKI-model-
based signatures and the DLT-based ICO smart contract signatures for the 
evidentiary function can be considered functionally equivalent.  
Looking specifically at Article 3(10) of the eIDAS, the “‘electronic signature’ 
means data in an electronic form which is attached to or logically associated with 
other data in an electronic form and which is used by the signatory to sign”.518 
This means that the legal definition of electronic signature is void of any technical 
requirements and includes a broad range of electronic signatures (also a name in 
an e-mail)519 and is “meant to be able to cover future technologies for authenti-
cating data.”520 On the basis of eIDAS, a name in an e-mail without any verifi-
cation of identity is not considered a sufficiently secure link between the 
signatory and their declaration of intention521 to qualify for a contract in an 
                                                                          
517  Also, the EU Blockchain Observatory has concluded that smart contract signatures meet 
the criteria of simple and advanced electronic signatures, but because these signature issuance 
processes do not include the trust service providers listed in the LOTL, they first have to 
undergo “the arduous process of becoming a recognised [trust service provider].” Legal and 
regulatory framework of blockchains and smart contracts. A thematic report prepared by the 
EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum, v1.0 – Published on 27 September 2019.  
<https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/sites/default/files/reports/report_legal_v1.0.pdf> 
accessed 26 January 2020. 
518  Martin Hogg, ‘Secrecy and Signatures – Turning the Legal Spotlight on Encryption and 
Electronic Signatures’, in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde, Law & the Internet. A 
framework for electronic commerce. (Hart Publishing 2000), p. 37. 
519  Article 2 (3) of eIDAS. 
520  Article 1 b) of eIDAS. 
521  Study material included four countries (Estonia, Luxembourg, Iceland and Austria), while 
in the other member states “the number of electronic signatures was fewer, or it was not 
possible to gather enough information about the country”. Ernst & Young Baltic AS, Study 
Report SUMMARY OF THE STUDY: “USAGE OF QUALIFIED ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE 
WITHIN EUROPE UNION” (2015). <https://mkm.ee/sites/default/files/summary_of_the_ 
study_usage_of_qualified_electronic_signature_within_europe_union.pdf> accessed 21 July 
2019, p. 2. 
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electronic form. Therefore, in order to establish the form in which the contract is 
concluded, Articles 3(11), (12) and (23) of the eIDAS must be more closely 
examined in relation to the ICO smart contract, which is provided below on the 
basis of the following list of criteria required for a qualified electronic signature. 
 
 
(a) the signature is uniquely linked to the signatory 
In the case of an ICO smart contract, the public-private keys linked to the wallet 
address serve as the identifiers and the wallet address is the public key unique to 
the signatory. Operating under the assumption that only one individual uses the 
key-pair (the same assumption applies to keys used for electronic signatures that 
are based on the PKI model), the conclusion can be made that the electronic 
signature in an ICO smart contract is uniquely linked to a signatory. 
 
 
(b) the signature is capable of identifying the signatory 
As discussed, the identity of the signatory of the ICO smart contract is not 
publicly available for checking nor directly linked to the keys used for signing – 
there is no certification process as such. Although, the public key (wallet address) 
as the identifier is linked to the private key that links the identifier to the actual 
identity of the individual.  
One of the parties to the ICO smart contract is the ICO organizer, whose 
identity is disclosed in the ICO smart contract and whose electronic signature is 
attached to the contract upon transferring the issued token. Although, in the case 
of a legal entity as an ICO organizer, it remains unclear who actually controls the 
wallet address and whether the individual who controls the wallet is actually 
authorized to act on behalf of the legal entity. The other party to the ICO smart 
contract is the participant in ICO fundraising – the party who transfers either ETH 
or BTC to the ICO organizer from the participant’s wallet address (the public key 
as the individual’s identifier), controlling the wallet with the participant’s private 
key.  
Furthermore, as earlier described, it is possible to fulfil the identification 
function requirement with either an off-chain solution, such as a separate KYC 
procedure carried out by the ICO organizer, the wallet service provider (in the 
case of custodial wallet service) or the controller of the permission-based ledger, 
or an on-chain solution. This means that the identity of the controller of the public 
key can be linked to the wallet address through a separate identification process. 
As in, whoever controls the public key with their private key is considered the 
signatory of the transaction and the off-chain or on-chain linking of the identity 
to the key pair allows the identity to be linked to the electronic signature.  
Although, due to the identifier being present and publicly visible in the ledger 
chain of transactions, all of the transactions are already linked to an identifier that 
we can also regard as a pseudonym. Hence, all transactions between publicly 
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visible wallet addresses can be regarded as pseudonymous transactions, as the 
identifier is like a placeholder for an identity not revealed but potentially linkable 
to the signature.  
Furthermore, as explained above, the link between the identity and the sig-
natory can be created through additional solutions. With the innovative solutions 
of big data analytics and machine learning and the public key (of a non-custodian 
wallet) as an identifier, it is possible to identify the signatory.522  
Consequently, on the basis of this analysis, a question arises: depending on 
the linkage to the identity of the signatory and its fluctuation over time, could the 
contract form and signature type on the contract change depending on whether 
the link between the signature and identity can be made? Or does the eIDAS 
requirement ‘capable of identifying the signatory’ presume the signatory identi-
fying capability to be innate to the technology, meaning that this capability cannot 
be substituted externally? 
On the basis of the above, the author concludes that, although the DLT-based 
electronic signature does not use the CA-centric PKI model, there are a plethora 
of alternative solutions that can be used to perform the identification function, 
which is performed by the CA in the PKI model, and this function does not have 
to be performed innate to the technology.  
Furthermore, there is no requirement in the eIDAS that the linking of the 
identity to the signatory must be innate to the signing technology and cannot be 
substituted by a solution that may result in the identity being linked to the 
technology, as this would be a functionally equivalent solution. According to 
Reed, even if a regulator decides that a particular function is essential for achieving 
a certain legal result, such as identification, in these circumstances, “the regulator 
can achieve some level of neutrality between different technology implemen-
tations by drafting the legal requirements in such a way that non-compliant imple-
mentations can be modified to become compliant”.523 Reed refers to this solution 
as potential neutrality. The author suggests that, in such cases, the modifications 
                                                                          
522  Harlev et al.: “it is indeed possible to cluster together Bitcoin addresses and link such 
clusters to real-world identities”. Harlev et al., ‘Breaking Bad: De-Anonymising Entity Types 
on the Bitcoin Blockchain Using Supervised Machine Learning’, (2018 Proceedings of the 
51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences). <https://core.ac.uk/download/ 
pdf/143481278.pdf> accessed 8 July 2019. In January 2019, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission publicly sought vendors who can provide insights on “to whom a particular 
address belongs” in relation to wallet addresses. More information on this: <https://www.fbo. 
gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=c18a03f93cf06df47dab8a1c1a7f87a9&tab=core
&_cview=0> accessed 08 July 2019. Also, the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum report 
stated that “While not always identifiable at the moment of the transaction, given enough time 
and effort, many parties to a transaction can be unmasked. Therefore, at this point there is no 
question of total impunity for blockchain actors.” Legal and regulatory framework of 
blockchains and smart contracts. A thematic report prepared by the EU Blockchain Obser-
vatory and Forum, v1.0 – Published on 27 September 2019, p. 14. <https://www.eublockcha-
inforum.eu/sites/default/files/reports/report_legal_v1.0.pdf> accessed 26 January 2020. 
523  Reed (n. 100), p. 273. 
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do not have to be innate to the specific technology, especially considering that 
DLT is a fusion of technologies. The identification function can be added to the 
fusion, however, without dictating in which way the addition must take place.  
On the basis of the principle of technology neutrality, the author concludes that 
the accepted solution for linking the signature to the identity in order to qualify 
an electronic signature as a qualified electronic signature cannot merely be the 
CA-centric PKI model, but must also allow the use of other solutions. Although 
allowing these other solutions could have the consequence that the form of 
contract is fluid – in the sense that when there is no linkage to identity – the 
qualification is different from when the link between the identity and the signa-
ture is actually verified, and the contract’s form is then requalified.  
 
 
(c) the signature is created using electronic signature creation data that the 
signatory can, with a high level of confidence, use under their sole control 
The referred electronic signature creation data are the keys used for signing. The 
electronic signatures on the ICO smart contracts of a non-custodial wallet meet 
the data requirement. In the case of non-custodial wallets, the private key, which 
is linked to the public key, is used to send the funds to the ICO organiser similarly 
to the PINs used in the PKI model. This means that in the case of non-custodial 
wallets under this category, these signatures are functionally equivalent. 
 
 
(d) the signature is linked to the data signed therewith in such  
a way that any subsequent change in the data is detectable 
The hash function secures the integrity of the data in the ICO smart contract 
similarly to the way it functions in PKI-model-based electronic signatures. If the 
data in the ICO smart contract is in any way tampered with, the hash value changes 
automatically. Consequently, the ICO smart contract meets requirement (d).  
 
 
(e) created by a qualified electronic signature creation device 
As discussed above, according to Article 3(23) of the eIDAS, the ‘qualified 
electronic signature creation device’ refers to software or hardware that is used 
to create an electronic signature and needs to meet the requirements in Annex II 
to the eIDAS. On the basis of the principle of technology neutrality and the 
analysis conducted in Article III, the author concludes that the requirements 
stated in Annex II to the eIDAS are met by the ICO smart contract,524 except the 
requirement in Section 3 that discusses trust service providers. 
                                                                          
524  Under 1(a), the confidentiality of the keys of the electronic signature creation data of the 
ICO smart contract is reasonably assured. Under 1(b), once the keys are used the verification 
process starts, and this means that it can practically occur only once. Under 1(c), the keys 
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The requirement in Section 3 stipulates the need to involve the trust service 
provider in the signing and execution of the ICO smart contract. However, in case 
of smart contracts there usually is no trust service provider involved. It is the 
understanding of the author that in case the keys are used in electronic signing, 
the ICO smart contract that is linked to a non-custodial wallet, then no need for 
the keys to be issued by a separate trust service provider as the keys are neither 
generated nor managed on behalf of the signatory by an entity requiring trust. 
Therefore, there is no need to involve the trust service provider in this process.  
In the case that the signatory uses custodial wallets, the requirement to involve 
the trust service provider seems pointless, as the keys are not issued to the 
signatory at all since these belong to the custodian and the custodian is using the 
wallet with its own keys. 
 
 
(f) based on a qualified certificate for electronic signatures 
Article 3(15) of the eIDAS stipulates that the qualified certificate for an electronic 
signature is the certificate for electronic signatures issued by a qualified trust 
service provider and meeting the requirements laid down in Annex I to the eIDAS. 
As established, these requirements are aimed at fulfilling the evidentiary and 
identification function and, as has been established by the author, both of these 
functions can be executed by alternative solutions used in the ICO smart contract.  
 
 
4.3.4 eIDAS needs adaptation 
In conclusion, the third DLT use case shows that the certification-centric authen-
tication technology regulation needs to be amended in order to ensure equal 
treatment for these alternative ways to perform the evidentiary and identification 
function and to secure equivalence of outcome to the alternative solutions. How-
ever, as stated by Anna Nordén, simply fulfilling the evidentiary function equiva-
lently through the use of a technical capability without the backing of a regulatory 
framework is not sufficient as this “does not produce much result in legal 
certainty”.525 The author agrees with this warning, as the equivalence of outcome 
or effects equivalence needs to be ensured by regulation, otherwise the principle 
of technology neutrality fails in its impact.  
Consequently, in order to qualify the ICO smart contract as a contract in an 
electronic form on the basis of the hierarchy of contract forms, existing regulation 
                                                                          
cannot be derived from each other and the signature is reasonably protected against forgery. 
Under 1(d), the keys can be reliably protected against other users. Under 2, the DLT 
technology itself cannot alter the data signed. Even if verification of the transaction happens 
(by miners adding the transaction to the blockchain), the data remains unaltered. The require-
ments in Section 4 are also met as the ledger entries are duplicated exactly in accordance with 
Section 4.  
525  Nordén, (n. 494), p. 161. 
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needs to be amended to ensure the same weight and value to functionally equi-
valent electronic signatures on DLT-protocol-based electronic contracts. The aim 
of such a stipulation would be to be in line with the aim of Article 9 of the 
Ecommerce Directive,526 which requires Member States to “ensure that the legal 
requirements applicable to the contractual process neither create obstacles for the 
use of electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being deprived of legal 
effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by electronic 
means”. Such stpilation must be equally extended to smart contracts. 
Furthermore, the regulator should assess whether any regulation built around 
one infrastructure is open to alternative infrastructure; in this case, specifically to 
infrastructure not based on LOTL. As explained above, technically, the signing 
processes based on the PKI model and DLT are rather similar. As DLT is a fusion 
of technologies, it binds together technologies such as cryptography, P2P net-
works, consensus mechanism and linked timestamping without involving cent-
ralized trust structures, nevertheless, using much of the same technology as the 
PKI model. Additionally, the trust in the technical setup and auditable protocol 
creates decentralized trust without the need to involve LOTL-based centralized 
trust providers.  
For the purposes of identifying the moment the hybrid smart contract agreement 
is electronically signed, the author concluded that it is the moment the user uses 
their private key to control the wallet, e.g., to transfer the virtual currency to the 
wallet address of the ICO organizer. At a later stage, the smart contract protocol 
issues tokens in return for the virtual currency collected during the ICO period. 
However, this act can be considered an execution of the contract, as the electronic 
signature with the private key was already appended to the protocol when the 
protocol was prepared and presented for auditing. The author is of the opinion 
that both the ICO organizer and the user participating in the ICO have expressed 
their will, are identifiable and have appended their electronic signature on the 
agreement through the use of the private key in relation to their wallet.  
Contrary to the existing trust source, the entire DLT network is built on a 
protocol to instil trust without centralized authority and a central trust list, as all 
communication under the protocol in a DLT network is encrypted and uses linked 
timestamping,527 which is also how the electronic signing under the eIDAS 
functions.528 The DLT-based smart contract uses public-private key encryption 
                                                                          
526  Article 9 of e-Commerce Directive. 
527  Konstantinos Christidis, Michael Devetsikiotis, ‘Blockchains and Smart Contracts for the 
Internet of Things’. Special section on the plethora of research in the internet of things (IoT). 
(3 June 2016). doi:<10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2566339> or <http://people.cs.pitt.edu/~mosse/ 
courses/cs3720/blockchain-iot.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
528  ENISA. ‘Security guidelines on the appropriate use of qualified electronic signatures. 
Guidance for users.’ V 2.0 Final (December 2016) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ 
security-guidelines-on-the-appropriate-use-of-qualified-electronic-signatures/at_download/ 
fullReport> accessed 11 May 2020. 
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that originates from a cryptography algorithm similar to the EU technical standards 
for the eIDAS interoperability framework.529  
As stated by Herian,530 DLT-based smart contracts are “post-trust electronic 
agreements”. In the opinion of the author, this merely means that the trust is 
dependent on centralised-system based characteristics and predetermined features 
that do not grant effects equivalence to functionally equivalent trust systems. This 
does not mean a blank check should be given to all DLT-based smart contract users 
or that the outputs of this protocol are functionally equivalent to the electronic 
signatures protocol and trust system under the eIDAS, it merely means that the 
system under the eIDAS is tilted towards granting effects of validity and recog-
nition to only electronic signatures that originate from the system of trust ful-
filling the requirements and standards created under the eIDAS.  
The author concludes based on the above, any regulation which does not grant 
equivalence of outcome to functionally equivalent alternative systems fails to 
comply with the technology neutrality principle. This is a substantial shortcoming 
considering the growth of electronic commerce and the popularity of the financial 
technology and regulation technology startups that compete on the market to 
provide different on-chain or off-chain solutions to potentially substitute the CA-
based electronic identification system.531 Consequently, liberalisation should be 
welcomed due to the fact that any models dependent on the centralized identi-
fication function are internally vulnerable due to the presence of a single point of 
failure such as the LOTL.532  
Furthermore, given that in the offline world anonymous or pseudonymous 
transactions are allowed between the parties, perhaps it is time to equalize these 
options for the online world by amending the existing regulation to allow users 
of ICO smart contracts to remain either anonymous or pseudonymous but still be 






                                                                          
529  ENISA. ‘Standardisation in the field of Electronic Identities and Trust Service Providers. 
Inventory of activities’ Version 1.0, December 2014 <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publi-
cations/standards-eidas/at_download/fullReport> accessed 11 May 2020. 
530  Robert Herian, ‘Legal Recognition of Blockchain Registries and Smart Contracts.’ (EU 
Blockchain Observatory and Forum 2018) <http://oro.open.ac.uk/59481/> accessed 1 May 2019. 
531  Eric Borgsten, Oskar Jiang, ‘Authentication using Smart Contracts in a Blockchain’, 
Master’s thesis in Computer Systems and Networks, (University of Gothenburg and Chalmers 
University of Technology 2018), p. 15. <http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/ 
256254/256254.pdf> accessed 10 July 2019. 
532  As shown by the DigiNotar hack in 2011 in the Netherlands. See more on this by: Werbach, 
Kevin, (August 1, 2017), p. 510. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The bias in regulation identified in the first use case was for centralised means of 
payment and against any alternative means of payment (not specifically against 
DLT-based means of payment). The conclusion is based on the bitcoin’s functional 
equivalence to fiat currency identified in the Hedqvist case that did not result in 
effects equivalence in the de Voogd case. Analysis of Hedqvist demonstrates that 
even if regulation is not constructed in a technology neutral way, it can be 
implemented neutrally if the regulator conducts functional analysis, employs 
functional-teleological interpretation and allocates resources for research of the 
technology, objectives of existing regulation and the impact of the existing 
regulation on the innovative solution.  
On the basis of the court cases analyzed, as demonstrated in the first DLT use 
case, innovative individuals, entities and early adopters will act justifiably dif-
ferently amongst legal uncertainty in cases their innovative business models meet 
with existing regulation. These modes of action are either to seek clarity through 
open communication with the regulator or act without such communication. It 
might seem that the first option is always better, however, in case of open 
communication with the regulator is not subjected to a sandbox-type process, the 
individual can be subjected to long administrative proceedings or even disputes 
(that is visible from the Hedqvist case) where the simple request for legal clarity 
in the midst of innovation took an innovative individual down the path of dispute 
with the Swedish tax authorities (Skatteverket) that reached the CJEU and lasted 
for more than 2 years.533 This example shows that this mode of action is not a 
very efficient way for any startup to seek legal clarity or obtain legal certainty.  
The other mode of action is not to open communication with the regulator and 
not to try to understand whether the embarked business model “fits a box” under 
the existing regulation. As also can be seen in Article I, Mr. de Voogd took that 
particular mode of action and ironically also ended up in a legal dispute of more 
than 2 years534 for a regulatory requirement that after the final ruling in de Voogd 
survived less than hundred days. Furthermore, these two court cases also show 
                                                                          
533  Hedqvist applied for the decision of the Swedish Revenue Law Commission (SRLC) to 
obtain legal clarity in the issue of taxation related to bitcoins in 2013 and received the SRLC 
decision on the issue on 14th October 2013, which was challenged in the administrative court 
by another authority, the Swedish tax authority (Skatteverket), and ended up under the 
preliminary ruling procedure on the table of CJEU from which a ruling came down on 22 
October 2015 in favour of Hedqvist. Most likely Hedqvist approached his tax advisors much 
earlier than October 2013 and spent a considerable amount of funds to finance the com-
munication with these different authorities and the legal battle at the Swedish administrative 
court and CJEU.  
534  On 13th February 2014 the FIU initiated the communication with De Voogd that was 
followed by a precept to comply on 24th March 2014 and led to the FIU submitting a claim 
against De Voogd in an administrative court on 21st April 2014 that was finalised with an 
Estonian Supreme Court decision on 11th April 2016 in favour of the FIU’s position on the 
interpretation of a norm De Voogd was refusing to comply with.  
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that the public communication to build and share “knowledge” about what the 
regulation requires and how the authorities interpret the regulation should be a 
substantially higher priority for regulators. Furthermore, in case the public is 
repeatedly misinformed by the regulator on the subject matter, such factors should 
mitigate any failures of the public to operate in conformity with the regulation.  
de Voogd case is an outcome of Collingridge dilemma and clearly exemplifies 
the Pacing Problem, yet, these interpretations of the requirements of the regulator 
needed to be more transparency, include less discriminatory effect and should 
have been made public in advance.  
The bias in regulation identified in relation to the second use case was related 
to CSD – in case the shares of a private liability company under Estonian law 
were administered by the CSD – the more stringent requirements related to share 
transfer transactions were waived and freedom of form for share transfer and 
pledge transaction prevailed.  
Furthermore, the entry of shareholder data in the CSD-maintained ledger 
carries constitutive value, while the CC grants entries in the non-CSD ledgers no 
such value, irrespective of how ledger maintenance is organised or what techno-
logical solution is used by the ledger administrator. As the author presented, the 
regulation includes no flexibility to grant effects equivalence to a non-CSD ledger 
maintenance solution even if it is functionally equivalent to the CSD ledger. Such 
conclusion proves that the existing regulation is based on a bias for centralised 
intermediaries such as the CSD and is non-compliant with the technology 
neutrality principle. Given that the CSD ledgers have not been successful in 
attaining their goal of easing share transfers and their popularity among users is 
even more discouraging, the non-compliance of the CC with the technology 
neutrality principle is creating an obstacle on the market that also cannot be said 
to meet the requirements of the Services Directive discussed in Chapter 2 above 
as this regulation is not: 
 
(a)  non-discriminatory; 
(b)  justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest; 
(c)  proportionate to that public interest objective; 
(d)  clear and unambiguous; 
(e)  objective; 
(f)  made public in advance; 
(g)  transparent and accessible.  
 
Therefore, in order to effectively use DLT-protocol based shareholder ledgers, 
CC should be adapted at least with a waiver model as provided for the CSD-
registered shares or alternatively by a GDPR model where the objectives or 
functions the ledger must meet are stipulated in regulation, but the specific 
measures are left up to the administrator. 
Finally, on the basis of the third use case it can be concluded that currently, 
eIDAS regulation on electronic signatures is built around LOTL infrastructure 
and the PKI model. As research showed, technically, the signing processes based 
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on the PKI model and the one based on DLT are rather similar and, consequently, 
as gathered on the basis of the analysis, functionally predominantly equivalent. 
As described in this dissertation, DLT is a fusion of technologies that binds 
together cryptography, P2P networks, consensus mechanism and linked time-
stamping, but does not include centralised trust structures. Differently from the 
existing source of trust for electronic signatures, DLT-based trust is built on a 
protocol-based trust that does not require a centralised authority or a central trust 
list such as LOTL. The auditable protocol of DLT creates decentralised trust with-
out the need to involve LOTL-based centralised trust-based key management for 
electronic signing of contracts in an electronic form. Communication between 
parties, based on DLT protocol, is encrypted and uses linked timestamping, which 
is functionally equivalent to electronic signing under the eIDAS. Furthermore, 
the DLT-based contract uses a similar public-private key encryption crypto-
graphy algorithm, as required in the EU technical standards under the eIDAS 
interoperability framework.  
Furthermore, such conclusion does not mean that all DLT-based smart contract 
signatures are functionally equivalent to the electronic signatures required under 
the eIDAS. However, it does mean that the electronic signature system required 
under the eIDAS for contracts to be qualified in an electronic form is tilted and 
biased towards electronic signatures that originate from the centralised system of 
trust. However, in line with the principle of technology neutrality and Article 9 
of the Ecommerce Directive, which also calls for the same weight and value for 
functionally equivalent electronic signatures, DLT-based smart contracts should 
not be discriminated against simply because the key generation and key administ-
ration is executed differently. The author is of the opinion that none of the 
restrictions allowed under Article 3 (2) and (4) of the Ecommerce Directive for 
Member States to limit the freedom to provide information society services would 
be applicable in this use case and therefore, there is no justification for the non-
compliance with the principle. 
Nevertheless, the research showed that there are differences in functions of 
centralized and decentralized solutions: either the issuer of the means of payment 
is different, the source of trust is different, the key generation and management is 
different, the ledger administrator is different, and this could in some circum-
stances result in functional difference rather than equivalence. However, functional 
equivalence does not mean that the processes and institutions (parties executing the 
processes) must be the same, rather functional equivalence (and functional 
approach in comparative law) in general looks at the objectives these processes 
are targeted at and aims to clarify if the objectives (such as protection goals or 
values) are addressed equivalently. This does not mean that the difference in 
processes, institutions or infrastructure should be ignored, but rather that when a 
difference is identified, this calls for assessment of a need for difference in 
treatment. Finally, at times these identified differences can justify difference in 
treatment that is proportional to the difference in the analysed process or its 
inherent functions, e.g. lifting or adding certain compliance requirements. In the 
DLT use cases discussed in the present chapter, there were differences identified 
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in the functions but due to the similarity of objectives these different functions 
pursued, the treatment of these technical solutions called for effects equivalence 
with minor adjustments to. Consequently, these use cases show that rather than 
denying technical solutions that perform functions differently (while reaching 
similar or same objectives) all effects equivalence, the technology neutrality 
principle calls for effects equivalence to be granted (even with adjustments if 
needed) to address advances or risks related to the new technological solution.  
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V CONCLUSIONS  
As existing regulation has been drafted for centralised structures and not 
distributed ones like DLT, this dissertation explored the existing regulation 
author for bias against DLT use in the EU and Estonia applied to the specific DLT 
use cases chosen by the. The research demonstrated different apparent and non-
apparent biases against DLT use that maybe difficult to detect if no functional 
analysis is conducted on existing regulation. The conclusions based on the posed 
research questions can be summarized as follows.  
 
 
5.1 Identifying bias against DLT  
To identify bias, the author used the principle of technology neutrality as a bench-
mark. The author extends the application of the principle developed in the 1990s 
for the equal treatment of offline and online dimensions to test the equivalence of 
treatment of centralised and distributed dimensions. The principle is aimed at pre-
venting regulators from preferring or favouring a certain technology. Although 
the principle was originally linked only to ICT, with the expansion of digital 
society to all sectors of life, the principle has become a general principle of law. 
The principle is not an overarching principle and certainly must be balanced against 
other values (rights, freedoms and justifications) that need protection by law.  
As to the content of the principle, the research of the author showed that the 
principle consists of the components of functional equivalence and effects equi-
valence. In order to identify bias in regulation, these components should be used 
to conduct functional and effects analysis. In order to understand why existing 
regulation is how it is – e.g., creating dependencies on intermediaries and regis-
trations or issuing processes – the models, processes and solutions predominantly 
used during the development of the existing regulation should be investigated. 
Such investigation provides insight into the reasons for any possible inherent bias 
and reveals the hidden features the regulation presumes from technology, which, 
in the context of new technology, often require the performance of unfit, repetitive 
or unnecessary formalities that have already been sufficiently addressed by the 
technical or organisational solution (e.g., see analysis in Article III of the hybrid 
smart contract use case). These requirements may become obsolete in the context 
of the new technology. Consequently, maintaining the regulation as is creates a 
disadvantage for the functionally equivalent innovative technology solutions, as 
these often are not granted effects equivalence without meeting the formalities 
stated in the existing regulation. Therefore, the objectives of these formalities 
must be explored in order to assess whether a waiver of the formalities is called 
for. A similar approach was taken for example by the European regulator in the 
Pilot Regime that was just recently introduced in relation to crypto-assets. The 
functional and effects analysis, as indicated by its title, has two parts:  
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(i) in order to check compliance with the sub-principle of functional equi-
valence, the technology and its functions need to be compared with the 
objectives of the requirements in the existing regulation with the aim to 
identify whether the solution can be considered functionally equivalent; 
(ii) thereafter, the effects of the existing regulation to functionally equivalent 
solutions that do not comply with the specific requirements in the existing 
regulation should be investigated in order to understand whether effects 
equivalence (such effects as validity, binding effect, constitutive value, etc.) 
can be granted under the existing regulation to functionally equivalent 
solutions (solutions that meet the objectives of the requirements but not the 
formal requirements themselves). 
  
In case effects analysis reveals difference of treatment of a functionally equi-
valent solution that is not justified by any specific difference in the specific 
solution, the difference of treatment can be regarded as discriminatory and con-
sequently, considered as a bias written in the existing regulation. The detection 
of bias under such analysis is largely dependent on how well regulators under-
stand the new technology, the wider context of the technology, the impact of 
existing regulation on the technology and the technology neutrality principle itself.  
The research showed that the sub-principle of functional equivalence challenges 
any bias towards a certain existing solution (technical or organisational models) 
and requires the regulator to analyse whether an innovative solution is able to 
achieve the objectives of the requirements of the existing regulation functionally 
equivalently without necessarily meeting all of the formal requirements prescribed 
in the existing regulation. This idea has been successfully incorporated in the 
‘privacy-by-design’ regulative model of the GDPR by including only the objectives 
of the requirements in the regulation and not the specific procedural requirements 
how these objectives need to be obtained. 
Furthermore, based on the research presented in the dissertation, it appeared 
that a core aspect of the principle and one of the most cited values in relation to 
the neutrality principle is the sustainability goal. Regulation should be flexible 
and abstract enough to sustain development of new technology and, if it is 
technology-specific, it should grant effects equivalence to functionally equivalent 
solutions, similar to the way that electronic form, under certain conditions, is 
treated equivalently with written or physical form. Based on the sustainability 
goal, each piece of existing regulation must be evaluated for possible hurdles to 
innovation. However, as discussed in this dissertation, such sustainable regulation 
might be difficult to draft and maintain due to the technology advancing in un-
expected directions. This means that whenever a new technology reveals its new 
use cases, existing regulation might need an overhaul check for compliance with 
the technology neutrality principle. The Digital Finance Package introduced in 
late 2020 clearly shows that the EU is introducing evidence-based adaptations of 
existing regulation and this evidence can be gathered based on this type of 
functional and effects analysis, as discussed in this dissertation. Based on the use 
cases analysed, this dissertation showed that this type of analysis should not stop 
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at financial sector regulation (e.g., the Digital Finance Package), but should cover 
all existing regulation addressing digital society.  
However, the research on the application of the technology neutrality principle 
presented in the dissertation reveals that the courts have a hard time understanding 
the principle and applying it outside the scope of electronic communication 
regulation. Furthermore, some relevant court cases (such as UsedSoft and Tom 
Kabinet) separate the content layer from transport layer and identify how the 
transport layer can influence the content layer, the utility and rights attached to 
the goods or service to make it functionally different from the same goods or 
service in a different form and consequently, justifying also the difference in 
treatment. As can be seen in these court cases, technical solutions have multiple 
layers and the process of examination thereof might reveal a different utility of a 
good that is in a different form. These differences often call for different treatment, 
as equivalence should not restrict the use of a more advanced technology in order 
to achieve the advanced objectives of regulators that the new technology allows 
(such as the wider protection of rights of copyright holders). This means that 
technology’s advancement can influence regulation in a way that the new product 
may be granted additional effects that are not granted to the physical medium, 
and such treatment is in compliance with the technology neutrality principle, as 
regulation should not limit technology from advancing different legal regimes 
(e.g., ownership or control of private property). The existence of the layers them-
selves does not necessarily justify different treatment but assists in understanding 
the objective regulators might have to treat these media differently despite the 
functional equivalence of the content layer. Considering that the principle is 
based on the general principles of non-discrimination, the limitation of the prin-
ciple is anchored at the borders of differences in the new technical solution. The 
ultimate question, however, remains – is the difference substantive enough to 
justify difference of treatment and is the difference in treatment proportional to 
the difference in substance.  
Such conclusions and questions are in line with the critique of the principle 
stating that due to the advancement of technology and the changes in the market 
and society, regulation is unable to maintain sustainability and is bound to become 
unfit for the changed context. Digital publishing, online media and OTT services 
are all vastly different domains than their physical infrastructure-based counter-
parts, and this calls for the recognition of the contextual change and the conver-
gence of technologies and sectors that has taken place. This type of development 
challenges regulators’ use of the technology neutrality principle, as there is no 
strict functional equivalence in the sense that the new technology is used for the 
same purpose as the old (e.g., telephone services and VoiP), but enables more 
functionalities and use cases, less friction, a wider reach, a global user base, etc. 
In such a case, the technology neutrality principle demands that regulators not 
extend existing regulation to the new context, but instead adapt it to consider 
technological development and their objective in regulating. The newly introduced 
Digital Finance Package is aimed at exactly that – adaptation of the existing 
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regulation to consider the use of DLT outputs in the form of crypto-assets in the 
financial sector. 
However, such phenomenon makes it difficult for regulators to understand 
how effects equivalence should be granted to comply with technology neutrality 
principle and therefore, not to favour or prefer a certain technology, while at the 
same time still creating technology-specific regulation to enable the new 
technology to fulfil its use potential. This difficulty might lead regulators to create 
regulation that merely uses neutral terminology while still being built around 
certain specific existing solutions used in reality. Such outcome was identified in 
the third DLT use case analysed in the dissertation in relation to electronic signa-
ture regulation under the eIDAS. As revealed by the third DLT use case, techno-
logy neutral wording in regulation may still include a bias for the use of technical 
solutions existing at the moment of drafting the regulation. As a solution, the 
technology neutrality principle requires regulators to use functional analysis to 
diligently investigate for such bias and to aim to ensure neutrality.  
 
 
5.2 Identifying bias against DLT based on use cases 
In the dissertation, the author conducted three compliance checks of existing 
regulation with the technology neutrality principle on the basis of three different 
DLT use cases based on the objectives of the specific regulation. The objectives 
reveal why the regulator stipulated in the regulation specific functional require-
ments. These compliance checks allowed the author to conduct a functional and 
effects analysis of the existing regulation relevant to the DLT use case. Such an 
approach challenges any bias written into existing regulation towards a certain 
existing (technical or organizational) solution and makes it possible to analyse 
whether, in a specific use case, the DLT solution is able to achieve the objectives 
of the regulator functionally equivalently without necessarily meeting all the 
procedural or formal requirements set in the existing regulation. The described 
approach allows the author to assess whether the existing regulation is technology-
neutral or has an innate bias for a technical or organizational solution that existed 
during the drafting of the regulation. The following sections provide a summary 
of the conclusions made on the basis of the use case analysis. 
 
 
5.2.1 Bias for centralised means of payment  
The first DLT use case explored whether anti-money laundering regulation and 
the application of it in Estonia to bitcoin and its traders in de Voogd case was 
technologically neutral. The research focused on the treatment of bitcoin and 
bitcoin traders under the anti-money laundering regulation that was valid from 
2014–2016 in Estonia (referred to as MLPA I). Research showed that MLPA I 
separated the treatment of bitcoin from fiat currency under a new sui generis 
category called ‘alternative means of payment’ that was not based on AMLD and 
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consequently treated the traders of bitcoin differently from the traders of fiat 
currency. Although, AMLD allowed the EU Member States to develop more 
stringent rules and additional categories of obligated entities, the Member States 
needed to notify the Commission of such activity. Though such separation into 
different subject categories cannot be regarded as contrary to the principle of 
technology neutrality, the different treatment of these categories can be regarded 
as contrary to the principle (and also perhaps against the aim of the AMLD) 
unless the difference of treatment is based on the difference in technology.  
Hence, the bias identified in the first use case was the bias for centralised 
means of payment and, consequently, the bias against alternative means of 
payment, such as decentralised or distributed. As part of the analysis the author 
compared de Voogd ruling to the application of the EU VAT regulation to bitcoin 
and its traders in CJEU ruling in Hedqvist. The conclusion on bias is largely based 
on the Hedqvist ruling. Based on the Hedqvist, the author argues that the dif-
ference in treatment of fiat currency and alternative means of payment under 
MLPA I was contrary to the principle of technology neutrality as in the Hedqvist 
case, CJEU had confirmed these categories to be functionally equivalent. Con-
sequently, not granting these object categories (the means of payment) and 
subject categories (the traders) equivalent treatment with fiat currency and fiat 
currency traders, and subjecting the DLT-based object and trading subjects under 
more stringent compliance rules can be regarded as contrary to the technology 
neutrality principle. 
In the de Voogd ruling of the Estonian Supreme Court, bitcoin was qualified 
as an alternative means of payment under MLPA I, although the court did not 
identify any grounds related to anti-money laundering regulation objectives that 
justified the difference in the treatment of these functionally equivalent categories 
of fiat currency and bitcoin. Furthermore, considering the statements of the 
Supreme Court in the respective ruling, the court was also of the opinion that the 
treatment of this sui generis category must be proportionate to and considerate of 
the technological and global use cases of bitcoin. Although the court clearly states 
these concerns in the ruling, it, nevertheless, did not apply the MLPA I to bitcoin 
and bitcoin traders in a functional-teleological way nor refer the interpretation of 
AMLD to CJEU for preliminary ruling to explore whether the introduction of an 
alternative means of payment category without notification and granting the 
subjects trading with this category different treatment is at all compliant with 
AMLD.  
In the ruling of the de Voogd, the Supreme Court urged the legislative branch 
is: (i) to assess the effect of MLPA I on bitcoin trade, (ii) to consider adapting 
MLPA I considering the characteristics of bitcoin trading and (iii) to ensure 
sufficient flexibility in order to treat innovative technology neutrally. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court itself failed to interpret MLPA I in a functional-techno-
logical way, the way the CJEU had interpreted with the EU VAT regulation in 
the Hedqvist case.  
Consequently, the research of the first DLT use case presented in this disser-
tation showed that the courts (and not only legislators) must also conduct a 
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functional analysis and, upon identifying functional equivalence, grant effects 
equivalence to the new technological outputs on the basis ofthe existing regu-
lation. The analysis showed that the application of the principle of technology 
neutrality revealed a bias against ‘alternative means of payment’ and, although 
the in the definition of the sui generis category of MLPA I was meant to be 
sustainable, the treatment of this category failed to have a sufficient level of 
flexibility to allow innovation and different technologies to flourish and to com-
pete. Given the new Digital Finance Package introduced in the EU late 2020 
addressing crypto-assets and the fact that the MLPA I has been replaced with 
multiple different versions of MLPA since 2016 both on the basis of amendments 
to AMLD and also not based on it, there is no other specific recommendation or 
course of action suggested by the author on the basis of this analysis. 
 
 
5.2.2 Bias for centralised administrator of shareholder ledger 
The second DLT use case explored a bias in the shareholder ledger administration 
regulation of Estonian private limited companies under the Estonian Commercial 
Code (CC). More specifically, the author analysed whether the relevant pro-
visions in the CC were technology-neutral and allowed for the effective use of 
DLT in the ledger administration of the shares not registered at the CSD (non-
CSD shares). In summary, the existing CC does not restrict the use of DLT or any 
other technology in shareholder ledger administration. In fact, the existing CC 
regulation is technology-independent as it neither requires nor prohibits the use 
of any technological solution for ledger administration. However, the author’s 
research showed that the entries in the ledgers maintained by either CSD or non-
CSD are valued differently, and the regulation does not allow for effects equi-
valence to be granted in case functional equivalence with CSD ledger is estab-
lished in non-CSD ledger administration through the use of any technology. 
Consequently, the author identified a bias in the CC for CSD maintained ledger. 
Consequently, the difference of treatment of ledgers, ledger entries and shares 
registered in these is based on who the administrator of the ledger is. Furthermore, 
which any non-CSD ledger maintenance solution, irrelevant how sophisticated 
could not resolve such bias under the existing CC.  
Given that DLT is a ledger technology, maintaining shareholder ledgers using 
DLT, the ledger functionalities ensure trustworthiness, transparency and verifi-
cation of data entries. Due to these functionalities, the DLT-based shareholder 
ledger could potentially equivalently perform the functions CSD performs in 
maintaining the ledger. Consequently, in order to be compliant with the techno-
logy neutrality principle, the Estonian regulator should either, using either the 
GDPR regulative model, introduce the objectives of the technical and orga-
nisational measures that need to be fulfilled for any technological solution for 
ledger maintenance to be considered functionally equivalent to the CSD-main-
tained ledger or on the basis of the waiver regulative model include flexibility in 
the CC to allow waivers from more stringent requirements in case of non-CSD 
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share ledgers in case certain trustworthiness, transparency and verification 
requirements for data entries are met. Such recommendation is in line with the 
Pilot Regime that allows exemptions from certain requirements of the CSDR and 
MIFID II that are “proportionate to and justified”535 by the use of DLT. Con-
sequently, it would be equally proportionate to expect the Estonian regulator to 
grant the use of DLT in the shareholder ledger maintenance of non-CSD shares 
also effects equivalence with the treatment of CSD shares under the CC. As long 
as the Estonian regulator is mute as to these flexible solutions to achieve effects 
equivalence, the CC regulation is based on a bias for a centralised solution. 
 
 
5.2.3 Bias for centralised key management  
The third DLT use case explored the certification-centric authentication techno-
logy regulation of the eIDAS, analysing whether a DLT-based smart contract 
signature could be regarded as functionally equivalent to an eIDAS qualified 
electronic signature. The author identified a bias in the electronic signatures regu-
lation related to key management. The bias was attached to the requirement that 
the keys needed for electronic signing must be generated and maintained by a 
trust service provider. This requirement can be regarded as bias as while DLT 
key generation and management is independent of all service providers. This 
means that the eIDAS regulation stipulates requirements that have no relevance 
or reasoned need, in the case of DLT as in DLT-based systems it is possible to 
issue trustworthy signatures without the use of service providers. Consequently, 
the author concludes that the eIDAS needs an adaptation through either (i) waiver 
regulative model as was initiated in the EU with the Digital Finance Package or 
(i) GDPR model through the introduction of objectives without specific list of 
procedural requirements or (iii) through polycentric coregulation using multiple 
stakeholders who are well-versed with available electronic signing solutions.  
The only function the DLT-based smart contract analysed in the third DLT 
model failed to address was the identification function. The research presented 
showed that the inherent identification function can be added on the smart 
contract solution as a separate stand-alone function or be performed based on 
other evidence, such as IP address, e-mail address, phone number, etc., or alter-
natively the EU regulator could also expand the freedom of contract of the parties 
and enable contracts to be concluded in an electronic form which do not require 
identification function to be performed at all. If regulation, such as the eIDAS, 
does not grant effects equivalence to functionally equivalent alternative electronic 
signature systems, the regulation is not in compliance with the technology 
neutrality principle. Such shortcoming can be considered a substantial drawback 
given the expected growth of electronic commerce. Any liberalisation of the 
regulation under investigation in the third DLT use case is much needed. This 
liberalisation could also be extended to the concept of anonymous or pseudo-
                                                                          
535  Article 5 of the Pilot Regime. 
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nymous transactions in the online domain, which the author is sure is also a much-
needed development given the prevalent privacy concerns of online commerce.  
As self-executing smart contracts are easier to enforce than non-self-executing 
contracts, the balancing exercise does not necessarily create an advantage for 
contracts with ease of identification but often creates an advantage for contracts 
ensuring ease of enforcement. One is not necessarily better than the other simply 
because we as users and also the regulator are accustomed to it. Any preference 
towards one solution over the other by regulators shows that they indulge them-
selves to an infrastructural bias against innovative solutions that may or may not 
include distributed networks, ledgers and DLT.  
 
 
5.3 Ensuring DLT-neutrality in regulation 
The need to address infrastructural bias for centralized means of payment, cent-
ralized ledger maintenance and centralized key generation and maintenance is a 
in line with the technology-neutrality principle and the sub-principle of functional 
equivalence must be utilized to recognize the objectives different regulators 
desire to reach through including these biases in the regulation. Such recognition 
allows to conduct a functional and effects analysis of the innovative technological 
solution used against these objectives and conclude whether the new solution is 
equivalently suitable to perform the required functions of the regulation and should 
be granted effects equivalence. To ensure DLT-neutrality, the regulation should 
allow effects equivalence to all DLT-based functionally equivalent solutions. 
In light of this conclusion and given that new DLT applications are constantly 
being developed, the author asked in the dissertation whether it is at all possible 
to ensure DLT-neutrality in regulation that also has a certain level of sustain-
ability. DLT is after all an ‘all-purpose technology’, which means the technology 
can be used in multiple sectors and facets of society. This creates a need to 
evaluate many regulatory frameworks to identify these biases and, if necessary, 
resolve these. Such a task called for an exploration into the regulative models and 
strategies that could sustainably achieve DLT-neutrality across jurisdictions.  
For this purpose, the author addressed the sustainable DLT-neutrality quest on 
a foundational level. This means that upon conducting such exploration into 
regulative strategies, not one specific DLT use case was used as an example as 
otherwise the research would have been fragmented to that use case, instead, the 
wider perspective of regulative strategies and models was considered.  
This dissertation did not treat DLT regulation in any way as a separate field 
of study or in need of separate regulation. Nevertheless, introducing DLT-specific 
regulation is not in breach of the technology neutrality principle as long as effects 
equivalence is granted across different technologies. This means that each 
technology can be addressed by a separate regulation that considers its functional 
differences and still be technology neutral. The Digital Finance Package serves 
as an example here, as a DLT-specific regulation that adapts existing regulation 
to consider DLT functionalities while maintaining protection interests similar to 
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those addressed for existing technology. Consequently, in this dissertation, the 
author discussed the different regulative strategies in relation to DLT, aiming to 
identify alternative paths sustainably to ensure DLT-neutrality across regulatory 
frameworks.  
As research showed, these regulative strategies can be expressed in different 
regulative models. For example, in the case of the Digital Finance Package, the 
impact assessment showed that although the Commission identified similar regu-
lative strategies for the Pilot Regime and the MiCA Proposal, the models chosen 
for adapting existing regulation were different. Among the alternative options 
discussed in the Pilot Regime were issuing interpretation in the form of guidance 
on the applicability of EU regulation to crypto-assets or adapting existing EU 
regulatory framework through either a more comprehensive regulation change or 
a temporary and iterative option chosen by the regulator in the Pilot Regime.  
On the other hand, the MiCA Proposal identified an even wider selection of 
alternative models (full harmonisation or an opt-in licensing regime coupled with 
a separate regime for stablecoins) under these same regulative strategies, which 
all focused on adapting existing regulation. The compromise of the MiCA Pro-
posal is a selection of these alternative options all in one.  
Therefore, in this dissertation, the author addressed alternative models of 
regulation as part of these regulative strategies that as research showed are able 
to ensure DLT neutrality in a sustainable way. The models discussed in the disser-
tation include functional-teleological interpretation and the waiver solution as 
part of the strategy to apply existing regulation and the UNCITRAL and the 
GDPR model along with either self-regulation or polycentric coregulation as 
models for adaptation of existing regulation. Furthermore, the author concluded 
that these regulative strategies and models are often adopted in parallel (wait-and-
see, along with the application of existing regulation) or coupled with temporary 
additional exploration techniques (such as the sandbox regime). 
 As the research presented in this dissertation showed, both the subsidiarity 
principle-based model used in the GDPR and the strategy of polycentric coregu-
lation (which includes the constantly evolving amorphous soft law, multiple 
sources of regulation and reliance on stakeholders, etc.) enable a certain level of 
sustainability and flexibility, allowing the iteration of regulatory responses to the 
fast-paced change brought about by DLT. 
To exemplify this, the Digital Finance Package, with the example of the Pilot 
Regime, is a revolutionary regulative approach employing constantly iterative 
functionalities in respect of the subsidiarity principle, targeting the sustainability 
goal through the waiver regime and reaching for neutrality through allowing a 
directly applicable list of exemptions from compliance requirements to be custo-
mised to specific DLT applications. The referred Pilot Regime shows that the EU 
regulator is without a doubt able to revolutionise with regulatory strategy by 
adapting to the needs of distributed infrastructure in order to promote competition 
and innovation.  
Nevertheless, the Digital Finance Package merely addresses the financial 
sector and its regulation; however, DLT has an array of other use cases across 
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multiple sectors, and regulative strategies and models securing neutrality in a 
sustainable way should also be a priority in these other regulatory frameworks. 
DLT challenging substantive law is not the only challenge, as DLT can also be 
used in the delivery of regulation and in complying with the regulation. As dis-
cussed in the final section of chapter 3, DLT enables the delivery of regulation to 
its subjects in the form of a code and allows compliance with the requirements of 
regulation also be executed through the use of the built-in code. Therefore, as the 
financial sector is allowing use of DLT in fulfilling financial compliance require-
ments, regulators should also explore the use of DLT for any other type of regu-
latory compliance. Consequently, the challenge posed by DLT to regulators should 
no longer be limited to the content layer (the content of the provisions of regu-
lation themselves), but also expanded to the transport layer (the delivery tool of 
the content of the provisions), paving the way for code-based regulation that 
allows compliance through the use of the same code (DLT used as regulatory 
compliance tool). 
Unfortunately, neutrality as a goal can also be used to create an advantage (as 
the EU Digital Finance Package proposal shows) to the use of one technology 
(e.g., DLT) and could therefore, be also considered as technology-partial as it 
promotes one technology over another. DLT neutrality might not necessarily be 
technology-neutral to all other technologies unless effects equivalence of the 
DLT-specific regulation is secured to other functionally equivalent technologies. 
Consequently, the challenge to be sustainably technology-neutral is considerably 
more difficult than being merely sustainably DLT-neutral.  
Finally, the research presented in this dissertation established that regulators 
(including legislative, executive and judiciary branch), not only the innovator, 
needs to be active in learning about DLT and its wider context in order to ensure 
DLT-neutrality and identify infrastructural bias in regulation, but it should be the 
aim of regulators themselves to interpret and implement existing regulation in a 
technologically neutral way, issue guidelines that explain compliance objectives 
(rather than enforce existing unfit requirements) and promote market-led poly-
centric coregulation efforts. All of these activities are creating and sharing knowl-
edge, and through such cooperation activities the regulator is supporting 
innovation and promoting regulation compliant behaviour without putting the 
burden of obtaining legal clarity and certainty on any single early-adopter.In this 
dissertation, the author was exploring biases written into existing regulation using 
the principle of technology neutrality as a benchmark and consequently, the aim 
of the dissertation was not to explore the specific adaptations needed to the 
existing regulation applicable and relevant in the analysed DLT use cases. Such 
analysis of specific adaptations needed or justifications for not making these 
adaptations in all three DLT use cases needs to be addressed in future work. 
Furthermore, any limitations and challenges raised in this dissertation similarly 
provide opportunities for future research. Not to mention, the use of DLT in 
corporate applications, the wider use of smart contracts and cryptocurrencies, 
crypto-assets and non-fungible tokens calls for similar explorations into the 
biases of the relevant existing regulation that may lead to adaptations of far more 
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sources of existing regulation than this dissertation addressed. The code-based or 
algorithmic regulation is a topic that certainly is gaining momentum and should 
be further explored also in the context of the challenges raised in this dissertation – 
specifically how to address the fast pace change of technology in relation to self-
executing contracts, self-driving cars and self-operating machines with a dynamic 
and adaptive regulation. Lastly, given the popularity of online commerce and 
rivalry desire for privacy and security while conversing and trading in the digital 
domain, the identification and authentication technology along with the domain 
of smart contracts needs the attention of legal scholars to address anonymous and 
pseudonymous online contracts and self-sovereign identity administration.  
The focus of technology neutrality principle has certainly moved from the 
comparison of online-offline dimensions to a highly developed virtual world 
available on multiple different infrastructures – centralized, decentralized and 
distributed, with primary and subset levels of interactions with communities, 
platforms, peers (P2P) and machines. From the time the principle was discussed 
in the writings of Koops and Reed in the context of equal treatment of offline-
online domains, the relevance of digital technology has grown exponentially and 
consequently, the relevance of the neutrality principle has multiplied. However, 
due to the complexities introduced with such development of the digital domain, 
the functional and effects analysis are of utmost importance as both the regulator 
and the legal scholar should be exploring these realities as comparative legal 
theorists are exploring foreign legal systems – on the basis of functional approach 
and free of assumptions. The author’s findings in the dissertation concur with 
those of Reyes, Finck, de Filippi and Wright that the regulatory challenges specific 
to DLT and blockchain need regulators to expand their traditional regulatory stra-
tegies recognizing endogenous, code-based and self- or co-regulation alternatives 
to respond to these challenges. Finally, all of the enumerated challenges of infra-
structural paradigm shift presented in this dissertation and biases the onlookers 
have when observing this transformation from one paradigm to the next can be 
recognized already in the work of Lessig and consequently, the findings in this 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutuselevõtu õiguslikud takistused: 
tehnoloogia neutraalsuse ja funktsionaalse samaväärsuse 
põhimõtetele tuginev analüüs 
Väitekirja uurimisese on hajusraamatutehnoloogia (distributed ledger techno-
logy), sh plokiahelatehnoloogia (blockchain technology) kasutamisel esinevad 
õiguslikud takistused, mis tulenevad õigusraamistikku sisse kirjutatud taristus-
likest eelarvamustest. Viidatud eelarvamusi ning nendega seotud tagajärgi uuri-
takse väitekirjas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte ja funktsionaalse sama-
väärsuse alampõhimõtte alusel. Kuigi need põhimõtted on olulised laiemas tehno-
loogia reguleerimise kontekstis, mitte pelgalt hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasuta-
misel, piirdutakse väitekirjas põhimõtete kohaldamisega autori poolt valitud 
hajusraamatutehnoloogia konkreetsetel kasutusjuhtudel kohalduvatele õigus-
normidele. Olukorras, kus ilmneb õigusnormi mittevastavus tehnoloogianeutraal-
suse põhimõttele, uurib autor selle mittevastavuse põhjuseid ja tagajärgi ning 
püüab leida mittevastavusele lahendusi kasutades tehnoloogianeutraalsuse alam-
põhimõtte – funktsionaalse samaväärsuse – abi. 
Hajusraamatutehnoloogia all peetakse silmas andmestruktuuri, mis kajastab 
algoritmis sätestatud loogika kohaselt kodeeritud arvestusraamatu (ledger) and-
metest, mida saab vahetada ja millel võib olla õiguslik tähendus. Andmete tervik-
likkust kaitseb iteratiivne räsimine (hashing). Räside endi terviklikkust kaitsevad 
krüptograafia (cryptography) ja ajatembeldus (timestamping) funktsioonid. 
Kõige tuntum hajusraamatutehnoloogia andmestruktuur on plokiahel, mida kasu-
tatakse ka krüptoraha (cryptocurrency) andmestruktuurides. Sellistes andme-
struktuurides esitab arvestusraamat krüptoraha kasutajate rahakottide kohta and-
meid ning nende rahakottide vahelisi makseid ühikutes, mis on käibel arvestus-
raamatu oma taristu sees ja enamasti võimaldab teha vahetustehinguid ka 
andmestruktuuriga seotud turgudel. Kõige tuntum krüptoraha on tänini bitimünt 
(bitcoin) ja sellest väiksem sama vääringu ühik satoshi (sajamiljondik biti-
mündist). Plokiahela andmestruktuuri iseloomustab see, et andmestruktuur koos-
neb andmeplokkidest ja iga järgnev andmeplokk on räsi kaudu eelneva andme-
plokiga ühenduses. Arvestusraamatuid hoitakse hajusraamatutehnoloogia puhul 
(nagu ka selle nimetus ütleb) hajutatult, s.t ei ole nii, et on üks arvestusraamatu 
originaal ja teised vaid koopiad, vaid mitu osalist hoiab arvestusraamatu identset 
originaali algoritmi sissekirjutatud konsensusprotokolli alusel, mille põhjal 
lepivad hajusraamatu kasutajad (kes üksteist enamasti ei tunne) kokku, mis on 
arvestusraamatusse tehtud kannete tegelik seis. Kuna plokiahel on vaid üks hajus-
raamatutehnoloogia andmestruktuure, käsitletakse väitekirjas plokiahela andme-
struktuuri kui näidet, mis ilmestab õigusraamistikust tulenevaid takistusi sh normi-
desse sissekirjutatud eelarvamusi hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusele võtmisele. 
Transformatiivne ehk murranguline innovatsioon mõjutab eri ühiskonnakihte 
ning kuna hajusraamatutehnoloogiat peetakse just selliseks transformatiivseks 
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ehk murranguliseks innovatsiooniks, mis mõjutab ühiskonda suureulatuslikult ja 
selle mõju ühiskonnas on mitmedimensiooniline. Kuigi finantsteenused (sh krüpto-
raha) on hajusraamatutehnoloogia üks levinumaid rakendusi, seisneb hajus-
raamatutehnoloogia murrangulisus asjaolus, et sellel tehnoloogial võib olla palju 
laiem mõju kui vaid finantssektoris, näiteks valdkondades nagu isikusamasuse 
haldamine, turvalisuse haldamine ja andmete haldamine. Hajusraamatutehno-
loogia murrangulist mõju saab täheldada mitmes sektoris ning selle rakendused 
on kasutusel lisaks finantssektori rakendustele ka rahvusvahelises kaubanduses, 
väärtpaberitehingute talletamises ja kajastamises, ravimite väljakirjutamises ja 
selle protsessi seires, organidoonorluse seires, energiaressursside jaotuses ja 
ümberjaotuses ning igasuguste andmete talletamises ja vahetamises paljudes 
sektorites, nagu tarneahela juhtimine, tervishoid, avalikud teenused, intellektuaal-
omandiõiguste haldus, e-kaubandus, jms. Kuna hajusraamatutehnoloogia on 
üldotstarbeline tehnoloogia, millel on hulk võimalikke rakendusi ja väljundeid 
ning mida saab kasutada eri teenuste osutamisel ja protsesside rakendamisel, 
prognoositakse, et hajusraamatutehnoloogia mõju äritegevusele ja ühiskonnale 
suureneb ajas oluliselt. Sellist järeldust toetab ka septembris 2020.a. avaldatud 
EL-i digitaalse finantspaketi projekt, mille eesmärk on tehnoloogianeutraalselt 
toetada hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutuselevõttu EL-is finantssektoris krüpto-
varade reguleerimise kaudu.  
Õigusraamistikku sissekirjutatud taristuslike eelarvamuste uurimisel tuleb 
arvestada ka tempoprobleemi (pacing problem), mis tähendab seda, et tehno-
loogia ja selle kasutuspraktika muutuvad ajas kiiresti ning eksponentsiaalselt, kuid 
õigusraamistik samas muutub vähehaaval ning aeglaselt. Lisaks tuleb arvesse 
võtta ka Collingridge’i dilemmat, mille kohaselt tunneb seadusandja vajadust 
sekkuda iga uue tehnoloogia saabumisega tekkinud mõjudesse üsna varakult, 
olgugi et uue tehnoloogia kasutuselevõtu tagajärjed on tihti veel varajases etapis 
ning seega üpris ebaselged. Sekkumise põhjus on tihtipeale hirm, et selleks ajaks, 
kui kasutuselevõtu mõju ja tagajärjed on selged, on tehnoloogia sageli nii olulisel 
määral osa majandusest või ühiskonnast, et seda on raske ohjata. Seega on 
Collingridge’i dilemma kohaselt lihtsam kehtestada uued õigusnormid pigem 
võimalikult varakult – ajal, mil tehnoloogia ei ole veel täielikult välja kujunenud. 
Samas kuna uue regulatsiooni mõju on varakult sekkudes veel arenemata tehno-
loogia osas ebaselge võivad uued õigusnormid osutuda tehnoloogia laiemale 
kasutuselevõtule piiravaks või hukatuslikuks. 
Oluline on tuvastada õigusraamistikku sissekirjutatud taristuslikud eelarva-
mused hajusraamatutehnoloogia osas ka põhjusel, et Euroopa Komisjoni endise 
presidendi Junckeri sõnul on ühtse digitaalse turu loomisel vaja luua võrdsed 
võimalused nii turgu valitsevatele ettevõtjatele kui ka tehnoloogia, taristu, 
kasutusjuhtude uuendajatele, kehtestades võrdsed mängureeglid kõigele, mis on 
digitaalne. Sarnane soov väljendub ka EL-i 2020. a septembris avaldatud digitaalse 
finantspaketi projektidokumentides, mille eesmärk on kooskõlas tehnoloogia-
neutraalsuse põhimõttega toetada hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutuselevõttu EL-
is ning autori arvates ka kõrvaldada olemasolevasse finantsturge puudutavasse 
õigusraamistikku sissekirjutatud taristust lähtuvad eelarvamused. Paraku püüel-
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dakse võrdsete mängureeglite kehtestamise eesmärgi poole sageli viisil, mis on 
ajendatud hirmust, et murranguline innovatsioon tekitab juba olemasoleval ja toi-
mival turul kaose ja ebaselguse. Sel põhjusel on seadusandja tihti motiveeritud 
allutama turul asetleidvad uuendused olemasolevatele õigusnormidele ilma norme 
uuenenud tehnoloogilisele lahendusele kohandamata. Seda isegi juhul, kui inno-
vatsioon selle tegevuse tulemusel kannatab. 
Väitekirja üldine eesmärk on välja selgitada, kas Eesti ja Euroopa Liidu õigus, 
mida kohaldatakse või kohaldati autori poolt välja valitud konkreetsetel hajus-
raamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhtudel, on tehnoloogianeutraalne. Kui konkreetsel 
juhul kohalduv õigus ei vasta tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttele, uurib autor, 
mis ulatuses ja kuidas on vaja õigusraamistikku muuta, et saavutada tehnoloogia-
neutraalsus. Et saavutada väitekirja üldine eesmärk, püstitas autor alltoodud 
uurimisküsimused: 
 
1. Kuidas tuvastada olemasolevatesse õigusnormidesse sisse kirjutatud eel-
arvamused hajusraamatutehnoloogia suhtes? 
2. Kuidas jätkusuutlikult tagada õigusnormide tehnoloogianeutraalsus hajus-
raamatutehnoloogia suhtes? 
3. Kas autori poolt valitud hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhtudele kohal-
datavad õigusnormid on kooskõlas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttega või 
sisaldab eelarvamusi hajusraamatutehnoloogia suhtes? Täpsemad uurimis-
küsimused iga hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhu kohta on järgnevad: 
 
a) Kas rahapesutõkestamise regulatsioon Eestis ja selle rakendamine olid 
bitimündi ja selle kauplejate suhtes tehnoloogianeutraalsed (de Voogd 
näitel) nagu käibemaksu regulatsiooni rakendamine bitimündi ja selle 
kauplejate osas EL-is (Hedqvist’i näitel)? 
b) Kas Eesti äriseadustiku alusel osaühingu osanike nimekirja pidamine 
juhatuse poolt võimaldab seda pidada hajusraamatutehnoloogia baasil 
funktsionaalselt samaväärsena keskregistri poolt peetava nimekirjaga ja 
kas seadus tagab sellisele osanike nimekirja pidamisele tehnoloogia-
neutraalsuse põhimõttest lähtuvalt võrdse kohtlemise? 
c) Kas hajusraamatutehnoloogial põhinevat allkirja targal lepingul saab 
lugeda funktsionaalselt samaväärseks eIDAS-e kvalifitseeritud elekt-
roonilise allkirjaga ning kas eIDAS võimaldab seda allkirja tehnoloogia-
neutraalsuse põhimõttest lähtuvalt võrdselt kohelda PKI mudelil põhineva 
allkirjaga? 
 
Autori poolt valitud hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhud illustreerivad eri-
nevaid viise, kuidas õigusnormid võivad mõjuda hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasu-
tusele diskrimineerivalt. Näited annavad tunnistust sellest, et kehtiv õigus on 
mitmeti tehnoloogiliselt erapoolik või konkreetse taristu keskne. Eespool toodud 
uurimisküsimusi käsitletakse lisaks käesolevas väitekirjas toodule ka alljärgnevas 
neljas õigusteadusartiklis, mille on avaldanud autor või autor koos kaasautoritega: 
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• Artikkel I: „Decentralised technology and technology neutrality in legal 
rules: an analysis of De Voogd and Hedqvist“, milles analüüsitakse biti-
mündile kui maksevahendile ja bitimündiga kauplejale kohaldatavaid õigus-
norme Eesti rahapesutõkestamise seaduse ja Euroopa käibemaksu regulat-
siooni alusel. Artiklis uuritakse, kas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõte sobib 
tsentraalsel-detsentraalsel skaalal tekkiva diskrimineerimise lahendamiseks 
sarnaselt tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte rakendamisega füüsilise ja 
digimaailma (offline-online) reguleerimise vastuolude puhul. Artiklis käsit-
letakse kahte kohtuasja, millest üht lahendas Eesti Vabariigi Riigikohus (de 
Voogd) ja teises võttis seisukoha Euroopa Liidu Kohus (Hedqvist). See-
juures võrreldakse kohtuasjade pinnal kahte eri lähenemisviisi bitimüntidele 
ja nendega kauplemisele olemasolevate õigusnormide alusel. Võrdluse põhjal 
uurib autor, kas õigusraamistik ja selle rakendamine Eestis oli tehnoloogia-
neutraalne või sisaldas regulatsioon ja selle kohaldamine taristupõhiseid eel-
arvamusi. Artiklis antakse ka põgus ülevaade tehnoloogianeutraalsuse 
põhimõttest. 
• Artikkel II: „Shareholder ledger using distributed ledger technology: the 
Estonian perspective“, milles analüüsitakse hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasu-
tamist osanike nimekirja pidamisel Eesti õiguse näitel. Analüüsi fookuses on 
küsimus, kas osanike nimekirja pidamisele kohaldatavad õigusnormid vasta-
vad tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttele. Autor analüüsib, kas olemasolev 
õigusraamistik annab eeliseid osanike nimekirja pidamisele tsentraliseeritud 
taristu (väärtpaberite keskregister) poolt ning seega kas kohalduvad õigus-
normid sisaldavad eelarvamusi detsentraliseeritud innovaatiliste tehno-
loogiliste lahenduste (nt hajusraamatutehnoloogia) kasutuse vastu osanike 
nimekirja pidamise, mis suudab keskregistriga funktsionaalselt samaväärselt 
nimekirja käitada ilma keskse vahendajata. 
• Artikkel III: „Hybrid smart contract challenge to European electronic signa-
ture regulation“ (kaasautorid Liisi Jürgen, Eduardo da Cruz Rodrigues e 
Silva ja Alex Norta), milles uuritakse Eesti ja EL-i õiguse näitel, kas määrus 
910/2014 (eIDAS) võimaldab hajusraamatutehnoloogial põhinevat hüb-
riidset tarka lepingut, mida kasutatakse müntide esmaemissioonil (Initial 
Coin Offering (ICO)), lugeda sellele lisatud e-allkirja alusel elektroonilises 
vormis sõlmitud lepinguks. Artiklis nimetatakse tarka lepingut hübriidseks 
targaks lepinguks põhjusel, et selle moodustavad eri komponendid, mis ei 
koosne üksnes koodist, vaid ka lepingu kasutajatele mõeldud kirjalikust 
tekstist. Artikli keskmes on eIDAS-e vastavuse analüüs tehnoloogianeut-
raalsuse põhimõttele hajusraamatutehnoloogia baasil sõlmitud lepingute 
kasutusjuhu puhul. Lisaks analüüsitakse artiklis funktsionaalse samaväär-
suse alampõhimõtte alusel, kas hübriidse targa lepingu allkiri kvalifitseeruks 
funktsionaalselt samaväärseks eIDAS-e kvalifitseeritud e-allkirjaga isegi 
juhul, kui see ei vasta kõigile sellise allkirja vorminõuetele, kuid täidab 
nende nõuete eesmärke. 
• Artikkel IV: „Functional equivalence – an exploration through shortcomings 
to solutions“, milles uuritakse tehnoloogianeutraalsuse ja funktsionaalse 
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samaväärsuse põhimõtete alusel hajusraamatutehnoloogianeutraalse regu-
latsiooni kujundamisalternatiive, et lahendada eelnevates artiklites toodud 
näidete alusel tuvastatud tsentraliseeritud taristu eelistamisest tulenevat dis-
krimineerimist detsentraliseeritud ja hajustehnoloogiatel põhinevate raken-
duste vastu. Artiklis analüüsitakse üksikasjalikumalt funktsionaalse sama-
väärsuse alampõhimõtet ning selle kasutamist EL-i õiguse tõlgendamisel ja 
kohandamisel. Artiklis uuritakse funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhi-
mõttele tuginevat regulatsioonimudelit võttes eeskujuks isikuandmete kaitse 
üldmääruses (GDPR) kasutatud „lõimitud andmekaitse reguleerimismudel“. 
Viimane pigem kirjeldab oma regulatsioonis väärtusi ja eesmärke, selle 
asemel et keskenduda konkreetsele tehnilisele või korralduslikule taristu-
kesksele lahendusele ning seeläbi diskrimineerides kõiki teisi alternatiivseid 
lahendusi. 
 
Väitekirjas kasutatavad uurimismeetodid koosnevad õiguse uurimise meetoditest 
ja proaktiivsest meetodist, mille aluseks on Peter Seipeli pakutud lähenemisviisid 
infotehnoloogiaõigusele. Õiguse uurimise meetoditest kasutatakse esiteks kvali-
tatiivset süsteemse analüüsi meetodit, et kaardistada tehnoloogianeutraalsuse 
põhimõtte ja funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhimõtte sisu ja ulatus, võttes 
aluseks õigusaktid, kohtupraktika, õigusteooria ning muud teisesed allikad. 
Teiseks kasutatakse õigusdogmaatikat, et uurida positiivset õigust, tuvastamaks 
olemasolevad õigusnormid, mis kohalduvad valitud hajusraamatutehnoloogia 
kasutusjuhtudele. Dogmaatilist meetodit kombineeritakse kirjeldava (väline 
perspektiiv), hermeneutilise ja normatiivse (sisemine perspektiiv) uurimusega, s.t 
autor mitte üksnes ei kirjelda positiivset õigust, vaid tõlgendab selle teksti ning 
hindab seda. Ehkki autor ei kasuta väitekirjas võrdlevat meetodit, kasutab ta võrd-
lusi kui meetodit, võrreldes eri jurisdiktsioonide kohtupraktikat ja esitades mitmete 
jurisdiktsioonide õigusnorme, mille fookus on reguleerida hajusraamatutehno-
loogia kasutamist. 
Kuna hajusraamatutehnoloogia on uus ja arenev tehnoloogia, kasutatakse 
väitekirjas ka proaktiivset uurimismetoodikat uurimaks infotehnoloogiaõigusele 
omaselt takistusi klastrikeskselt ja kohaldades Peter Seipel’i eriteooria lähene-
misviisi. Klastrikeskne lähenemisviis võimaldab uurimuses süveneda vaid nen-
desse aspektidesse, mis tulenevad vaid konkreetse tehnoloogia kasutusjuhu puhul 
kohalduvast õigusest. Lähenemisviisi raames analüüsitakse eri õigusinstrumente, 
et tuvastada kasutusjuhule kohalduvad õigusnormid ning seejärel lahendada 
õigusnormide kohaldamisest tulenev tehnoloogia kasutusega seotud probleem, 
mis käesolevas väitekirjas on väljendatud õigusnormi sissekirjutatud eelarva-
musena hajusraamatutehnoloogia vastu. Seipel leiab, et viidatud lähenemisviis on 
funktsionaalne ning selle eesmärk on tuvastada õigusnormide lüngad ja puudused, 
pidades silmas konkreetset tehnoloogia kasutusjuhtu. Hajusraamatutehnoloogia 
konkreetsed kasutusjuhud määretlevad probleemide klastri, mis võib hõlmata nii 
regulatsiooni lünki, sissekirjutatud eelarvamusi kui ka puudusi, mis takistavad 
fookuses oleva tehnoloogia kasutuselevõttu. 
189 
Lõpetuseks käsitletakse klastri osas eriteooriale tuginevat lähenemisviisi. 
Sellesse käsitlusse kuuluvad teemad nõuavad õigusnormide ja nn. tööriistade ehk 
tehnoloogia kokkupuutepunktide analüüse ning see lähenemisviis ei rahuldu 
pelgalt olemasolevate õigusnormide analüüsiga, vaid nõuab ka nn. Tööriistade 
ehk tehnoloogia enda uurimist (inglise keeles „tools“ ehk tehnoloogiat ennast, 
jne). Autor kasutab eriteooria lähenemisviisi funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alam-
põhimõtte rakendamiseks hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhtudele. Eriteooria 
lähenemisviis hõlmab hajusraamatutehnoloogia funktsioonide analüüsi koos 
õigusnormidest tulenevate tööriista-kesksete nõuete analüüsiga. Selle analüüsi 
eesmärk on püüda mõista, kas hajusraamatutehnoloogia täidab või on suuteline 
täitma õigusnormides püstitatud eesmärke nii õigusnormides toodud tehnoloogia-
keskseid vorminõudeid täites või neid vorminõudeid täitmata. Seega kontrollib 
autor eriteooriale tugineva lähenemisviisi rakendamise abil hajusraamatutehno-
loogial põhineva lahenduse funktsionaalset samaväärsust õigusnormi loomisel 
arvestatud ja õigusnormides väljendatud tööriistakeskse lahenduse eesmärkide 
ning vorminõuetega. Selleks süveneb autor väitekirjas konkreetsel kasutusjuhul 
kohalduvate õigusnormidega kehtestatud nõuete eesmärkidesse ja kehtestatud 
vorminõuete põhjustesse. Eriteooriale tuginev lähenemisviis võimaldab tuvastada 
kohalduvates õigusaktides sisalduvad taristulikud eelarvamused olemasoleva 
lahenduse suhtes ning seda seetõttu ka eelistades. Selline tagajärg aga ei ole 
kooskõlas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttega. 
Väitekirjas kasutatavad peamised allikad olid tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhi-
mõtte kaardistamisel EL-i õiguse pinnal raamdirektiiv, NIS, isikuandmete kaitse 
üldmäärus, eIDAS ja EL-i uus digitaalse finantspaketi projekt koos EL-i kohtu-
praktika ning õigusteadusteostega. Sama põhimõtte kaardistamisel Eesti õiguse 
pinnal oli primaarne allikas elektroonilise side seadus. Lisaks dogmaatilise õigus-
alase uurimuse allikatena kasutas autor hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhtude 
keskseid kohalduvaid õigusnormikogumeid nii era- kui ka avalike õigusallikate 
hulgast. Näiteks bitimüntide kasutusjuhuga seoses uuritakse käibemaksu ja 
rahapesu tõkestamist puudutavaid õigusnorme rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise 
tõkestamise seaduse, rahapesu tõkestamise 5. direktiivi ja käibemaksudirektiivi 
alusel. Osanike nimekirja kasutusjuhuga seoses uuritakse ühinguõigust, eelkõige 
Eesti Vabariigi äriseadustikku. Protokollipõhiste tarkade hübriidlepingute 
kasutusjuhuga seoses uuritakse primaarselt elektroonilist allkirja reguleerivaid 
õigusnorme eIDAS-e alusel. 
Käesolevaga esitab autor kokkuvõtte uurimisprobleemidest ja väitekirjas 
toodud analüüsi pinnal tehtud järeldustest. 
 
 
1. Kuidas tuvastada olemasolevatesse õigusnormidesse sissekirjutatud eel-
arvamused hajusraamatutehnoloogia suhtes? 
 
Digimaailma loomisel tuvastas seadusandja võimaliku diskrimineerimisohu seoses 
digivormiga. Nimelt selgus, et digivormi koheldi ebavõrdselt võrreldes tollal 
harjumuspärase analoogvormiga, kuna digivormi suhtes oldi eelarvamustega, 
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mida kajastas ka regulatsioon. Selleks, et maandada nimetatud ebavõrdse kohtle-
mise riski ja eelarvamusi, peeti vajalikuks võtta kasutusele tehnoloogianeutraal-
suse põhimõte, mille eesmärk oli neutraliseerida analoogmaailma eelistamine 
riigivõimu poolt ning tagada digivormi võrdne kohtlemine regulatsiooni kaudu. 
Sellest kasvas välja üldine tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõte. 
 
 
1.1. Tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõte 
 
Arvestades tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte eesmärki, on selle põhimõtte 
kohaldamine hajusraamatutehnoloogia kontekstis sama asjakohane kui transfor-
matiivse innovatsiooni kontekstis, mille tingisid digimaailm ja interneti kasu-
tuselevõtt. Sarnane diskrimineerimisoht peitub ka hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasu-
tuselevõtu puhul. Et selle ohuga tegeleda ja võtta kasutusele ohtu minimeerivad 
meetmed, on esmalt vaja tuvastada asjaolud, mille tulemusena tekivad takistused 
innovatsioonile, ning seetõttu tuleb luua tingimused, mis maandavad tehnoloogia 
kasutuselevõttu takistavaid tegureid. Seega peab hajusraamatutehnoloogia 
põhjustatud transformatiivse innovatsiooni tõttu kontrollima olemasolevaid 
õigusnorme tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte alusel, et tuvastada, kas kehtiv 
õigus sisaldab eelarvamusi ja diskrimineerib hajusraamatutehnoloogiat. 
Tehnoloogianeutraalsus on põhimõte, mida peetakse info- ja kommunikat-
sioonitehnoloogiaõiguse (IKT-õiguse) ning ka tänapäevasema infotehnoloogia-
õiguse (IT-õiguse) lähtepunktiks. Tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte eesmärk 
on kaitsta innovatsiooni ja konkurentsi. Tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõte sar-
naneb paljuski soolise ja rassilise neutraalsuse põhimõttega ning selle eesmärk on 
tagada ühtlasi iga uue tehnoloogiaga arvestamine. Arvestamine väljendub siin-
kohal pigem selles, et seadusandja ei eelista ühtegi varasemat tehnoloogiat, 
võimaldades tehnoloogia kasutajal vabalt valida tehnoloogia ega diskrimineeri 
ühegi konkreetse tehnoloogia kasutust. 
See põhimõte pärineb 1990-ndatest ning on esindatud EL-i telekommu-
nikatsiooni direktiivides, nagu raamdirektiiv, juurdepääsu direktiiv, loadirektiiv, 
parema õigusloome direktiiv ja NIS-i direktiiv. Samas on põhimõtte eesmärk, 
kohelda erinevaid intellektuaalomandiõiguse väljendusvorme võrdselt, väljen-
datud ka InfoSoc direktiivis ja tarkvaradirektiivis ning elektroonilise lepingu-
vormi diskrimineerimiskeeld on väljendatud ka elektroonilise kaubanduse direk-
tiivis. Nii põhimõte kui ka funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhimõte on ära-
tuntavad ka riigihanke direktiivi põhjenduses 74 ning sama direktiivi võrdse 
kohtlemise, mittediskrimineerimise ja läbipaistvuse põhimõtetes – see on aru-
saadav, sest mingi konkreetse tehnoloogia eelistamise keeld riigihankemenetluses 
on kooskõlas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttega. Väitekirjas esitatud analüüs 
näitas, et põhimõtet mainitakse EL-i kohtukaasustes harva ja enamasti siiski ilma 
viiteta konkreetsele õigusallikale. Samas viitavad nii isikuandmete kaitse üld-
määruse (GDPR) kui ka veel trükimustad EL-i digitaalse finantspaketi määruste 
projektid tehnoloogianeutraalsusele kui oma eesmärgile ja suunisele. Selline 
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areng näitab, et põhimõtet ei saa enam seostada vaid IT-õigusega või IKT-
sektoriga, vaid see mõjutab kõiki valdkondi, kus on digitaalne element. 
Väitekirjas uuriti ka põhimõtte kajastamist Eesti õiguses ning autor tuvastas, 
et põhimõtet mainitakse vaid elektroonilise side seaduses (ESS). Samas jätab 
seadusandja isegi ESS-is põhimõtte defineerimata ning seletab seda teiste väär-
tuste kirjelduste kaudu eraldiseisvates sätetes. Nii nagu EL-i õiguses on ka põhi-
mõtte komponendid äratuntavad riigihangete seaduses ning selle pinnalt on 
põhimõtet käsitletud ka Eesti kohtulahendites. 
Uurides täpsemalt põhimõtte sisu, saab väitekirjas esitatu alusel järeldada, et 
põhimõte koosneb funktsionaalse samaväärsuse ja mõju samaväärsuse alampõhi-
mõtetest ning jätkusuutlikkuse eesmärgist. Väitekirjas süveneb autor pigem 
funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhimõtte tähendusse ja käsitleb mõju sama-
väärsust vaid funktsionaalse samaväärsuspõhimõtte nõutud tagajärjena. 
 
 
1.2. Funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhimõte 
 
Funktsionaalne samaväärsus on infotehnoloogia üks peamisi reguleerimismeeto-
deid. Seda alampõhimõtet kasutatakse õigusloomes sageli õigustusena, et laien-
dada kehtivaid õigusnorme uuele tehnoloogiale ilma uue tehnoloogia ja selle 
erinevuste piisava analüüsita. Väitekirjas esitatud analüüs aga kinnitas vastu-
pidiselt, et funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhimõtte eesmärk on hoopis suunata 
seadusandjat tuvastama õigusnormis sisalduvate nõuete eesmärke ning hindama, 
kas neid eesmärke on võimalik saavutada kasutades tehnoloogia enda omadusi . 
Et mõista, miks kehtiv õigus on selline, nagu see on (nt nõudes vahendaja olemas-
olu, registreerimist või keskregistrit), tuleks uurida konkreetsete nõuete seadus-
tamise ajal kasutatud mudeleid, protsesse ja lahendusi, et mõista, miks olid need 
nõuded vajalikud konkreetse õigusnormi eesmärgi täitmiseks. Selline analüüs 
aitab mõista õigusnormidesse sisseehitatud kallutatusi ja eelarvamusi ning paljas-
tab selged ja varjatud tunnused või funktsioonid, mille olemasolu õigusnormid 
eeldavad ja mis tihtipeale nõuavad uuele tehnoloogiale sobimatuid, korduvaid või 
ebavajalikke formaalsusi. Selliste formaalsuste täitmise jätkuv nõudmine võib 
uuendajat piirata innovaatilise tehnoloogia peamiste eeliste kasutamiselning 
takistada uue tehnoloogia kasutamist. Lisaks tuleb funktsionaalse samaväärsuse 
alampõhimõtte alusel seadusandjal veenduda, et formaalsuste nõudmine ei oleks 
diskrimineeriv ka tehnoloogia kasutajate harjumuste ja käitumise suhtes (nt tarkade 
lepingute kasutajad võivad soovida sõlmida elektroonilises vormis lepinguid ka 
anonüümselt). 
Väitekirjas esitatud kasutusjuhtude analüüsi põhjal jõudis autor järeldusele, et 
funktsionaalne samaväärsus nõuab näiteks ka seda, et riigivõim nii seadusandja 
kui ka täidesaatva ja kohtuvõimu rollis aktsepteeriks eri tehnoloogiakasutus-
juhtudel õigusnormis nõutust teistsugust lahendust, juhul kui selle teistsuguse 
lahenduse eesmärk on samaväärne normis nõutuga. Näiteks kolmanda hajus-
raamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhu puhul tuvastas autor, et elektrooniliste allkirjade 
osas vajaliku isikutuvastus nõude täitmiseks võiks aktsepteerida nii hajus-
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raamatutehnoloogias endas sisalduvaid kui ka sellest eraldiseisvaid funktsioone, 
sh võimaldades isikut tuvastada muude tõendite alusel, nagu IP-aadress, e-posti 
aadress, telefoninumber jne, või hoopis laiendades valiku- ja lepinguvabadust, 
võimaldades isikutuvastusest loobuda elektroonilises vormis lepingute puhul 
(anonüümsed elektroonilised lepingud jne). 
Autor leidis väitekirjas, et mõned õigusnormidest tulenevad nõuded (nt PKI-
mudelile tuginev isikusamasuse tuvastamise süsteem, mis on sätestatud eIDAS-e 
nõuetes) on tegelikkuses pelgalt „riskijuhtimise viis“, mille eesmärk on lepingu 
osapoolelt kõrvaldada isiku tuvastamise koorem, kuna see võib osutuda lepingu 
täitmise nõudmisel koormavaks. Siinkohal võib küsida, kas sellise riskijuhtimise 
eesmärk õigustab formaliseeritud õigusraamistikku, mis ei anna seda riski-
juhtimise valikuvabadust lepingupooltele. Arvestades tarkade hübriidlepingute 
kasutusjuhtu, on seadusandjal alati võimalus lubada lepingupooltel kasutada 
funktsionaalselt samaväärseid elektrooniliste lepingute sõlmimise tööriistu, 
tagades mõju samaväärsuse ka juhul, kui kasutajad ise soovivad võtta riske, mis 
tulenevad puuduvast isikusamasuse tuvastamise funktsioonist (nt elektroonilises 
vormis anonüümsed lepingud). 
Siinkohal tuleb arvestada, et isetäitva (self-executing) lepingu täitmisele 
pööramine on lihtsam kui mitteisetäitva (non-self-executing) lepingu täitmisele 
pööramine, isegi kui sellise lepingu puhul on täidetud isiku tuvastamise funkt-
sioon. Üks ei pruugi olla ilmtingimata parem alternatiiv kui teine pelgalt seetõttu, 
et kasutajad või seadusandja on selle alternatiiviga harjunud. Kui seadusandja 
eelistab üht lahendust teisele, tähendab see seda, et ta lubab enesele innovaatiliste 
lahenduste diskrimineerimist valikute põhjal, mis võivad kitsendada isiku valiku-
vabadust. 
Kõnealune alampõhimõte seab kahtluse alla igasuguse diskrimineerimise teatud 
olemasoleva lahenduse alusel ja nõuab, et seadusandja analüüsiks, kas uuenduslik 
lahendus suudab saavutada kehtiva õiguse nõuete eesmärgid funktsionaalselt 
samaväärselt, ilma et see lahendust täidaks kõiki vorminõudeid, mida kehtiv õigus 
ette näeb. 
Kuigi analüüs näitas, et seadusandjal ja kohtuvõimul on raskusi funktsionaalse 
samaväärsuse põhimõtte kohaldamisega, võib selle kohaldamine olla edukas, kui 
kaasata tehnoloogia ja selle funktsioonide hindamisse tehnikaeksperte. Lisaks 
saavad oma teadmisi jagada turuosalised, uuendajad ja huvirühmad, koostades 
eneseregulatsiooni standardeid, suuniseid või muid polütsentrilise koosregu-
leerimise väljendusi, mida saab esitada kirjaliku tekstina või lõimida koodipõhise 
lahendusena tarkvarasse (koodipõhine reguleerimine). 
Siinkohal uuris autor lähemalt, kuidas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtet ja 








1.3. Põhimõtte rakendamine funktsioonide analüüsi teel 
 
Selleks, et tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtet rakendada, on vaja teha nii funkt-
sioonide kui ka mõjude analüüs ning hinnata nõnda uue tehnoloogia kohtlemist 
olemasolevate õigusnormide alusel. Seega on tehtavas analüüsis kaks osa: 
 
(iii) et hinnata funktsionaalset samaväärsust, tuleb kõigepealt kaardistada uue 
tehnoloogia funktsioonid ning ka olemasolevate õigusnormide alusel 
nõutud funktsioonid ning nende nõuete ja funktsioonide eesmärgid; 
(iv) teiseks tuleb hinnata mõjude samaväärsust ehk seda, kas olemasolevates 
õigusnormides toodud nõuetele vastavus või nõuete eesmärkidele vastavus 
toob kaasa samaväärse mõju nii varasemale kui ka uuele tehnoloogiale, mis 
pruugib täita osa õigusnormides toodud nõudeid uuele tehnoloogiale 
omasel viisil. Mõju all peetakse siinkohal silmas nii instrumendi kehtivust, 
siduvust, heauskse omandamise võimalikkust, registrikande usaldus-
väärsust, tehingu vorminõuet, jms. 
 
Analüüsi raames kallutatuse või eelarvamuse tuvastamine sõltub sellest, kas 
analüüsija mõistab uut tehnoloogiat, selle toimimist, selle funktsioone ning nende 
funktsioonide eesmärke, olemasolevate õigusnormide mõju ning ka tehnoloogia-
neutraalsuse põhimõtet. Seega on olemasolevate õigusnormide puhul oluline, et 
kehtiv õigus oleks läbipaistev ja neutraalne ka uue tehnoloogia ja taristu suhtes. 
Kohtuasja Hedqvist analüüs näitas, et isegi kui õigusnormid ei ole koostatud 
tehnoloogianeutraalselt, saab neid tehnoloogianeutraalselt rakendada, kui seadus-
andja analüüsib tehnoloogia funktsioone, kasutab funktsionaalset tõlgendamist 
ning eraldab aega, et uurida tehnoloogia mõju, kehtiva õiguse eesmärke ja kehtiva 
õiguse mõju uuenduslikule lahendusele. See tähendab, et isegi „ootame-vaatame“ 
ja „kehtiva õiguse rakendamise“ regulatiivstrateegiat (mis ei pruugi olla tehno-
loogianeutraalne) saab rakendada tehnoloogianeutraalsel viisil juhul kui seadus-




2. Kuidas jätkusuutlikult tagada õigusnormide tehnoloogianeutraalsus 
hajusraamatutehnoloogia suhtes? 
 
Tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte oluline omadus on ühtlasi tagada õigus-
normide jätkusuutlikkus ja paindlikkus. Jätkusuutlikkust nimetatakse ka õigus-
aktide tulevikukindlaks muutmiseks või „pikaealisuse tagatiseks“. Sel põhjusel 
peaks tehnoloogia suhtes kohalduv õigusnorm olema piisavalt paindlik, et mitte 
takistada uue tehnoloogia kasutust või sama tehnoloogia uusi kasutusvõimalusi. 
Samal ajal tuleb arvestada, et mida abstraktsem on õigusnorm, seda ebakind-
lamad on selle adressaadid normi sisu ja sellest tulenevate kohustuste osas. Subsi-
diaarsuspõhimõttest tuleneb, et mida kõrgemal tasandil konkreetne õigusaktide 
hierarhias on, seda abstraktsemad ja jätkusuutlikumad peavad selle õigusnormid 
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olema, samas kui madalam tasand õigusaktide hierarhias koosneb vähem kest-
likest ja lünkade täitmiseks mõeldud suunistest, standarditest jms. 
Eelneva põhjal saab järeldada, et tehnoloogia neutraalsus peaks olema kehtiva 
õiguse tõlgendamist suunav meetod, sest see on osa teleoloogilisest meetodist. 
Ainus erinevus seisneb selles, et tõlgendamine peaks olema funktsionaal-teleo-
loogiline. Tõlgendaja peaks püüdma mõista kehtivas õiguses nõutud rakenduste 
või lahenduste funktsioone ja tõlgendama kehtivat õigust viisil, mis ei hinda 
funktsioone kui tööriistu, vaid peab suutma mõista nende funktsioonide eesmärke 
ning hindama, kas uus tehnoloogia suudab saavutada neid eesmärke sama-
väärselt. Sarnane lahendus on lisatud isikuandmete kaitse üldmäärusesse lõi-
mitud andmekaitse või lõimprivaatsuse (‘privacy-by-design’) regulatsiooni, mille 
kohaselt on sõnastatud küll andmekaitse eesmärgid, kuid tehnilised ja korral-
duslikud meetmed selle kaitse tagamiseks on jäetud kohustatud isikute endi 
valida. Selles lahenduses väljendubki tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõte. Lõim-
privaatsus kui regulatsiooni kujundusviis on n-ö avatud lahendus, mis ei omista 
asendamatut väärtust varasemale tehnoloogiale, ärimudelile või taristule, sest 
„sobivate tehniliste või korralduslike meetmete“ valik on selle olemasoleva turu-
osalise või uuendaja enda teha, kes peab pakkuma nõutud kaitset isikuandmete 
kaitse üldmääruse alusel. 
Tehnoloogia neutraalsuse põhimõttest saadakse sageli valesti aru. Põhimõtte 
eesmärk on piirata õigusnormide mõju tehnoloogia, tööriista või vormi valikule, 
rõhutades, et riigi asemel peab otsustama turg seda, milline tehnoloogia on turul 
edukas. Lisaks nimetatud põhimõte vaikimisi pigem piirab varasemat tehno-
loogiat silmas pidades väljatöötatud õigusnormide kohaldamist uuele tehno-
loogiale, isegi kui uuel tehnoloogial on sama otstarve või sarnased funktsioonid. 
Seega nimetatud põhimõte pigem pooldab eneseregulatsiooni kui sobimatu 
kehtiva regulatsiooni kohaldamist uutele tehnoloogiatele või olemasoleva tehno-
loogia uutele kasutusjuhtudele. 
Arvestades tehnoloogia kiiret arengut, tempoprobleemi (pacing problem) ja 
Collingridge’i dilemmat, saab vastuolu tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttega 
lahendada, kaaludes alternatiivseid regulatiivstrateegiaid, sh funktsionaalse sama-
väärsuse alampõhimõtte kasutamist ilma regulatsiooni ennast muutmata. Väite-
kirjas käsitleb autor sellist alternatiivi kui erandi mudelit (waiver model). Erandi 
mudelit kasutatakse pisut muudetud kujul ka digitaalse finantspaketi projektides, 
milles luuakse MIFID II ja Euroopa keskdepositooriumite määrusega (CSDR) 
määrustes toodud nõuetest hajusraamatutehnoloogia suhtes hulk erandeid, kuid 
seda vaid regulatiivse muudatuse teel. 
Autor järeldab, et arvestades tehnoloogiliste muudatuste kiirust, jätkub tehni-
liste lahenduste erinev de- ja rekonstrueerimine, mistõttu ei suuda tehnoloogia-
spetsiifiline staatiline õigus iialgi olla piisavalt paindlik kõigi uute tehnoloogiate 
suhtes. Seega on vaja üldisemat lähenemisviisi, mille puhul kasutatakse turul 
väljakujunenud või riigi kehtestatud standardeid (koosreguleerimine) või enese-
regulatsiooni suuniseid kõigi uudsete lahenduste puhul, et oleks tagatud nende 
õiglane kohtlemine. 
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Kui aga kasutada funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhimõtet korrektselt, siis 
on võimalik tagada õigusraamistiku piisav paindlikkus, mis võimaldab regulat-
sioonil kohaneda uuest rakendusest või tehnoloogiast tulenevate probleemidega, 
mida innovatsioon tekitab ja millele saab kiiresti reageerida, kasutades rea-
geerimisprotsessis eri huvirühmade abi. Alampõhimõttest lähtudes peab seadus-
andja normi luues läbi mõtlema ka selle, kuidas oleks võimalik tagada õigusnormi 
mõju samaväärsus juhul, kui funktsionaalne analüüs tuvastab rakenduse, mis on 
olemasolevate õigusnormide nõuete eesmärgiga samaväärne. Väitekirja kohaselt 
saab selle eesmärgi saavutamisse kaasata tehnoloogilise innovatsiooni eesliini 
osalisi ehk siis uuendajad endid, et kiiremini hinnata, mis lahendust saab pidada 
funktsionaalselt samaväärseks alternatiiviks ja millist mitte. Selline hindamis-
protsess võib toimuda nn liivakasti (sandbox) menetluse kaudu või ka polü-
tsentrilise koosreguleerimise mudeli kasutamise teel, mida väitekirjas ka põgusalt 
tutvustatakse. Samas ei saa siin rääkida ühestki konkreetsest toimivast reguleeri-
mismudelist, vaid pigem alternatiividest, mille vahel seadusandjal on võimalik 
valida, adresseerides tehnoloogianeutraalsusest tulenevaid nõudeid. 
Tehnoloogianeutraalsuse tagamine õigusnormides nõuab innovaatorite endi 
aktiivsust, et selgitada seadusandjale õigusnormide mõju samaväärsuse puudu-
seid või normides sisalduvaid eelarvamusi võimalike lahenduste kohta. Samuti 
nõuab põhimõte avatust, turuosalejate endi kehtestatud eneseregulatsiooni 
aktsepteerimist, standardite kehtestamist, eeskuju näitamist, mis võib olla esin-
datud ka hajusraamatutehnoloogiale omaselt protokollis endas või konsensus-
mehhanismis või võrgustiku valitsemisreeglites. Selliseid laiapõhjalisi regu-
leerimisstrateegiate alternatiive peab seadusandja kaaluma ka seepärast, et hajus-
raamatutehnoloogia on mitmeotstarbeline tehnoloogia (all-purpose technology), 
mida saab kasutada paljudes sektorites, rakendustes ja lahendustes ning mis toob 
kaasa vajaduse muuta õigusnorme paljudes õigusaktides ja võimaldada selle 
tehnoloogia kasutamist samaväärse mõjuga. See tähendab, et väitekirjas lähene-
takse regulatsiooni muutmise alternatiivsetele strateegiatele pigem fundamen-
taalsel tasandil ja ei laskuta teatava normi või õigusakti muutmise konkreetsetesse 
detailidesse eraldiseisvalt seega vältides fragmenteeritust. Selline valik on õigus-
tatud, et mõista hajusraamatutehnoloogia eripära ja suuremat pilti olemasolevate 
õigusnormide mõjust, millega seadusandja peaks uurima, et tagada tehnoloogia-
neutraalsus. See ei tähenda, et konkreetse õigusnormi või -akti funktsionaalne 
analüüs konkreetse kasutusjuhu puhul ei päädi konkreetsete muudatusettepane-
kutega, vaid pigem, et selle väitekirja eesmärk ei ole teha muudatusettepanekuid 
normi tasandil, mida rakendatakse kasutusjuhu puhul, vaid pakkuda alternatiive, 
kuidas oleks võimalik tagada õiguses hajusraamatutehnoloogia suhtes jätku-
suutlik neutraalsus, arvestades seda, mis tulemusi väitekirjas käsitletud kasutus-
juhtude analüüsid näitasid. Nagu öeldud, ei ole ka väitekirjas hajusraamatutehno-
loogia kasutusjuhtude osas kohalduv õigus mingi eraldi valdkond ja see tehno-
loogia ei ole eraldi reguleerimisobjekt. Samuti ei ole üksnes hajusraamatutehno-
loogia rakendustele suunatud õigusnormid või õigusakt otseselt tehnoloogia-
neutraalsuse põhimõttega vastuolus ja selle kinnituseks on ka EL-i digitaalse 
finantspaketi projektdokumentatsioon. 
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Sellest lähtuvalt käsitletakse väitekirjas varasemates hajusraamatutehnoloogia 




(ii) olemasolevate õigusnormide kohaldamine; 
(iii) olemasolevate õigusnormide muutmine. 
 
Need strateegiad võivad olla väljendatud eri mudelites, mida väitekirjas käsit-
letakse hajusraamatutehnoloogia kontekstis. Mudelite hulgas on nt erandi mudel, 
mida kohaldatakse siis kui funktsionaalne analüüs on tuvastanud, et uus tehno-
loogia suudab funktsionaalselt samaväärselt normi eesmärke saavutada ning 
peaks seega olema tagatud mõju samaväärsus isegi kui uus tehnoloogia kõiki 
õigusakti nõudeid ei täida . Kuid mudelite hulgas on ka GDPR-i lõimprivaatsuse 
mudel, funktsionaal-teleoloogiline tõlgendamismudel, UNCITRAL-i mudel ning 
olemasolevate õigusnormide muutmine eneseregulatsiooni ja polütsentrilise 
koosreguleerimise teel. Igal mudelil võivad olla oma puudused ja eelised nii 
neutraalsuse kui ka jätkusuutlikkuse osas, kuid nagu autor väitekirjas tuvastas, on 
vaata-ja-oota strateegia pigem olemasolevate õigusnormide kohaldamine, mitte 
eraldi strateegia, ning mudelid ise ei ole eksklusiivsed seega seadusandja pruugib 
kasutada mitut mudelit või strateegiat samaaegselt, leides sobiliku alternatiivi 
lähtuvalt tehnoloogia rakendus- ja kasutusjuhtudele. 
 
 
3. Kas autori valitud hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhtude suhtes kohal-
duvad õigusnormid on kooskõlas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttega? 
 
Väitekirjas analüüsitakse kolme hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhtu, et kont-
rollida, kas kehtivad õigusnormid on kooskõlas tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhi-
mõttega või valitseb hajusraamatutehnoloogia suhtes tehnoloogiline või taristust 
lähtuv kallutatus ehk eelarvamus. Kasutusjuhu analüüsis kasutab autor prob-
leemikogumi lähenemisviisi ja käsitleb kasutusjuhule kohalduvat kehtivat regu-
latsiooni, et kontrollida, kas see vastab tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttele. 




3.1 Kas rahapesutõkestamise regulatsioon Eestis ja selle rakendamine  
olid bitimündi ja selle kauplejate suhtes tehnoloogianeutraalne  
(de Voogd näitel) sarnaselt EL käibemaksu regulatsiooni rakendamisele 
bitimündi ja selle kauplejate osas (Hedqvist’i näitel)? 
 
Esimese vaadeldava kasutusjuhu puhul uurib autor bitimündi ja bitimüntide 
vahetusteenuse pakkujate kohtlemist võrreldes kehtiva vääringu ning selle 
vahetusteenuse pakkujate kohtlemisega analüüsides de Voogd ja Hedqvist 
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kohtuasju. Riigikohtu lahend de Voogd’i kohtuasjas tehti 2016. aasta 11. aprillil 
ja Euroopa Liidu Kohtu otsus Hedqvist’i kohtuasjas 2015. aasta 22. oktoobril (sh 
kohtujuristi arvamus samas kohtuasjas avaldati 2015. aasta 16. juulil). Seega 
analüüsib autor esimese kasutusjuhu raames 2015.–2016. aastal kehtinud rahapesu 
ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seaduse (RahaPTS) eri redaktsioone, raha-
pesu tõkestamise direktiivi eri redaktsioone ja EL käibemaksudirektiivi piiratud 
ulatuses. 
Hedqvist’i kohtuasjas järeldas Euroopa Liidu Kohus käibemaksudirektiivi 
artikli 135 lõike 1 punkti e alusel, et bitimünte ja nendega tehtud tehinguid tuleb 
kohelda käibemaksuga maksustamise mõttes võrdselt muude kehtiva vääringuga 
tehtud finantstehingutega, kuna kehtiv vääring ja bitimünt on nende kasutajatele 
funktsionaalselt samaväärsed. Lahend on seega kooskõlas tehnoloogianeutraal-
suse põhimõttega, sh selle põhimõtte funktsionaalse samaväärsuse alampõhi-
mõttega. 
Samas erines Hedqvist’ is toodud kohtu järeldus oluliselt järeldusest, milleni 
vaid aasta varem jõudis Euroopa Komisjoni käibemaksukomitee. Selleks et võtta 
Hedqvist’i asjas seisukoht, uurisid Euroopa Liidu Kohus, kohtujurist Kokott ja 
varem ka käibemaksukomitee põhjalikult bitimündi funktsioone ning võrdlesid 
neid kehtiva vääringu ehk riikliku valuuta funktsioonidega ja kohaldamisele 
kuuluva normi eesmärgiga. Kohtujurist Kokott järeldas, et vääringutel, mida 
kasutatakse maksevahendina, „ei ole põhimõtteliselt muud praktilise kasutamise 
võimalust kui maksevahendina kasutamine“ ja seepärast peaks „see, mis kehtib 
seaduslike maksevahendite kohta, kehtima ka muude maksevahendite kohta, 
mille funktsioon sellega ammendub“, sest „nad täidavad käibemaksu seisukohast 
sama ülesannet“. 
Hedqvist’ile eelnevates bitimündile kohalduva regulatsiooni analüüsides lähtus 
Euroopa Komisjoni käibemaksukomitee käibemaksudirektiivi artikli 135 lõike 1 
punkti e sõnastuse grammatilisest tõlgendusest, lubades terminoloogial piirata 
käibemaksudirektiivi mõju funktsionaalselt samaväärsete maksevahendite osas ja 
jättes selle tulemusel bitimündid normi kohaldamisulatusest välja. Toodud lähe-
nemisega jättis käibemaksukomitee kõrvale vastavate normide funktsionaalse ja 
teleoloogilise tõlgenduse ning tõlgendas maksevahendi erinevuste tõttu õigus-
normi bitimüntide suhtes diskrimineerival viisil. Samas liigitas Hedqvist’i otsuses 
toodud vastava normi tõlgendus bitimündid seaduslike maksevahenditega sama-
väärsete objektide hulka, mille tulemusena laiendas kohus tehnoloogianeutraal-
suse põhimõttega kooskõlas käibemaksudirektiivi artikli 135 lõike 1 punkti e 
kohaldamisala. Nagu juba ülal toodud, kinnitab ka käsitletud lahend, et seadus-
andlik, täitev- ja kohtuvõim peavad tegema tehnoloogia funktsioonide analüüsi, 
et kehtivat õigust tehnoloogianeutraalselt tõlgendada, ning liikuma õigusnormi 
grammatilisest tõlgendamisest ka funktsionaalse ja teleoloogilise tõlgendamise 
poole, hinnates ühtlasi õigusnormi kohaldamise mõju uue tehnoloogia ja biti-
müntide kasutusele. 
Kohtuasjas de Voogd leidis Riigikohus sel ajal kehtinud RahaPTS-i alusel, et 
„õigusnormi sõnastuse alusel loetakse krüptoraha vahetusteenuse pakkujaid 
kehtiva õiguse kohaselt alternatiivsete maksevahendite teenuse pakkujateks“. 
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Sellisele järeldusele jõudmiseks tuvastas Riigikohus mõned bitimündi omadused, 
näiteks i) bitimünte saab vahetada kehtiva vääringu vastu, ii) bitimüntide kaup-
lemiskeskkondades tekib neil rahaliselt mõõdetav kurss ning iii) neid saab 
kasutada kehtiva valuuta asemel ka tehingute eest tasumiseks. Seega, samamoodi 
nagu Euroopa Liidu Kohus Hedqvist’i asjas, leidis ka Riigikohus, et bitimüntide 
ainus funktsioon on nende kasutamine maksevahendina. Samas ei viidanud Riigi-
kohus de Voogd’i kohtuasjas Hedqvist’i lahendile ega selle lahendi kohtujuristi 
arvamusele ega põhjendanud ka, miks see lahend ei ole asjakohane või miks 
selles toodud samaväärsust ei saa de Voogdis kohaldada. Funktsionaalne analüüs 
bitimündi ja riikliku valuuta erinevuste kohta, mis võiks olla alus nende erinevale 
kohtlemisele, de Voogd’i lahendis puudub. Samuti ei kasutatud Riigikohtu lahen-
dis konkreetse õigusnormi funktsionaalset ja teleoloogilist tõlgendamist, et 
hinnata, kas enne hajusraamatutehnoloogia loomist jõustunud vastav RahaPTS-i 
norm on diskrimineeriv bitimüntide osas või hajusraamatutehnoloogia raken-
duste suhtes. 
Seega, olenemata asjaolust, et Riigikohus jõudis de Voogd’is bitimündi kasu-
tusotstarbe osas samale järeldusele nagu Euroopa Liidu Kohus Hedqvist’is – et 
bitimünte saab kasutada kehtiva valuuta asemel ka tehingute eest tasumiseks –, 
ei järeldanud kohus de Voogd’i kaasuses sarnaselt Hedqvist’iga, et bitimündid on 
funktsionaalselt samaväärsed kehtiva vääringuga ning nende kohtlemine peab 
seega olema kooskõlas kehtiva vääringu kohtlemisega. Selle asemel luges nii 
Politsei- ja Piirivalveameti Rahapesu Andmebüroo (RAB) kui ka Riigikohus, et 
bitimünt tuleb liigitada sui generis-kategooria „alternatiivne maksevahend“ alla 
ning seda tuleb kohelda teisiti kui kehtivat vääringut. 
Lahendi ajal kehtinud RahaPTS-is oli nimetatud kategooria sõnastatud väga 
üldiselt, defineerides RahaPTS-i § 6 lg 4 kohaselt alternatiivseid maksevahendeid 
kui „rahalise väärtusega vahendeid, mille abil on võimalik täita rahalisi kohustusi 
või mida saab vahetada kehtiva vääringu vastu“. Bitimüntide lugemine alter-
natiivsete maksevahendite hulka võimaldas kohelda nii neid ühikuid kui ka 
nendega kauplejaid teisiti kui riiklikku valuutat või sellega kauplejaid. Seega tõi 
selline kvalifikatsioon kaasa RahaPTS-i § 15 lg 8 alusel bitimüntidega kauplejate 
suhtes tunduvalt karmimate vastavusmeetmete (eelkõige näost näkku isikutuvas-
tamise nõue väga väikse tehinguväärtuse pealt) kohaldamise kui riikliku valuuta 
kauplejate suhtes. Seetõttu piiras bitimüntide liigitamine alternatiivseteks makse-
vahenditeks oluliselt bitimüntidega kauplejaid, mis bitimüntide kauplemise eri-
pärasid arvestades (tegu on globaalselt kasutatava digivormis maksevahendiga, 
mis võimaldab kaubelda pseudoanonüümselt) ajutiselt seiskas kogu sellega 
seotud äritegevuse Eesti turul. 
Tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte alusel tuleb kriitiliselt hinnata selliste 
uute sui generis-kategooriate teisiti kohtlemist kehtivast vääringust ja tuvastada, 
mis on teisiti kohtlemise eesmärk. Nagu eespool märgitud, tuleb sellesuunalise 
analüüsi tegemiseks tutvuda uue tehnoloogia funktsioonidega ning ühtlasi sea-
dusandja eesmärgiga õigusnormi loomisel, et mõista, kas õigusnormi funkt-
sionaal-teleoloogilise tõlgendamise tagajärjel on erinev kohtlemine põhjendatud, 
täitmaks seadusandja püstitatud eesmärki. Autorile jääb ebaselgeks ja de Voogd’i 
199 
lahendi alusel põhjendamatuks, miks Riigikohus eiras Euroopa Liidu Kohtu 
järeldust kehtiva vääringu ja bitimüntide funktsionaalse samaväärsuse kohta ning 
ei pidanud vajalikuks Hedqvist’i lahendit ega selles toodud järeldusi uurida ega 
hinnata. Lahendist jääb selgusetuks, kas Riigikohus leidis, et RahaPTS-ist ja selle 
§ 15 lg-st 8 tulenev alternatiivsete maksevahendite kehtivast vääringust erinev 
kohtlemine on Riigikohtu arvates kooskõlas Hedqvist’i lahendiga või mitte. 
Autori arvates oleks Hedqvist’i lahendist lähtudes saanud aktsepteerida bitimünte 
funktsionaalselt samaväärsena kehtiva vääringuna. Ühtlasi oleks pidanud tehno-
loogianeutraalselt põhjendama RahaPTS-i § 15 lg 8 alusel kehtiva vääringuga 
kauplejate suhtes oluliselt karmimate vastavusmeetmete kohaldamist, lähtudes 
seadusandja eesmärgist ja bitimüntidega seotud erinevustest. Tehnoloogianeut-
raalsus tähendab siinjuures seda, et bitimüntide teisiti kohtlemisel tuleb tagada, 
et erinevus ei tooks kaasa ebavõrdset kohtlemist, eelarvamusi uue tehnoloogia 
suhtes ega bitimüntide suhtes diskrimineerivat kohtlemist, kui see kohtlemis-
erinevus pole kooskõlas seadusandja eesmärgiga. Siinkohal on oluline rõhutada, 
et tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte järgi ei saa seadusandja seada eesmärgiks 
soodustada bitimüntidega kauplemise asemel kehtiva valuutaga kauplemist ja sel 
põhjusel luua viimastele soodsamad tingimused. 
de Voogd’i lahendi ajal kehtinud rahapesu tõkestamise direktiiv ei käsitlenud 
bitimünte ega olnud ka aluseks RahaPTS-i alternatiivse maksevahendi kate-
gooriale. Samas oli sel ajal kehtinud rahapesu tõkestamise direktiiv minimaalse 
harmoniseerimise direktiiv ning lubas liikmesriikidel kehtestada rangemad 
reeglid, et tegeleda suurte ohtudega, mida liikmesriigid peavad maandama riigi-
siseselt. Seega oli liikmesriikidel rahapesu tõkestamise direktiivi artikli 4 alusel 
õigus laiendada direktiivi kohaldamisala uute kohustatud isikute kategooriatega, 
teavitades sellest komisjoni. Nagu autor tuvastas de Voogd’i lahendis, ei olnud ka 
Riigikohus Eesti Vabariigi nimel teavitanud komisjoni uuest sui generis-kate-
gooriast. Samas leidis kohus, et mitteteavitamine „ei oma selle regulatsiooni 
kehtivuse ja kohaldatavuse aspektist tähendust“. Riigikohus pigem rõhutas, et 
sama direktiivi artikli 5 alusel võivad liikmesriigid „direktiiviga reguleeritud 
valdkonnas rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamiseks vastu võtta või 
kehtima jätta käesoleva direktiivi sätetest rangemad sätted“. Siinkohal pidas 
Riigikohus vajalikuks nentida, et „direktiivi artiklid 4 ja 5 on üheselt mõistetavad 
ning piisavalt selged. Seega esineb acte clair-olukord ning puudub alus ja vajadus 
küsida Euroopa Kohtult eelotsust.“ Selline järeldus tundub väitekirja autorile 
ootamatu olukorras, kus riigivõimu eri asutused kuulutasid avalikult, et biti-
müntidele ei kohaldu ühtegi normi; kus kohustatud isikute laiendamise aluses 
(artikkel 4) toodud teavitamiskohustust ei olnud järgitud; kus rangemad nõuded 
artikli 5 alusel olid kehtestatud vaid teatud rühmale (alternatiivne maksevahen-
diga kaupleja), tuues seega kaasa selle rühma ebavõrdse kohtlemise. Arvestades 
halduskohtumenetluse mittediskrimineerimise põhimõtet, proportsionaalsuse 
põhimõtet ja tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtet, oleks de Voogd’i lahendis 
Euroopa Kohtult eelotsuse küsimine artiklite 4 ja 5 kohta olnud kooskõlas haldus-
kohtumenetluse peamise eesmärgiga, milleks on isikute õiguste kaitse õigus-
vastase tegevuse eest täidesaatva võimu teostamisel. 
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Nagu öeldud, ei tuginenud alternatiivse maksevahendi erinev kohtlemine de 
Voogd’i menetlemise ajal kehtinud EL-i õigusele ega olnud kooskõlas ka raha-
pesu tõkestamise 5. direktiivi ettepaneku eesmärkidega, mis avalikustati 5. juulil 
2016. Autori hinnangul on oluline, et rahapesu tõkestamise 5. direktiivi ette-
panekus kinnitasid selle koostajad, et mitte ükski Euroopa Liidu liikmesriik ei ole 
kehtestanud bitimüntide ega üldisemalt virtuaalvääringute kohta õigusakte, mis 
reguleeriks rahapesu tõkestamist. See tähendab, et kuigi de Voogd’i kohtuasjas 
leidis Riigikohus laiendavalt tõlgendades, et rahapesu tõkestamise nõuded regu-
leerivad sui generis-kategooriat „alternatiivne maksevahend“, mis hõlmab ka 
bitimünte, ei peetud „alternatiivse maksevahendi“ kohta kehtestatud norme biti-
müntidele või üldisemalt virtuaalvääringutele suunatud normideks. 
Bitimündi riigisisese õiguse sui generis-kategooriasse paigutamise negatiivne 
mõju isikule seisneb seega rangemate vastavusnõuete kohaldamises. Arvestades 
kohtu pädevust selles asjas, jääb ebaselgeks, miks halduskohus ei nõustunud 
Hedqvist’i lahendist lähtuvalt selles toodud järeldusega funktsionaalse sama-
väärsuse kohta ja pidas seda ebaoluliseks ning miks jättis kohus Hedqvist’i lahendi 
järeldused tähelepanuta, kvalifitseerides bitimündid sui generis-kategooria alla. 
Kuigi Riigikohus leidis, et RahaPTS-is toodud alternatiivse maksevahendi 
kauplejate suhtes kohalduvate vastavusmeetmete tegelik mõju on ebaselge ja et 
seadusandja peaks põhjalikumalt hindama kõnealuste vastavusnõuete mõju, jättis 
Riigikohus autori hinnangul oma lahendis isiku õigused kaitsmata, eirates oma 
kohustust ise hinnata sätte mõju uuele tehnoloogiale ning kohaldada sätet 
tehnoloogianeutraalselt ja kooskõlas EL-i kohtupraktikaga. 
 
 
3.2. Kas Eesti äriseadustiku alusel osaühingu osanike nimekirja pidamine 
juhatuse poolt võimaldab seda pidada hajusraamatutehnoloogia baasil 
funktsionaalselt samaväärsena keskregistri poolt peetava nimekirjaga ja 
kas seadus tagab sellisele osanike nimekirja pidamisele tehnoloogia-
neutraalsuse põhimõttest lähtuvalt võrdse kohtlemise? 
 
Teine väitekirjas vaadeldav hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuht, mida käsitle-
takse põhjalikumalt artiklis II, keskendub osaühingu osanike nimekirja pida-
misele Eestis. Hajusraamatutehnoloogia on olemuslikult arvestusraamatu tehno-
loogia ja seega võiks eeldada, et seda sobiks kasutada ka igasuguste registrite ja 
nimekirjade pidamiseks, kus on oluline andmete terviklikkus ja muudatuste 
läbipaistvus. Seega on põhjendatud uurida, kas seda hajusraamatutehnoloogiat 
saaks kasutada osaühingute (OÜ) osanike nimekirjade pidamiseks. Eesti osa-
ühingu osanike nimekirja pidamiseks on ÄS-is väitekirja kirjutamise seisuga ette 
nähtud kaks võimalust: 
 
(i)  osad registreeritakse väärtpaberite keskregistris (EVK-s) – EVK-s regist-
reeritud osad – või 
(ii)  osanike nimekirja peab osaühingu juhatus – EVK-s registreerimata osad. 
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EVK-s on registreerinud osad vähem kui 5% OÜ-dest, mis tähendab, et 95% OÜ-
del peab osanike nimekirja juhatus. Sarnane süsteem, et osanike nimekirja peab 
juhatus, on ka ÜK-s, Soomes, Rootsis, Taanis, Lätis, Saksamaal ja Hollandis. ÄS 
ei nõua juhatuselt mingi tehnoloogia kasutamist osanike nimekirja pidamiseks. 
Kehtivad normid ei näi ka kohustavat juhatust täitma mingeid erifunktsioone selle 
nimekirja pidamiseks, muutes omakorda vastavad normid tehnoloogiast 
sõltumatuks. 
Samas sõltuvad osade võõrandamise nõuded osanike nimekirja pidajast. 
EVK-s registreerimata osade võõrandamise kohta kehtivad rangemad nõuded kui 
EVK-s registreeritud osade võõrandamise kohta. ÄS-i § 149 (4) alusel saab  
EVK-s registreerimata osi võõrandada üksnes notariaalselt tõestatud tehinguga, 
samas kui ÄS-i § 149 (5) alusel saab EVK-s registreeritud osi võõrandada mis 
tahes vormis tehinguga. Nimetatud nõudeid muudeti hiljuti riskikapitalisektori 
algatusel ning need jõustusid 01. augustil 2020 ja tõid kaasa teatud muudatused 
ka ÄS-i viidatud regulatsioonis. Muudatuste tulemusel nõutakse ÄS-i §-ga 149 
(4) vaid käsutustehingu notariaalset tõestamist ning kohustustehingud on vormi-
vabad. Lisaks saab OÜ ÄS-i § 149 (6) alusel teatud tingimuste täitmisel ka 
käsutustehingu vorminõuet oluliselt muuta, nimelt juhul, kui: 
 
(i) osakapital on vähemalt 10 000 eurot; 
(ii) osakapital on täies ulatuses sisse makstud; 
(iii) põhikirjaga loobutakse notariaalse tõestamise vorminõudest; 
(iv) põhikirja sellise kinnitamis- või muutmisotsuse poolt, millega loobutakse 
vorminõudest, peavad olema kõik osaühingu osanikud. 
 
Selliste tingimuste täitmisel kohaldub osa võõrandamise käsutustehingule vaid 
kirjalikku taasesitamist võimaldav vorm. Kuna ainult 9,6% OÜ-dest täidab 
praegu 10 000 euro suurust osakapitali nõuet, on see muudatus hetkeseisuga olu-
line üksnes nendele ning 85% OÜ-dest peab muutma nii kapitali kui ka põhikirja, 
et saada muudatuse mõjust osa. Seega on kasutusjuhu kirjelduses toodud 
erinevused siiski relevantsed. 
Seega nõuab kehtiv õigus teatud funktsioonide täitmist, mida seadusandja 
hinnangul saab teha vaid inimvahendaja (nt notar), tulenevalt sellest, kes on 
osanike nimekirja pidaja. Kehtiva õiguse alusel ei ole need funktsioonid ega 
notarist vahendaja vajalikud, kui osanike nimekirja peab EVK. Üksnes EVK 
kasutamise korral eeldatakse, et osanike nimekiri täidab teatud funktsioone, mis 
võimaldavad vormivabadust osa võõrandamisel. Kokkuvõttes tuleb nentida, et 
kehtiv õigus nõuab lisafunktsioonide täitmist, kui osanike nimekirja peab OÜ 
juhatus. Vorminõude mõju samaväärsus on seega seotud subjektiga, kes osanike 
nimekirja peab, mitte pidamisviisiga, sh sellega, mis funktsioone nimekirja 
pidamisel täidetakse või mis eesmärgid neil funktsioonidel on või mis väärtusi 
need funktsioonid kaitsevad. See omakorda tähendab, et kehtiv õigus on kallu-
tatud kesksete vahendajate (EVK, notarid) poole. 
Siinkohal on oluline nentida, et võõrandamise vorminõuded ei ole ainsad, mis 
nende kahe osanike nimekirja pidamisel erinevad. Väärtpaberite registri pidamise 
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seaduse § 9 (2) alusel saab registrile tuginedes heauskselt EVK-s registreeritud 
osi omandada. Sama heauskse omandamise võimalust EVK-s registreerimata 
osadele seadus ei võimalda. Nagu väitekirjas toodud näitab analüüs, et mõju 
samaväärsuse osanike nimekirja kannete konstitutiivse väärtuse mõistes tagab 
kehtiv õigus üksnes juhul, kui osanike nimekirja peab EVK, ning mõju sama-
väärsust ei omistata funktsionaalselt samaväärsele osanike nimekirja pidamise 
protsessile olukorras, kus selle pidaja ei ole taaskord EVK. Sellest tuleneb, et 
kehtiv õigus ei ole selle regulatsiooniga jätkusuutlik, kuna ÄS ei võimalda praegu 
innovatsiooni EVK-s registreerimata osanike nimekirja pidamise osas.Nagu 
öeldud, on hajusraamatutehnoloogia arvestusraamatu tehnoloogia ning sellel on 
teoreetiliselt funktsionaalsus, mis tagab usalduse, läbipaistvuse ja andmete kont-
rollimise võimaluse. See tähendab, et igal hajustehnoloogial põhineval osanike 
nimekirjal võivad olla olemas kõik funktsioonid, mida täidab EKV-s peetav 
osanike nimekiri. Kehtiv õigus ei piira juhatusel hajus- ega muu tehnoloogia 
kasutamist osanike nimekirja pidamiseks. Samas on kehtiv õigus tehnoloogiast 
sõltumatu ja ei nõua ega keela mis tahes tehnilise lahenduse kasutamist. Isegi 
juhul kui osanike nimekirja pidamisel kasutatakse tehnoloogiaid nagu nt. hajus-
raamatutehnoloogia siis olenemata selle pidamisel toimivatest funktsioonidest 
mõju samaväärsust ÄS ei taga. Kehtiv õigus ei tee vahet sellel, kuidas juhatus 
osanike nimekirja peab, kuna mõju samaväärsus on pelgalt subjektipõhine. Kehtiv 
õigus ei võimalda mõju samaväärsust. 
Juhatus saab küll valida tehnilised ja korralduslikud meetmed nimekirja pida-
miseks, ent seadusandja ei taga võrdset kohtlemist EVK-s registreeritud osadega 
olenemata neist meetmetest. Autor leiab, et kehtiv õigus ja ÄS-i hiljutised muuda-
tused ei anna osanikule võimalust valida võrdsete alternatiivide vahel, isegi kui 
kasutatakse hajusraamatutehnoloogiat või muu tehnoloogia põhist osanike 
nimekirja pidamise lahendust, mille funktsioone peetakse samaväärseks EVK-s 
registreeritud osade osanike nimekirja pidamisega. 
Seega viimastest muudatustest hoolimata oleks kehtiv õigus kooskõlas tehno-
loogianeutraalsuse põhimõttega vaid juhul, kui see sätestaks eesmärgid, mida 
osanike nimekiri peab saavutama, et olla EVK-s registreeritud osa suhtes peetava 
osanike nimekirjaga samaväärne. 
 
 
3.3. Kas hajusraamatutehnoloogial põhinevat allkirja targal lepingul  
saab lugeda funktsionaalselt samaväärseks eIDAS-e kvalifitseeritud 
elektroonilise allkirjaga ning kas eIDAS võimaldab seda allkirja 
tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttest lähtuvalt võrdselt kohelda? 
 
Kolmas hajusraamatu kasutusjuht, mida autor väitekirjas analüüsis, on seotud 
targa lepinguga, mis sõlmitakse esmasel mündipakkumisel (initial coin offering 
ehk ICO). Vastutasuks võõrandatud virtuaalvääringu eest emiteerib korraldaja 
tavaliselt münte (token) otse füüsilistele isikutele, kes pakkumises osalevad, ja 
kasutab selleks isetäitvat protokolli, mida nimetatakse targaks lepinguks. Väite-
kirjas uuris autor targaks lepinguks nimetatava koodi ja esmase mündipakkumise 
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muude tüüpelementide (esmase mündipakkumise korraldajalt avalikkusele tehtud 
pakkumus, pakkumusega nõustumus kasutaja poolt, vahendite ülekandmine 
pakkumise korraldajale; autor nimetab neid targaks hübriidlepinguks) kvalifit-
seerimist kehtiva õiguse alusel elektroonilist vormi lepinguks. 
Lepingu vorm on oluline, sest teatud vara või õiguste võõrandamiseks võidakse 
riigisisese õiguse järgi nõuda teatavat lepinguvormi. Esmase mündipakkumise 
korral emiteeritakse või võõrandatakse erinevaid õigusi väljendavaid münte. 
Maksimeerimaks võimalust, et neid lepinguid loetakse kehtivaks, on vaja aru 
saada, kas leping on sõlmitud korrektses vormis. 
Käesolevas doktoritöös uuris autor seda, kas esmase mündipakkumise raames 
sõlmitud tarku lepinguid saab Euroopa Liidu õiguse mõistes lugeda elektrooni-
lises vormis sõlmitud lepinguteks. Tarkade lepingute vastavat kvalifitseerimist 
lepinguvormide tüpoloogia alusel on nimetatud oluliseks õigusküsimuseks ka 
Euroopa Liidu plokiahela uuringus. Selleks, et lugeda lepingut elektroonilises 
vormis sõlmitud lepinguks, peab esmalt kontrollima, mis nõuded peavad olema 
selleks täidetud kehtiva riigisisese õiguse kohaselt, sest seda küsimust Euroopa 
Liidu õigus ei reguleeri. Selle kvalifikatsiooni seisukohast on oluline mitte üksnes 
lepinguõigus, vaid ka õigusnormid, mis reguleerivad elektroonilisi allkirju, kuna 
elektroonilised allkirjad peavad vastama teatud usaldustasemele (kvalifitseeritud 
elektrooniline allkiri), et lepinguvormi saaks kvalifitseerida elektrooniliseks. See-
pärast keskendub autor selle kasutusjuhu puhul Euroopa Liidu elektroonilise 
allkirja määruse eIDAS kohaldamisele, pidades silmas elektroonilist allkirja, mis 
on lisatud esmases mündipakkumises kasutatavale targale hübriidlepingule. 
Nagu ka väitekirjas toodud analüüs näitas, on eIDAS-e eesmärk harmoneerida 
elektrooniliste allkirjade regulatsiooni, et neid allkirju saaks usaldada piiriüleselt 
ning selle tulemusel võimaldada elektroonilisi tehinguid ja elektroonilist kauban-
dust. Lisaks on eIDAS-e eesmärk kohaldada tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtet 
tagamaks, et elektroonilisi tehinguid peetakse funktsionaalselt samaväärseks 
paberkandjal tehingutega. Iga kehtiv õigusakt on koostatud olemasoleva tehno-
loogia põhjal ja ka eIDAS on välja töötatud selleks, et seadustada protsess, kuidas 
elektrooniline allkirjastamine sel ajal praktikas toimis, ehk avaliku võtme taristu 
(Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)) mudelil. See tähendab, et kuigi eIDAS-t pee-
takse tehnoloogianeutraalseks, on see siiski rajatud PKI-mudelile ja määruse 
vastav regulatsioon pelgalt peidab PKI-mudeli terminoloogiliselt neutraalsemate 
terminite varju. 
Avaliku võtme taristu sõltub kontrollitud, s.o Euroopa usaldusnimekirja 
(European List of Trusted Lists (LOTL)) kantud allikate väljastatud digisertifi-
kaatidest ja krüptograafilistest võtmetest. Neid usaldusteenuse pakkujaid on vaja 
usaldada, sest nad väljastavad sertifikaate ja privaatvõtmeid kasutajatele, et kasu-
tajaid oleks võimalik seostada elektroonilise allkirjaga. See protsess on vajalik, 
et allkirja saaks pidada kvalifitseeritud elektrooniliseks allkirjaks, mis omakorda 
on vajalik selleks, et lepingut saaks lugeda elektroonilises vormis lepinguks. 
 Võrreldes PKI-taristuga on targas hübriidlepingus kasutatava hajusraamatu-
tehnoloogia alus teistmoodi usaldustaristu – selline, mis on ehitatud protokolli 
endasse ja selle valitsemise reeglitesse. Väitekirjas autori poolt esitatud 
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funktsionaalne analüüs näitas, et hajusraamatutehnoloogia põhiste elektrooniliste 
allkirjade usaldusväärsus ei sõltu usaldussertifikaatidest ega usaldusteenuse 
pakkuja väljastatud privaatvõtmetest just seepärast, et võtmed, mida kasutatakse 
hajusraamatutehnoloogiale tuginevas allkirjastamisprotsessis (olenevalt kasutaja 
eelistustest), väljastab protokoll otse kasutajale. Seega, erinevalt PKI-mudelist 
puudub hajusraamatutehnoloogia puhul vajadus usaldusväärse vahendaja või 
ametiasutuse järele, kes neid allkirjastamiseks vajalikke võtmeid keskselt väljas-
taks ja haldaks. 
Nagu väitekirjas kirjeldatud, on PKI-mudel ja hajusraamatutehnoloogial põhi-
nevaid süsteeme kasutavad allkirjastamisprotsessid tehniliselt üsna sarnased. 
Hajusraamatutehnoloogia kätkeb eri tehnoloogiaid, nagu krüptograafia, P2P-
võrgustikud, konsensusmehhanism ja lingitud ajatempliteenus, kasutamata seal-
juures tsentraliseeritud usaldusstruktuure, ent kasutades siiski paljuski sama 
tehnoloogiat kui PKI-mudelgi. Seda konteksti arvestades loob hajusraamatu-
tehnoloogia tehniline seadistus detsentraliseeritud usalduse ja kontrollitava proto-
kolli ilma, et oleks vaja kasutada LOTL-põhist tsentraliseeritud usaldusteenuse 
pakkujate süsteemi. See siiski ei tähenda, et kõikidele hajusraamatutehnoloogiat 
kasutavatele tarkade lepingute kasutajatele saaks kinnitada, et see protokoll on 
funktsionaalselt samaväärne eIDAS-e elektroonilise allkirja protokolli ja usaldus-
süsteemiga. See tähendab vaid seda, et eIDAS-e süsteem on kallutatud omistama 
kehtivust ja tunnustust vaid elektroonilistele allkirjadele, mis pärinevad usaldus-
teenuse pakkujatega seotud usaldussüsteemist ning seega vastavad eIDAS-es 
toodud nõuetele ja standarditele. 
Väitekirjas toodud analüüs näitas, et ainus funktsioon, mida hajusraamatu-
tehnoloogiale tuginevad targad hübriidlepingud ei täida, on allkirjaandja isiku-
tuvastus. Samas puudub eIDAS-es nõue, et isikusamasuse seostamine allkirja-
õigusliku isikuga peab olema allkirjastamistehnoloogia sisene võimekus ja et 
seda ei saa asendada lahendusega, mis suudab küll täita isikusamasuse tuvasta-
mise funktsiooni, kuid on allkirjastamistehnoloogiast eraldiseisev. Alternatiivina 
kirjeldatud lahendusele võiks seadusandja kaaluda tehinguvormi ajutisi staatusi 
ehk tehinguvormi fluiidsust, mille alusel vorm muutub, kui allkirja seos isikuga 
on tekkinud. Selline liberaliseerimine tuleks heaks kiita ka seetõttu, et mudelid, 
mis sõltuvad tsentraliseeritud isikusamasuse tuvastamise funktsioonist, on sise-
miselt haavatavad ühe sisemise tõrkepunkti (nt LOTL) olemasolu tõttu. Arves-
tades et analoogmaailmas lubatakse isikutevahelistes tehingutes anonüümseid või 
pseudonüümseid tehinguid, oleks ehk aeg võrdsustada need võimalused ka 
digimaailmas, muutes kehtivat õigust nii, et see võimaldaks esmaste mündi-
pakkumiste tarkade lepingute kasutajatel jääda anonüümseks või kasutada 
pseudonüümi, ent siiski sõlmida elektroonilises vormis lepinguid. 
Ülaltoodut arvestades leiab autor, et tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõttega on 
vastuolus igasugune õigusakt, mis ei taga mõju samaväärsust funktsionaalselt 





4. Tuvastatud eelarvamused 
 
Kokkuvõtteks näitavad hajusraamatutehnoloogia kasutusjuhud, et kehtiv õigus 
võib diskrimineerida innovaatilisi lahendusi ootamatutel viisidel: kohelda tehno-
loogia väljundit (bitimünti) diskrimineerivalt väljaandmisprotsessi tõttu (tsent-
raliseeritud vs. hajutatud), mitte omistada mõju samaväärsust funktsionaalselt 
samaväärsele tehnoloogilisele lahendusele põhjusel, et puudub tsentraliseeritud 
vahendaja või et usaldusallikas on midagi muud kui LOTL-i nimekirjas olevad 
usaldusteenuse pakkujad. Seetõttu, niikaua kui riigivõim ei püüa välja selgitada 
kehtiva õiguse negatiivset mõju uuele tehnoloogiale, ei ole selline diskrimi-
neerimine, kallutatus ega eelarvamused nähtavad, sest õigusnormi tekst võib olla 
tehnoloogiast sõltumatu (osanike nimekirja kasutusjuht) või grammatiliselt 
tehnoloogianeutraalne (eIDAS), ent neutraalse terminoloogia taga peituvad tege-
likkuses nõuded, mis on koostatud spetsiifilise tehnoloogia kujundatud tege-
likkuse alusel (avaliku võtme taristu mudel) ja mis ei taga mõju samaväärsust 
funktsionaalselt samaväärsetele tehnoloogiatele, kuna need ei kasuta keskset 
vahendajat (notar, väärtpaberite keskregister, LOTL-i usaldusteenuse pakkuja). 
Seadusandjad, kes kasutavad uue tehnoloogia saabumisel „ootame-vaatame“ 
või „kehtiva õiguse kohaldamise“ strateegiat, peaksid võtma seda järeldust hoia-
tusena, sest tehnoloogianeutraalsuse põhimõtte järgi peavad nad tegema märki-
misväärseid jõupingutusi, et püüda mõista seda uut tehnoloogiat ja selle laiemat 
konteksti, ning kohandama vähemasti kehtiva õiguse tõlgenduse selliseks, et see 
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